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This doctoral thesis consists of three articles: one literature overview and two empirical
articles. The fi rst article provides a literature overview about industrial diversifi cation, corpo-
rate acquisitions and the intersection of both research areas. This thesis secondly analyzes whe-
ther conglomerates invest externally differently from focused fi rms. This investigation provides 
new insights on the question how industrial diversifi cation infl uences corporate investment. It 
allows to draw conclusions whether internal investment is independent from external invest-
ment in diversifi ed fi rms, or whether weak internal investment in conglomerates is (at least par-
tially) offset by more effi cient external investment, or even whether value-destructive internal 
investment is accompanied by external investment eliciting the same effects. In this case weakly 
managed multi-segment fi rms could be also identifi ed by their behavior and success in corporate
acquisitions. Third, the thesis copes with the question how conglomerates are perceived and 
treated as potential targets of corporate acquisitions. This analysis adds further aspects to the 
question whether multi-segment fi rms are discounted due to their organizational form. Assu-
ming that the sum of the single segment of a diversifi ed company is higher valued than the con-
glomerate as a whole, one could expect that investors should strive to acquire such companies,
to dismantle them subsequently in order to create additional value by reshaping these
ineffi ciently composed entities. However, there are also contradicting effects of lower
synergies and higher integration costs compared to the acquisition of stand alone fi rms.
New insights in these discussions allow us to draw conclusions whether a diversifi cation
discount potentially being harvested by a bust up takeover outweighs lower synergies
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The impact of diversification has been intensely discussed in scientific research over
the last decades. Proponents of the ”conglomerate discount” stream (identified by Berger
and Ofek in their article ”Diversification’s effect on firm value” from 1995) state that
diversified firms destroy value through inefficient investment and lack of transparency
between their segments. As a consequence, the value of a conglomerate at the capital
market is 13-15% lower compared to a focused firm with similar characteristics.
Over the last years, however, there has been substantial academic critique on
the underlying hypothesis. Some researchers (e.g., Graham et al. in ”Does corporate
diversification destroy value?” in 2002), contradict the causality of the diversification
discount. They argue that the single segments of a conglomerate had been discounted
already before they were merged to a diversified firm. A further stream of academic
literature even suggests the absence of the conglomerate discount. Villalonga shows in
her article ”Diversification discount or premium? New evidence from the business infor-
mation tracking series” from 2004, by applying another database that diversified firms
are not discounted. Overall the impact of diversification on firm value and performance
is substantially contested in scientific conversation.
I do not aim to solve this conflict within my thesis. However, I strive to contribute
to this discussion by analyzing ramifications of industrial diversification, currently un-
tapped by academic research. Although many effects of diversification besides firm value
and performance, like cash holdings, financial constraints, productivity etc. have been
investigated in the past, several aspects of the impact of diversification on corporate
acquisitions are to the best of my knowledge currently undiscovered. By analyzing this
relationship I aim to contribute to several discussions.
First, I analyze whether conglomerates invest externally differently from focused
firms. This investigation provides new insights on the question how industrial diversi-
fication influences corporate investment. It allows to draw conclusions whether inter-
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nal investment is independent from external investment in diversified firms, or whether
weak internal investment in conglomerates is (at least partially) offset by more efficient
external investment, or even whether value-destructive internal investment is accom-
panied by external investment eliciting the same effects. In this case weakly managed
multi-segment firms could be also identified by their behavior and success in corporate
acquisitions.
Second, I analyze how conglomerates are perceived and treated as potential tar-
gets of corporate acquisitions. This analysis adds further aspects to the question whether
multi-segment firms are discounted due to their organizational form. Assuming that the
sum of the single segment of a diversified company is higher valued than the conglomer-
ate as a whole, one could expect that investors should strive to acquire such companies,
to dismantle them subsequently in order to create additional value by reshaping these
inefficiently composed entities. However, there are also contradicting effects of lower
synergies and higher integration costs compared to the acquisition of stand alone firms.
New insights in these discussions allow us to draw conclusions whether a diversification
discount potentially being harvested by a bust up takeover outweighs lower synergies
and higher integration costs.
Analyzing these topics provides further findings towards the scientific discussion
on the impact of diversification on corporate investment and firm value. Furthermore,
it suggests potential reasons why firms actively diversify and why some firms remain
diversified. My thesis also brings forward the discussion about factors that influence the
decision whether firms acquire and whether firms will be acquired. Moreover, it provides
an overview on recent research about industrial diversification, corporate acquisitions
and the intersection of both topics. Finally the results of my thesis also have some
practical implications. By identifying reasons for diversification, this work discusses
benefits for companies or their managers to diversify.
Approach
My doctoral thesis consists of three articles: one literature overview and two em-
pirical articles. The first article, which I have written as single author, ”Corporate
transactions and corporate diversification – an intersection to solve an age-old discus-
sion” provides a literature overview about industrial diversification, corporate acquisi-
tions and the intersection both research areas. This article aims to provide an update
on the most fundamental and the most recent results on scientific research regarding the
xiv
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above mentioned questions. Creating clarity on recent research helps to discover ques-
tions currently untapped by the scientific discussions. Moreover, it provides an overview
of state-of-the-art methodology, regarding econometrical approaches, database, sample
size and variables to be considered. As a lot a scientific articles cover similar questions
that I discuss in my thesis, the analysis of previous literature helps to determine an
appropriate number of observations and to identify the suitable ddependent, main ex-
planatory and most relevant control variables. Additionally, the literature review allows
deducting research hypotheses with a profound theoretical background. Finally, I could
identify research questions that have been uncovered by academic conversation so far.
Besides the literature overview, I have written two empirical articles with Prof.
Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler. Our first empirical article ”Value destruction inside or outside
the firm – are conglomerates better acquirers” investigates the differences, in terms of
probability, bid premium, method of payment and cumulative abnormal return, between
acquisitions done by stand alone firms and the ones done by diversified firms. In this
article we analyze the relationship between the organizational form and corporate invest-
ment. By doing so, we aim to answer the central question whether internal investment
efficiency (measured by a conglomerates excess value) is related to external investment
efficiency. Put differently, we strive to answer whether bad acquisition performance is
substitute, complement of or independent from inefficient internal investment.
Our paper is based on four central analyses. First, we determine the relation-
ship between acquisition likelihood and diversification. We analyze 27,000 firm years
between 2001 and 2008 in a worldwide sample. For this analysis, we apply a logistic
regression, which also allows us to calculate marginal effects and therewith to transpose
the coefficients from our regression into probability statements. Second, we analyze the
relationship between diversification and bid premiums. We analyze a sample of more
than 600 transactions from 2001 to 2008. Third, we analyze the relationship between
diversification and the method of payment. For this calculation we apply an ordered
logistic regression for 700 transactions from 2001 to 2008, with equity payment as 0,
cash payment as 2 and a mixture of both as 1. The last central analysis in our first
empirical article is the investigation of the relationship between diversification and the
cumulative abnormal return within the period of two days prior and two days after the
announcement of an acquisition. We estimate cumulative abnormal returns based on a
single-factor model. We compare the actual returns of the acquirer with its normal per-
formance between -504 and -252 days before the transaction by using the capital asset
pricing model proposed by Campell, Lo and MacKinlay in 1997. Again, we considered
xv
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700 transactions between 2001 and 2008.
Our major explanatory variables in both empirical articles capture diversification,
which is a binary variable, being 1 if a company reports segments in at least two different
Fama-French-48 industries and not generating more than 90% of its revenue in one
industry, and being 0 otherwise. The second major variable we apply captures higher
degree of diversification set equal to one if a company has to report segments in at
least three different industries. As we do not only want to estimate the impact of
diversification on external investment but also aim to discover the underlying reasons
for our results and perform robustness checks, we compute three further explanatory
variables. First, we compute a variable measuring the diversification discount, being
the interaction term between (strong) diversification and firms’ excess value. Second,
we calculate the variable investment, which we defined as CAPEX divided by total
operating assets deflated to the year 2001. Third, we compute the variable excess cash,
applying estimates from Sperling 2010.
As our first empirical paper covers the relationship between diversification and
investment, our second empirical article, ”Do acquirers of conglomerates benefit from the
diversification discount?” contributes to the scientific conversation about diversification
and firm value. Put differently, the first paper analyzes the role of a conglomerate as
subject in a corporate transaction whereas the second one investigates the role of a multi-
segment company as an object in an acquisition. Doing both, we obtain a comprehensive
picture about the impact of diversification on corporate transactions.
The second paper copes with the question whether acquirers of conglomerates
perceive and/or realize lower value creation compared to the takeover of focused firms.
We, therefore, examine whether diversified companies are more likely to be acquired
and whether acquirers pay a higher premium for multi-segment targets and yield higher
post-announcement returns. We use the same econometric tools as in our first empirical
article. We calculate the impact of diversification on the likelihood of being taken over
(using a logistic regression with the binary variable, being a target or not), on the
bid premium target shareholder receive and the cumulative abnormal return generated
by the acquirer. Also the key explanatory variables are similar, i.e. we apply the
variables diversification, strong diversification, conglomerate discount and excess cash.
Furthermore we introduce the variable segment match, which we define as the share of




With regards to the conclusion to be drawn from my thesis, one has to take into
account that, while considering a comprehensive sample of regions and industries (except
for the financial industry), we only observe the impact of diversification of a relatively
short period, i.e. eight years. As previous research has shown, relationships may change
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In this paper I provide an overview of the scientific literature about two
important areas of corporate finance and their intersection: industrial diver-
sification and corporate transactions. I find mixed results about diversifi-
cation’s impact on firm performance. The impact of diversification on firm
value, investment, financial constraints, agency conflicts, and information
asymmetry are controversial. The previous scientific conversation suggests
that the impact of diversification varies over time, region, industry, database
and applied methodology. The same picture holds for corporate transactions.
Acquisitions destroy value if they are large or driven by management hubris
or self-interest; however, a general assessment about the impact of mergers is
controversial. Although the intersection of both areas may reveal insightful




Most of the work in the USA in the 1990’s was done in a value-destructive environ-
ment. 50% of the U.S. employees worked from 1990 to 1996 in companies that destroyed
shareholder value.1 Put it differently, more than 85% of the top 500 U.S. firms applied a
value destructive strategy in 1992, as Montgomery (1994) exhibits. He further displays
that in 1992 almost 70% of the top 500 U.S. public companies report segments in more
than five different industries, according to 4-digit SIC2-codes. Examples of U.S. conglom-
erates are United Technologies, Honeywell, and General Electric. European diversified
firms are ThyssenKrupp, A.P. Moller-Maersk and Veolia Environnement. Conglomerates
also prevail in Asia, as the companies Matsushita Electric, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
and Hutchison Whampoa show. The majority of the U.S., European and Asian economy
is, however, only in an inefficient organizational environment if diversification is value
destructive. The question whether it is, is maybe one the most intensively discussed but
still unresolved issues in corporate finance. The discussion about the impact of diversifi-
cation concerns not only scientific theory but also corporate strategy. According to the
BostonConsultingGroup (2006), eight of the largest European conglomerates, like E.ON,
Norsk Hydro and TUI/Preussag, focused from 2002 to 2004. The report lists the most
popular objections against diversification mentioned by media and financial analysts.
The arguments are misallocation of capital, lack of transparency, and a too complex
organizational structure. On the other hand, better access to information, easy possibil-
ity of remedying absent transparency, and good opportunities to reduce the complexity
in multi-segment firms are encountered by defenders of a conglomerate organizational
structure. Thus, an answer whether diversification is deleterious, innocuous or beneficial
is of interest for theory and praxis.
Besides the organizational form and the corporate value, many further aspects
of drivers and impact of diversification have been examined for the last two decades.
E.g., the influence of diversification on investment efficiency,3 cash holdings,4 financial
constraints,5 productivity,6 agency conflicts,7 and information asymmetry8 has already
1 This data was collected by Villalonga (2000).
2 Standard industry classification.
3 See, e.g., Rajan et al. (2000)
4 See, e.g., Duchin (2010).
5 See, e.g., Bodnaruk et al. (2010).
6 See, e.g., Schoar (2002).
7 See, e.g., Amihud and Lev (1999).
8 See, e.g., Clarke et al. (2004).
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been researched. But the question whether a conglomerate destroys value due to its
organizational form is still controversial.
There is another topic in corporate finance, which is already deeply discussed
in scientific conversation: corporate acquisitions, their drivers, and their impact. De-
pendent on the sample, regarding region and time, there are different findings about
the overall acquisition success in terms of post-acquisition share price performance. 9
Furthermore, many relevant drivers of acquisitions itself and their success are already
identified. The intersection of both research areas is also partially analyzed. E.g., Tuch
and O’Sullivan (2007) find that diversifying mergers generate significantly lower returns
for the acquirer than transactions of firms which are in the same industry as the buyer.
In this paper I focus on the impact of diversification, drivers, and success of corporate
acquisitions and the intersection between both. The purpose of the paper is twofold:
first, I will provide an overview of the research about two of the most important fields
in corporate finance, i.e. I summarize the key findings and show the current state of
research. Second, I will show findings and potential implications of the intersection
between the two fields.
The impact of diversification as well as corporate transactions is for both research
areas controversial. Intensive effort has been put in answering the question whether di-
versification triggers lower firm valuation, inefficient investment, financial constraints,
agency conflicts, and information asymmetry. First, the answer depends on the time,
region, and industry. Second, the database used, methodology applied, and stakeholder
considered, substantially influence the answer of the overall question whether diversi-
fication destroys value. Further, I find that investment policy in conglomerates was
supposed to be inefficient, due to opaque business units and self-interested managers.
Previous research emphasizes sample selection bias, measurement errors, and no unused
promising investment opportunities as counterarguments to the thesis of inefficient in-
vestment in multi-segment firms. Moreover, I find that conglomerates are less prone to
financial constraints. The scientific findings about indicators about agency conflicts, in
terms of CEO compensation and corporate governance, and information asymmetry in
diversified firms are again contradicting.
The same mixed picture emerges when considering research about corporate
transactions. Scientific conversation provides varying answers about the overall im-
pact of acquisitions. Although there seems to be consent about the negative impact of
9 See, e.g., Moeller et al. (2005) and Martynova and Renneboog (2006).
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larger mergers and agency conflict driven deals, there is an ongoing debate about the
impact of other factors like method of payment etc. Corresponding to the controversial
debate about diversification and corporate transactions, the intersection between both
research areas also provides contradicting statements. One stream of literature suggests
that diversifying transactions destroy value and the bust-up of conglomerates is in the
interest of value-maximizing shareholders. The other main stream argues that there is
no evidence of value destruction due to diversifying mergers and, consequently, bust-ups
provide no arbitrage opportunities for the shareholders.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 1.2 I provide an overview of the
main findings in research about the impact of diversification on firm value and invest-
ment efficiency and show the current status of the discussion. Furthermore, I briefly
summarize the discussion about the association between diversification and further firm
characteristics. In section 1.3 I review the research about corporate acquisitions. I focus
on a broad overview of the overall impact of acquisitions on firm value, its key suc-
cess drivers and the factors that make acquisitions more or less likely. In section 1.4 I
show potential implications and findings of the intersection between diversification and
transactions. Summary and concluding remarks will be presented in section 1.5.
1.2. Impact of diversification
In this chapter I provide an overview of the main findings about conglomerates.
Research has covered many topics related to diversification and its impact. I will focus
on the scientific findings about the impact of diversification on firm value, investment
policy, cash holdings/financial constraints, agency conflicts, and information asymmetry.
Before I start the overview of the aftermaths of diversification, I briefly define
the common understanding of conglomerates in research and some points of criticism on
that understanding. A firm is generally considered as diversified if it operates in at least
two different industries.10 Most research uses Standard Industry Classification system
to distinguish between focused firms and diversified ones, as Fan and Lang (2000) argue.
Typically, previous research sets two thresholds for classifying a company as diversified:
first, a firm has to report segments in at least two different industries; second, no seg-
ment has to account for more than 90% of the firm’s materiality, which is e.g., sales or
10 In this paper I focus on industrial diversification, for the analysis of international diversification,
see e.g., Markides and Ittner (1992), Garrod and Rees (1998) or DosSantos et al. (2008), who find
that unrelated cross-border acquisitions lead to a significant lower firm value.
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assets.11 There is severe critique on SIC-based definition of diversification. For exam-
ple, Sambharya (2000) and Fan and Lang (2000) emphasize that SIC-based measures
inappropriately take relatedness into account since these measures are discrete and are
subject to errors like disregarding vertical relatedness. Some studies broaden the analysis
about diversification by applying variables that reflect different levels of diversification,
e.g., Herfindahl measures.12 Other studies apply the classification of Rumelt (1974) or
entropy measures. However, such measures require extensive information and are prone
to be questionably reliable, as Sambharya (2000) argues. The majority of the articles
that I present rely on the definition that classifies diversification as operating in different
industries with no segment accounting for more than 90% of the firm’s materiality.
1.2.1. Diversification and firm value
In this chapter I briefly describe the most relevant and influential recent findings
about the relationship between diversification and firm value. The scientific conversa-
tion about this topic can be clustered in three basic streams, as Martin and Sayrak
(2003) do. The first stream posits a negative impact of diversification on firm value.
The second stream also identifies a negative relationship between operating in different
industries and market valuations; however, advocates of this stream reverse the causality
between organizational form and share price development and claim that poor perfor-
mance triggers diversification. Proponents of the third stream identify no or even a
positive relationship between conglomerates and firm value.
One of the most cited studies about the relationship between diversification and
firm value stems from Berger and Ofek (1995). They identify a conglomerate discount
of 13-15%. Their discount calculation is based on the discrepancy between the market
value of the conglomerate and its so-called imputed value, which is the sum of the theo-
retical value of the firm’s business lines, if they were stand-alone. This theoretical value
in turn is based on Tobin’s Q of stand-alone firms of the same segment. They state that
diversification is the reason for this discount and argue that lower operating profitabil-
ity due to overinvestment and cross-subsidization of poorly performing business units is
the reason for this reduction and not outweighed by tax savings. Hence, they apply an
agency cost explanation for the diversification discount. These results confirm the find-
ing of Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) , who claim positive operating performance
11 See, e.g., Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lins and Servaes (1999).
12 See Gort (1962).
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effects for focused firms. The notion about the lower firm value due to diversification
has been widely accepted and confirmed by other research. Comment and Jarrell (1995)
and Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010) find a negative relationship between diversi-
fication and stock price performance.13 Schoar (2002) identifies a discount of 10% for
multi-segment firms. She emphasizes lower productivity as crucial driver for lower cor-
porate values induced by the decrease of productivity in incumbent plants and wage
increases for employees. Gomes and Livdan (2004) confirm the conglomerate discount
although they identify size differences and lower productivity of firms before diversifica-
tion as endogenous factors, which should at least partially explain the discount. Firms
in their sample recognize significant productivity losses after they expand, although non-
expanding focused firms were already more productive than diversified firms in advance
of their growth. Stowe and Xing (2006) attribute the discount to the lower growth op-
portunities, which multi-segment firm face already before the diversify; however, even
after controlling for that, the discount still remains, suggesting that growth opportuni-
ties are not mainly responsible for the valuation differences. At least for U.S. Fauver
et al. (2004) also find a conglomerate discount by applying a modified methodology of
Berger and Ofek (1995) to calculate firm’s excess value.
These findings are supported by another approach to measure the effect of di-
versification on firm value: testing the effects of diversification-reduction, i.e. bust-up
or corporate refocusing, on shareholder returns. Markides (1995) investigates the after-
maths of refocusing over-diversified firms. Over-diversified firms are, according to his
definition, companies that have the highest level of conglomeration in his sample, are
most diversified in their industry, or document the highest level of (un-)related diver-
sification. He finds that in 1980s refocusing of over-diversified firms was followed by
substantially higher returns on sales, assets, and equity. In contrary to these results,
supposed under-diversified firms documented no consistently (over all regressions) nega-
tive returns after their bust-up. Berger and Ofek (1999) examine a 7.3% abnormal return
on announcements of refocusing programs. The likelihood of such measures increases
with unrelated diversification, potentially inefficient capital expenditures, marked as un-
allocated headquarter expenses, and conglomerate discount. Burch and Nanda (2003)
identify significantly higher excess values after the reduction of industrial diversity, by
reconstructing the spin-offs after the divestiture and recalculating the excess value. Us-
ing a sample of spin-offs from 1979-1996, they calculate a median increase of 6.1%
13 See also Best et al. (2004) using the same approach as Berger and Ofek (1995) do for the calculation
of the excess value.
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combined-firm excess value. They draw the conclusion that the lower excess value is at
least partially entailed by the corporate structure and its ramifications on capital allo-
cation. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) also report a reduction of the discount after the
demerger of segments. This value increase is accompanied by an increased sensitivity
of investment expenditures to segment growth opportunities. Thus, they conclude that
the organizational structure has an impact on investment policy and therewith on firm
value. However, they still find a discount for the spin-offs, even for the now stand-alone
entities, after the reduction of the number of segments. Moreover, they argue that their
sample of 278 divestitures from 1983 to 1994 is prone to a self-selection bias. I.e. their
sample includes a disproportionately high number of conglomerates with inefficient cap-
ital allocation or investment structures. The argument of biased samples is one of the
major points of critique for researchers who argue that the causality of diversification
and lower firm values/poorer operating performance is reverse. Put it differently, they
suggest that worse performance leads to diversification and not the other way around.
Graham et al. (2002) are popular advocates of this argument. They use the
same approach as Berger and Ofek (1995) do and confirm the conglomerate discount.
However, they show that most of the discounted conglomerates consist of segments that
documented lower values already before their aggregation to a diversified firm. Further-
more, their results show that organic diversification is not associated with lower corpo-
rate values. Finally, they report that an increase of the number of segments solely due to
reporting changes does not lead to a lower market capitalization. Lang and Stulz (1994)
are also in line with this notion. While using a simplified approach compared to Berger
and Ofek (1995) to measure diversification discount, they show that conglomerates have
on average lower q ratios, which cannot solely be explained with industry effects, R&D
expenses, size and reporting biases. But they also support the finding that the lower q
ratios of conglomerates already existed before diversification. Hall (1995) tests the effect
of firm performance, applying return on assets, return on sales, and return on equity, on
diversification and the effect of diversification on firm performance. He finds that low
performance is a solid predictor of a firm’s decision about future diversification. Put it
differently, companies documenting weak returns are more likely to diversify. In contrast
to these results his second test, diversification’s impact on firm performance, provides no
significant results. Changes in the level of diversification (related and unrelated) are not
appropriate to draw inferences about future performance. Thus, Hall (1995) supports
the reverse causality explanation that poor performance triggers diversification.
Campa and Kedia (2002) add further aspects to this discussion. They explicitly
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test their relationship between diversification and firm value for endogeneity. First,
they analyze the emergence of multi-segment companies. Firms in industries with low
growth opportunities or high exit rates are more likely to diversify. Firms that start
to engage in different industries have higher values than entities that disappear but
lower values than corporates that remain focused. These findings clearly indicate a
self-selection bias. Controlling for these effects turns the original conglomerate discount
into a premium. Second, they examine causes of refocusing programs. They find that
the positive market reaction on divestitures by multi-segment corporates is driven by
firms reacting to shocks in their environment. Again, not diversification is the reason
for lower returns but rather exogenous events are responsible for the discount. Hyland
and Diltz (2002) find in there analysis further evidence that value destruction due to few
growth opportunities takes place before diversification and stops after the firm operates
in different industries, without facing further value loss.
The third line of conglomerate discount research questions the discount at all.
Research in this field tackles several starting-points for criticizing the calculation of the
conglomerate discount. I emphasize three of them: the data sample, the methodology,
and the selection of stakeholder for examining the impact of diversification.
One of the most prominent contributions that doubt the appropriateness of the
commonly used data sample stems from Villalonga (2004). She quotes three reasons for
her skepticism: first, all segments must meet the materiality condition of 10% (e.g., in
terms of asset size or revenues) to be reported as SIC segment. This condition implies
that segments with less than 10% of the total sales will not be considered and the true
state of diversification will be hidden if e.g., a firm operates in four industries with one
segment accounting for 75% of the sales and three segments each generating about 8%
of the total sales. Second, each company can decide on its own which segment to report
and which not. This degree of freedom may induce firms to hide successful segments to
prevent a more intensive competition in this business line. Third, she finds that firms
often change their segment reports although no real change occurred. To overcome these
obstacles, she uses another database, the Business Tracking Information Series (BITS).
This database includes data at the establishment level. Establishment is defined by
the United States Department of Labor as “a single physical location where business is
conducted or where services or industrial operations are performed”. Drawing the data
from this sample, she discovers that the diversification discount turns into a diversifica-
tion premium. However, unrelated diversification is still associated to a discount even
after applying the BITS database. Moreover, diversification discount is also dependent
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on time, region, and industry. Villalonga offers two explanations for her results. The
first one is partially in line with the findings of Berger and Ofek (1995), by attributing
the negative impact of diversification solely to the unrelated version. The fact that the
COMPUSTAT database, used e.g., by Berger and Ofek (1995), reports related diver-
sified units under one segment could provide an explanation for the different findings.
Her second explanation dissents negative impact of conglomerate organizational struc-
ture on firm performance. She argues that firms aggregate segments in a manner that
hides strongly performing business units.
Not only the database but also time, region, and industry have an impact on
the presence and the extent of the diversification discount. Servaes (1996) shows that
conglomerates had traded at a discount during the 1960’s, but also reports that this
discount disappeared at the beginning and in the middle of the 1970’s. The same re-
lationship could be observed between insider ownership and diversification. During the
1960’s firms with a large proportion of insider ownership had remained focused (while
discounts for multi-segment firms were high), but at the beginning of the 1970’s (while
the discount turned to zero) these firms started to diversify. He suggests that the market
assesses the advantages and disadvantages of diversification differently over time. Klein
(2001) finds reversed results, although he supports the notion of Servaes (1996) that the
conglomerate discount changes over time. Klein (2001) examines highly diversified firms
and their performance from 1966 to 1974. While conglomerates performed much worse
at the beginning of the 1970s they did similar or even better than focused firms in the
middle of the 1960s. The author conjectures that with increasing importance of exter-
nal capital markets the benefits of internal capital markets of multi-segment segment
firms became less relevant at the beginning of the 1970s. Moreover, typical drawbacks
of diversified firms, mentioned above, like inefficient investment due to inappropriate
information, rent-seeking of business unit managers etc., might have grown over time.
Finally, decreasing level of leverage of conglomerates, identified by the author, could
have diminished monitoring efficacy. Hubbard and Palia (1999) discuss reasons why di-
versifying mergers were value increasing in the 1960s. Weakly developed capital markets
triggered the expansion of internal capital markets through such mergers, allowing in-
vestment that would have been foregone if such transactions had not taken place. Put it
differently, financially unconstrained acquirers, assumed to have information advantages




Lins and Servaes (1999) examine the conglomerate discount in Germany, Japan,
and the United Kingdom by using the same approach as Berger and Ofek (1995) do.
Their results suggest substantial differences about the impact of diversification on firm
value. Operating in different industries has no impact on the share price in Germany,
significant but smaller effects on the discount in Japan compared to the USA, and sim-
ilar impact on the firm value in U.K. and the United States. The authors argue that
the institutional environment and corporate governance mechanisms vary over these
countries, triggering different opportunities for shareholders to influence the corporate
strategy. Accordingly, German firms with little insider ownership trade at a discount,
whereas in U.K. and Japan inside ownership does not influence share prices. Further,
Japanese companies belonging to an industrial group document lower firm value. Fau-
ver et al. (2004) also emphasize that the excess value of industrial diversification differs
over the countries in which they are computed. Whereas multi-segment firms trade at
a significant discount in the U.S., there is no evidence that firms in Germany or U.K.
operating in more than one industry face a lower corporate value than their stand-alone
peers. The absence of a conglomerate discount in Germany is confirmed by Rustige
and Grote (2009). Weiner (2005), however, examines a diversification discount of 6%
in Germany15 (when comparing German conglomerates with German focused firms and
a discount of even 20% when comparing German conglomerates to European focused
firms), by applying a modified valuation technique of Berger and Ofek (1995). Weiner
(2005) further argues that the change of conglomerate discount over his sample period
(from 1991 to 2003) can be partially explained with an increase of diversification. The
discount is at least partially due to weak corporate governance, which is listed in an
index of the Institutional Shareholder Service. Nachum (2004) identifies a positive rela-
tionship between diversification (up to a certain degree, depending of the country) and
performance in developing countries. This association is even stronger for unrelated hor-
izontal diversification and heavily depends on the region. Given the analysis about the
conglomerate discount in the USA, there are tremendous differences between developed
and developing countries. Fauver et al. (2004) synthesize that diversification is only
under certain conditions, regarding competition, regulatory environment, and the kind
of products and services produced value destructive but not in general.
14 The retention of target’s management to continue to run the operational business, shown by Hub-
bard and Palia (1999), provides further evidence that diversifying mergers mainly headed to over-
come financing barriers.
15 Analyzing all 30 DAX-listed companies.
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Jandik and Makhija (2005) show that conglomerates in the utilities sector traded
at a premium and were even after regulatory changes at least not discounted. The util-
ities industry characterized by severe regulatory constraints preventing free distribution
of profits tempted managers of stand-alone firms to overinvest in their business although
all value-increasing investment opportunities had already been exhausted. Though the
stand-alone discount disappeared after deregulation, no conglomerate discount emerged.
All of these contributions indicate dependence of the calculated impact of diversification
on the database, time period, region, and industry considered. These researchers suggest
that conglomerates are at the utmost only under specific conditions value destructive.
Besides the discussion about the data, there are also doubts about the methodol-
ogy used to identify the conglomerate discount. Bodnaruk et al. (2010) argue that the
interpretation of the results from Berger and Ofek (1995) should be vice versa. Whereas
Berger and Ofek (1995) conclude from the lower average q of multi-segment firms that it
has a lower firm value, Bodnaruk et al. (2010) argue that the lower Tobin’s q is a signal
of higher firm value. According to their analysis, conglomerates are significantly less
often affected by financial constraints. Consequently, diversified firms are in position to
run more value-increasing projects and are less often compelled to restrain to the most
profitable opportunities. Therefore, the market expects lower future growth as there
are fewer investment projects with an NPV greater 0 to be realized. They empirically
confirm their theory by providing evidence that a higher Tobin’s Q is related to more
financial constraints and a higher degree of cash availability goes along with a higher
likelihood of being diversified. The last effect is also tested for multi-segment firms and
still significant in the same direction.16
Sambharya (2000) attacks the validity of common (SIC-based or strategic) di-
versification measures.17 Therefore, firm value analyses based on these diversification
measures are overshadowed by doubts about preciseness or reliability. Another critique
on the common excess value calculation methodologies is mentioned by Erickson and
Whited (2005) . They find evidence that most of the q measures are of poor quality and
therefore inappropriate to examine the diversification discount. The true average of q
explains only two-third of the variation in its best proxy. Moreover, an adjustment of
these q measures reduces the number of observations in a way that the risk of a sample
selection bias becomes inadequately high. Custodio (2010) emphasizes the role of M&A
16 These findings are in contrast to the results of Lamont and Polk (2001). Conglomerates with lower
firm values have higher subsequent returns and vice versa.
17 See the discussion at the beginning of chapter 1.2.
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accounting on firm value. She argues that mergers heavily increase book value of assets
and cause therefore a drop of the buyer’s q. This effect combined with her argument
that conglomerates engage more often in corporate transactions drives the lower q of
firms that operate in different industries. After controlling for this bias by adjusting the
q for goodwill, she identifies no significant conglomerate discount anymore.
The third main critic on the common approach to identify the diversification
discount centers on the too narrow focus on the shareholder value. Mansi and Reeb
(2002) argue that diversification reduces shareholder value but increases bondholder
value. As the measures for the excess value calculation are based on the market value of
equity but only on the book value of debt, conglomerates are systematically undervalued
since the difference between market value of debt and its book value is significantly
larger for multi-segment firms than for stand-alone companies. After considering the
joint impact of diversification on shareholder and bondholder, the significance of the
relationship between diversification and firm value disappears.
To sum up I can say that not only the causality for the lower firm values of
conglomerates emerges controversial but also even the existence of the discount is. Lit-
erature suggests that diversification is not always associated with lower corporate values
and that the existence of such discounts depends to some extend on applied data sample,
methodology, and stakeholder considered. However, the mass of literature confirming
the diversification discount suggests that there is for the majority of the firms a signifi-
cant relationship between engagement in different industries and lower corporate value.
To gain further insights into the discussion about the causality I look at the impact of
diversification on further firm performance related characteristics.
1.2.2. Diversification and investment
The most common explanation for why diversification leads to lower firm value is
that conglomerates are supposed invest inefficiently. Berger and Ofek (1995) mention
overinvestment and subsidization of poorly performing segments as the key drivers for
the discount. The key assumption of this explanation is that internal capital markets are
inefficient in diversified firms. Previous research provides profound empirical support for
this assumption. Lamont (1997) examines the investment policy of subsidiaries whose
parent is in the oil industry. He finds that the cost of finance within the oil industry af-
fects the cost finance for subsidiaries that are not in the oil industry. Furthermore, large
reductions of cash flows oil industry segment entail decreased investments in the ana-
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lyzed subsidiaries that operate in other industries. The author confirms that segments
are interdependent and concludes that conglomerates overinvest and subsidize poorly
performing segments. Shin and Stulz (1998) suggest that internal capital markets in
diversified firms are inefficient. Although there is a significantly positive relationship be-
tween investment opportunities and actual investment, there is no evidence that a cash
flow decrease in a segment with good investment opportunities is compensated by capital
allocation from other segments with worse growth chances. Although segments with the
best investment opportunities have higher capital expenditures than those with worse
growth perspectives, the strong-perspective-segment investment sensitivity to cash flows
of other divisions does not distinguish from other business units’ CAPEX sensitivity to
cash flows of other divisions. Each segment must satisfy its cash demand by its own
cash flows.18 Gertner et al. (2002) find that the reduction of diversification has a posi-
tive impact on the efficiency of capital allocation. They show that spin-offs invest more
in line with their investment opportunities, hence, capital expenditures in high growth
segments increase and decrease in low growth segments after divestiture. This effect is
particularly strong if the divested segment is unrelated to its former parent. Neverthe-
less, the danger of sample selection bias exists when analyzing the investment policy
of conglomerates after divestitures, as the authors mention. Ahn et al. (2006) provide
further support for the thesis argued by the authors mentioned above. First, they iden-
tify a higher leverage ratio for multi-segment companies compared to stand-alone firms.
Second, they examine the impact of leverage on investment. High leverage should have a
positive impact for low q segments and firms (prevention of overinvestment) and rather
negative consequences for high q segments and firms. However, the positive impact of
leverage (for low q segments) is smaller in conglomerates than in stand-alone entities
and the negative impact of leverage is larger than in focused firms. They conclude that
the shortcomings of diversification offset the benefits of leverage.
Research about internal capital markets suggests two reasons why they are inef-
ficient in multi-segment firms. First, conglomerates are more prone to enterprise- and
segment-management self-interest. Second, limited information about segments’ prof-
itability and growth opportunities attenuates optimal investment in diversified firms.
Gertner et al. (1994) posit that internal capital markets in conglomerates reduce
the entrepreneurial incentives for segment managers since they do not have full control
over the capital. Hence, segment managers will be rewarded at maximum to a lower
extent compared to executives with full control over the capital. Rajan et al. (2000)
18 See also Doukas and Kan (2008).
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empirically confirm that capital is allocated and invested inefficiently in multi-segment
firms. They calculate the value of capital transfer by comparing each segment’s ratio of
invested capital to book value of assets with the industry average of this ratio. If the q
of the segment is larger than the average q of the firm, an above-industry investment to
assets ratio contributes positively to firm value and vice versa. The sum of each transfer
value per segment is the total conglomerate’s transfer value. Rajan et al. (2000) find that
this ratio is significantly negatively related to diversification. They identify two sources
for this observation: limited power and information of the headquarter officers about
efficient capital allocation and self-interest of business unit’s managers, who pursuit the
goal of power maximization. The notion of inefficient capital allocation in conglomerates
finds support by Scharfstein and Stein (2000). They argue that rent-seeking activities
are distinctive in poorly performing segments and CEOs rather increase budgets of these
segments than cash wages of its managers in order to avoid personnel costs.19 In this
case again self-interest of business unit managers is one source of inefficiency, but unlike
the reasoning of Rajan et al. (2000) it is also self-interest of headquarters’ officers
that enables inefficient investment. The extent of these inefficiencies increases with the
dispersion of segment performance and CEO weakness.
Harris et al. (1982) argue that differential information in multi-segment firms
cause information advantages for divisional managers and necessarily lead to information
asymmetry. Due to different preferences within the company it is not efficient to let
the divisions allocate the firm’s resources independently. As a consequence, pricing
schemes need to be introduced to overcome this trade-off. Goel et al. (2004) provide
further arguments for inefficient resource allocation in conglomerates. They assume
some divisions to be less informative than others. Furthermore, divisions dispose of
unobservable intangible assets. It is now in the interest of the top-executives to allocate
these resources to divisions that provide more information than others: top-executives
over-allocate (unobservable intangible) resources to the most transparent divisions and
causes or enforces diversification discount. This effect becomes more deleterious with
increasing variance of divisions’ transparency. Chang and Yu (2004) shed more light
on the opacity of segments in conglomerates. They posit that investment decisions by
19 He argues that the latter inefficiency can be explained by the self-interest of the CEO. He strives to
keep the wages in the firm low, and so the salaries of the segment management. Since investment
budget does not affect firm’s profits, larger CAPEX even for poorly performing segments does
not reduce firm’s earnings and therewith CEO’s compensation (at least in the short run). Hence,
increasing investment budgets for all segments to satisfy rent-seeking segment management is less
costly for the CEO than heightening wages.
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conglomerate are less efficient since they lack accurate indication from the stock market
about good investment opportunities in their business units. In contrast to a stand-
alone firm, which has per definition only one segment, stock market assesses the growth
opportunities for diversified firms as a whole but not per business unit. Wulf (2009)
combines the findings of Goel et al. (2004) and Chang and Yu (2004): the resource
allocation to segments depend on information either from segment management, which
are private but potentially distorted, or from public signals, which are reliable but noisy
and not exclusive. Since segment management has more power to distort information
in conglomerates, firm’s top-executives must put more weight on public information
if the interests of the divisional managers are not aligned with firm’s interest. Put
it differently, conglomerates relying strongly on public information are more likely to
suffer inefficient capital markets. Therefore, multi-segment firms are more likely failing
to recognize new and successful products and business ideas since they have a minor
focus on private information. Consequently, multi-segment firms have severe difficulties
to seize real growth opportunities, i.e. such opportunities not publicly known.
Recent scientific findings contradict a significant relationship between diversifi-
cation and inefficient capital allocation. The contribution to this dissent raises three
arguments against the findings that underpin the conviction of inefficient investment in
conglomerates. Former studies, first, often suffer a sample selection bias; second, are
prone to measurement errors; and third, do not take into account the advantages of
internal capital markets in conglomerates appropriately.
Chevalier (2000) picks up the discussion about the sample selection bias, already
emphasized by the proponents of the theory about cross-subsidization of poorly per-
forming segments. She investigates the investment behavior of acquirers and targets
before they merge. She finds that the acquirer and its target have the same investment
pattern prior and after the merger, although the investment of the acquirer and the
target should be independent before the transaction, whereas the investment of both
entities should not be independent after the acquistion. Thus, the results of e.g., Rajan
et al. (2000) are likely to suffer a sample selection bias. Matsusaka (2001) applies an
organizational-capabilities-based view on the discussion. He posits that each firm com-
mands organizational skills, generally held by top- and middle-management, which are
transferable. If a firm with strong organizational capabilities is in a declining industry,
it is a bad strategy to liquidate this firm and to forego these skills. In contrast, it is
a value-creating strategy to invest in new businesses and to transfer the organizational
capabilities, which are already built up. The author explains the diversification discount
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with an inefficient match of organizational skills and growth opportunities that entails
the decision to diversify. Hence, the sources of the discount exist already before the
diversification strategy starts.
Whited (2001) highlights typical measurement errors of the calculation of capital
transfers. He refutes inefficient investment in multi-segment firms. According to this
study, the usage of common q measures for determining the value of capital transfer
signals a lower positive relationship between investment opportunities and investment
in diversified firms. After the adjustment of the measurement error conceded to q by the
Erickson and Whited (2000) estimator, the differences of investment behavior between
conglomerates and their stand-alone peers disappear. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002)
find no evidence that diversified firms subsidize poorly performing segments. These
companies are on average less productive than their focused peers; however, this effect
is mainly triggered by the lower productivity of smaller and less relevant peripheral
segments. They show that segment growth is significantly positively related to pro-
ductivity. Hence, conglomerates invest the most in segments that perform best. They
support this conclusion with their finding that the largest segments dispose of the most
efficient plants.
In a further study Maksimovic and Phillips (2008) support their finding that
conglomerates do not subsidize poorly performing segments by highlighting advantages
of internal capital markets in multi-segment firms. He shows that generally capital
expenditures are similar in diversified and focused companies. Cash constraints reduce
the amount of investments in all segments, but the internal capital markets capital
markets of conglomerates reduces this alleviation and enables more beneficial investment.
This effect is particularly grave in high growth industries: conglomerates invest more
since poorly performing segments moderate financial dependence (i.e. cash flows are
smaller than cash spent). Consequently, these diversified corporates open more plants
in growth industries, but are less likely to close plants in loss-making business areas. I
will discuss the link between organizational form and financial constraints in the next
sub-chapter more detailed.
Glaser and Sautner (2007) support the findings of both streams of literature
examining the impact of the relationship between investment and organizational form.
They consider one conglomerate to examine its efficiency of resource allocation. They
show that the realized investment is inefficient since the capital expenditures per segment
depend significantly more on segments’ own cash flows than on the cash flows of the other
segments. The planned investment scheme instead is efficient. The difference between
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the planned and the realized cash flows can be attributed to unexpected cash windfalls
and the bargaining power of the business units’ managers. Assuming generalizability
of their results one can argue that diversified firms only invest inefficiently in case of
unexpected cash windfalls. Blanchard et al. (1994) show that inefficient use of cash
windfalls is likely to be a general phenomenon not only restricted to multi-segment
companies.
To sum up I can say that the impact of industrial diversification on firms’ in-
vestment is controversially discussed in scientific research. Hence, one of the major
reasons for the contested existence of diversification discount is disputed itself. I, there-
fore, investigate scientific literature about the impact of diversification on further firm
characteristics.
1.2.3. Diversification and further firm characteristics.
Diversification and cash/financial constraints
As Glaser (2007) and Sauter in their study indicate, the availability of cash and
financial constraints may play an important role for value destruction or creation in
conglomerates. Before I scrutinize the literature about the impact of the organizational
form on cash holdings and financial constraints, I examine the relevance of both factors.
Excursus: The relevance of cash holdings and financial constraints
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) the only relevant question for the re-
alization of an investment project is whether it increases the market value of the firm.
Under this condition, the availability of excess cash does not lead to any value-decreasing
investment and financial constraints do not exist. Therefore, no value-increasing invest-
ment project fails due to a lack financial viability. However, this theorem does not bear
up against empirical investigation. Both cash holdings and financial constraints are
decisive for investment and therewith firm value.
Jensen (1986) pronounces the value-destructive potential of excess cash. He ar-
gues that firms with large free cash holdings and few growth opportunities are likely
to initiate value-destroying acquisitions. Harford (1999) confirms this observation. He
identifies a model for the determination of a firm’s normal cash holdings. Firms with
cash holdings that exceed their calculated normal level are more likely to make acqui-
sitions. Moreover, these transactions decrease the acquirer’s firm value. Blanchard et
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al. (1994) analyze the behavior of firms that receive unexpected cash windfalls that
are not related to their operating business. They show that the perfect capital market
model by Modigliani and Miller (1958) does not hold. Instead of distributing the cash to
shareholder, the expected reaction under a perfect capital market model, managers keep
the cash inside the firm and partially trigger value-reducing activities. Some managers
commanding unexpected resources try to entrench themselves and to ensure the inde-
pendence of their firms, for example by acquiring entities in unrelated industries. But
even the value-increasing activities the authors list, e.g., discontinuing loss-making divi-
sions, are an indication for the importance of cash since these activities were not possible
to undertake without the cash windfalls. Further support comes from Oler and Picconi
(2009). They examine that cash-hoarding firms significantly underperform. Hence, the
market expects inefficient investment or subsidization of poorly performing operating
activities. This effect finds further support by significantly decreasing share prices after
a reduction of the cash hoardings, signaling an inefficient use of the abundant resources.
There are also empirical findings that highlight the positive aspects of large or
excess cash holdings, but though confirm that cash is a relevant factor for firm success.
Opler et al. (1999) find that firms with good growth opportunities hold more cash, not
spent for unnecessary (and therewith inefficient) investment. Pinkowitz and Williamson
(2002) show that the market reaction to cash holdings depends on growth opportu-
nities and financial constraints. They infer that large cash holdings entail profitable
investment in an economically dynamic environment. Furthermore, non-U.S. firms that
cross-list in U.S. face a valuation premium upon their excess cash. This emphasis on
the positive aftermaths of excess cash by Fresard and Salva (2009) goes along with the
findings of Fresard (2010), denoting that excess cash can even constitute a competitive
advantage. He shows that firms with large cash holdings, relative to their competitors,
document an increase of market share, corporate value, and operating performance. He
conjectures that the obstruction of market entries by potential rivals and the distortion
of investment and acquisition activities cause these benefits. Huang and Wang (2009)
identify a positive impact of cash on return on assets and on the share price develop-
ment of a firm. Bates et al. (2009) examine the heavy increase of cash holdings of U.S.
firms from 1980 through 2006.20 The increase of the cash ratio was mainly driven by
firms not paying dividends, recently publicly listing, and facing increasing volatile prof-
its. Responsible for that increase were lower inventories, higher cash flow risk, minor
capital expenditures, and superior R&D expenditures. Thus, changes in firm charac-
20 Average cash ratio soared from 10.5% in 1980 to 23.2% in 2006.
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teristics and market risks instead of agency conflicts explain the rising cash holdings.
As discussed above the impact of cash holdings on shareholders’ wealth is controversial.
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) point a solution out of this debate. They find that the value
of cash holdings is significantly discounted in countries with poor investor protection.
The authors examine the impact of liquid assets on firm value for minority shareholder
over a sample 35 countries, including those with good investor protection and those
with weak shareholder rights. Minority shareholder value liquid assets (dividends) much
lower (higher) in countries with worse investor protection and vice versa. Thus, the
impact of partially cash holdings depends on shareholder rights, corporate governance,
and investor protection.
After I outlined that cash holdings are important for corporate performance,
I present an overview of the existence and the consequences of financial constraints.
Fazzari et al. (1988) show that financial constraints substantially influence firm’s in-
vestment. According to them, cash flow sensitivity increases with declining internal
financial resources. Lamont and Polk (2001) find that financially constrained firms earn
lower returns and therefore face lower market valuations. Based on Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) they use five measures for identifying financially constrained firms: cash flow to
total capital, market to book ratio, debt to total capital, dividends to total capital, and
cash holdings to total capital. Using these measures, they consider 33% of their obser-
vations as financially constrained, compared to Kaplan and Zingales (1997), classifying
15% of their sample as constrained. The application of the methodology by Whited
and Wu (2006) confirms the existence of financial constraints. Almeida et al. (2004)
show that financially constrained firms need more cash to generate higher cash flows,
whereas financially unconstrained firms do not. Denis and Siblikov (2010) suggest that
financially constrained firms need to have higher cash holdings to realize value-increasing
investment projects. Hahn and Lee (2009) support these results: more internal funds
and higher debt capacity is associated with more investment and higher stock returns.21
The literature about cash holdings and financial constraints provides strong in-
dication that both are very important for investment and firm value. Whereas the
existence and the negative impact of financial constraints seem to be unambiguous, the
role of cash is inconclusive but crucial. Excess cash in mature industries appears to be
value destructive. Large cash holdings in high growth industries and/or in firms with
21 Massa and Zhang (2009) contribute details to one aspect of the discussion. They introduce the
concept of financial inflexibility, which they define as a regional imbalance between bank and
bond financing. Their results indicate the same as those of Denis and Siblikov (2010): financially
inflexible firms have a higher sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flow.
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financial constraints, however, are associated with better corporate performance.
Diversification and cash holdings/financial constraints
After I outlined the high relevance of cash holdings and financial constraints,
I discuss their dependence on the organizational form of a company. Levy and Sar-
nat (1970) hypothesize that, under the assumption of an imperfect capital market, the
independence or the negative correlation between the segments’ earnings reduces the
overall variance of a firm’s earnings and therewith increases its financial stability. In the
sample of Duchin (2010) diversified firms hold only about half as much cash as stand-
alone companies do. The consequences of this austerity would be negative if not all
value-increasing investment projects could be realized. However, the results of Duchin
(2010) suggest the opposite. Conglomerates’ lower cash holdings result from the com-
pensation of financing gaps (low cash holdings vs. many growth opportunities) in some
segments by large (excess) cash holdings combined with lower growth opportunities in
other segments. Therefore, less precautionary cash holdings are required and less value-
destructive investments are possible. Furthermore, the likelihood of financial constraints
(i.e. financing gaps) is also lower. He concludes that lower cash holdings can be seen as
a sign of efficient resource allocation in multi-segment firms since less liquid resources
appear mostly in well-governed conglomerates.
Further studies posit and document that conglomerates are less prone to financial
constraints than stand-alone companies. Bodnaruk et al. (2010) empirically confirm that
financial constraints are significantly highly negatively related to the likelihood of being
diversified. A further reason for that observation raises Hadlock et al. (2001), who
report less negative market response to equity issuance by multi-segment firms than by
stand-alone organizations. Since capital markets believe that conglomerates distribute
only internally inefficiently but not externally generated funds, as the authors claim,
multi-segment firms benefit in external financing situations.
The minor exposure of conglomerates to financial constraints become particularly
pronounced in times of overall liquidity shortages. According to Kuppuswamy and Vil-
lalonga (2010), the internal capital market of multi-segment firms has been particularly
value-creative during the financial crisis between 2008 and 2009 since conglomerates
received external funds more easily (“more money effect”) and could afford promising
projects by reallocating internal funds (“smarter money effect”), especially if firms were
at least partially industrially diversified and not pure financial conglomerates. Yan et
al. (2010) endorse Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010) by figuring out that in periods
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of weak external capital markets (ECM) conglomerates do not only benefit from easier
access to ECMs but also from their internal capital market, which becomes even more
efficient during weak ECM conditions.22 Whereas stand-alone corporates reduce their
investment if the ECM is weak, their diversified counterparts do not alter their CAPEX.
Moreover, conglomerates’ internal capital market becomes even more efficient if ECM
is weak. Therefore, multi-segment companies document a less severe reduction of its
firm value in external financing crises than focused entities. Campello (2002) examines
internal capital markets in financial conglomerates. The impact of weak external cap-
ital market conditions, e.g., due the tight monetary policy, is less severe in financial
conglomerates than in financial stand-alone entities. The dependence of a bank’s loan
policy on its own cash flows is lower in case diversification compared to banks operating
on a stand-alone base.
Conglomerates are not only less exposed to financial constraints but also suffer
lower risk of bankruptcy, as Rose (1992) models. Dawley et al. (2003) go one step
further in their analysis. They find evidence that a higher level of diversification leads
to a greater chance to survive bankruptcy, although it takes a longer time for them to
recover. Larger firms benefit in terms of lower bankruptcy risks and shorter recovery
times. If large firms are relatedly diversified, they benefit most.
Whereas the relationship between diversification and firm value and efficient in-
vestment is controversial, the impact of conglomeration and cash holdings/financing gaps
is much more distinct. Multi-segment firms have lower cash holdings and are less often
confronted with financial constraints. Nevertheless, the substantial research about the
value-destructive implications may have other reasons: agency conflicts and information
asymmetry. I provide an overview of the findings about both topics within the next two
sub-sections.
Diversification and agency conflicts
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) , an agency relationship exists when “one
person (the principal) engages another person (the agent) to perform some services on
their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”.23
They further argue that, under the assumption that both parties maximize their utility,
22 Conglomerates seem to have better access to debt capital markets not only during crises, given the
results of Duchin (2010) that these companies generally have a higher leverage ratio.
23 See Jensen and Meckling (1976): Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and
ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4), p. 308.
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the agent is likely to act not always in the interest of the principal. Costs from the
divergence of interests are then the sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual
loss. Monitoring costs are necessary to observe the agents activities, bonding costs are
incentives for the agent to act in the interest of the principal, and residual loss is costs
to the principal that occur if the agent does not act in line with the principal’s interests.
The latter has attracted most attention by research in the past.
Besides the articles mentioned above,24 Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) pretend
that conglomeration causes agency conflicts25 and posit that managers initiate firm di-
versification to do both: reducing their exposure to bankruptcy or low profit risk and
gaining private benefits like increasing resources under control and management en-
trenchment. Consequently, managers’ incentives like partial equity compensation in-
stead of pure cash payouts rather increase diversification. A typical consequence of the
residual loss is over- or underinvestment, following Bebchuk and Stole (1993). Since I
already discussed investment policy in the previous sub-chapters, I focus in this sub-
chapter on two indicators of agency conflicts: inappropriate top-executive compensation
and weak corporate governance. Therefore, I, first, provide an overview of the key ar-
ticles about the relationship between diversification and CEO payment and, second,
summarize literature about conglomerates and their corporate governance.
Rose and Shepard (1997) identify 12-14% higher CEO compensation in conglom-
erates. Their findings, however, suggest that this premium is rather due to the higher
complexity of managing a conglomerate, i.e., capability-based, than due to agency con-
flicts. CEOs that diversify a prior stand-alone corporate face a significant decline of
their earnings and receive lower salaries than a newly hired CEO of a conglomerate.
Anderson et al. (2000) report CEO compensation to be less performance sensitive and
less equity-holdings-oriented in conglomerates. Duru and Reeb (2002) contradict both
studies. According to them, CEO compensation in multi-segment firms is lower and
more dependent on firm performance than in focused companies. E.g., top-executives
of these firms make more intensive use of incentive compensation plans and are more
aligned with market-based performance measures.
The same puzzling picture arises when considering the relationship between cor-
porate governance and diversification. Denis et al. (1997a) find a strong negative as-
sociation between equity ownership of firm’s leadership and conglomeration. The same
holds true for ownership by outside blockholders: the existence of outside equity block-
24 See, e.g., Rajan et al. (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000).
25 See also Fulghieri and Hodrick (2006).
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holders is negatively associated with operating in different industries. A decrease in
diversification accompanies stronger disciplining forces as e.g., block purchases, acquisi-
tion attempts, financial distress, or management turnover. Consequently, firms that face
severe performance issues are much more likely to focus within the following years. How-
ever, management or blockholder ownership cannot explain the conglomerate discount.
According to Amihud and Lev (1999), the presence of strong shareholders, i.e., high
ownership concentration fosters stand-alone strategies of firms. Jirapon et al. (2005)
confirm that conglomerates are more prone to agency conflicts. That implies: a weak
corporate governance structure and less equity holdings by firm’s management are more
likely to occur in diversified firms. Berger and Ofek (1999) identify that a reduction of
diversification is often preceded by changes in corporate control, e.g., change of CEO,
new outside blockholder, financial distress, unsuccessful takeover bid, or activism from
pension fund investors. They indicate that weak corporate governance structures or
strong positions of top-executives pander diversification.
Otherwise, there are several studies that neglect the feasibility of conclusions
about the presence of agency conflicts to be drawn from the organizational form. An-
derson et al. (2000) find even in their own study support for the contradiction. In their
sample conglomerates have more outside directors, higher rates of managerial turnover,
and similar sensitivity of turnover to stock price performance. Furthermore, they notice
that the existence of outside blockholders is independent from the organizational form.
Denis et al. (1997b) posit that less equity ownership by top-executives, which is more
typical of conglomerates,26 are not necessarily associated with agency conflicts. In con-
trary, managerial ownership reduces the likelihood of top-executive turnover, decreases
the sensitivity of top-executive turnover to firm performance, alleviates the extent of
internal monitoring, and diminishes the probability of hostile takeovers. Gleason et al.
(2004) find that typical indications of strong corporate governance, as e.g., institutional
ownership, block ownership, large board size, or board independence ratio have no or
even a negative impact on a firm’s decision to diversify. Consequently, diversification
discount is not caused by agency conflicts and corporate governance as well as ownership
structures are entailed by diversification and firm performance rather than influencing
these factors. According to McNeil et al. (2004), management turnover after weak
performance is even easier for conglomerate’s subsidiaries, especially if the subsidiary
operates in an industry related to the parent’s. Stronger incentives, lower replacement
costs, and lower expenditures of finding new managers for headquarter executives com-
26 See Denis et al. (1997) and Amihud and Lev (1999).
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pared to board of directors lead to much stricter disciplining mechanisms for subsidiary
managers.
To sum up, I can say that scientific literature provides an ambiguous picture
about diversification and the emergence of agency conflicts. There is decent indication
that managers of conglomerates do not earn more than the executives of stand-alone
companies, hence increasing salaries appear not to be the reason for operating in different
industries. A final conclusion about the question whether conglomerates are a haven
of weak corporate governance, is, based on the contradicting articles I presented, not
reliable.
Diversification and limited information for outsiders
In this part of the article I consider whether diversification leads to more severe
information asymmetry for the shareholders and whether a potential relationship leads
to negative effects on the firm value. Best et al. (2004) figures out that information
asymmetry should be of interest in scientific discussion because leads to lower firm valu-
ation – for focused and diversified firms. Nevertheless, they also report the conglomerate
discount cannot be attributed to information asymmetry.27 Bens and Monahan (2004)
confirm a statistically significant positive relationship between information disclosure
and firm valuation, particularly for diversified firms. They argue that more information
allow more monitoring of management’s activities and, therefore, reduce their incentives
to subsidize poorly performing management. Better information disclosure quality leads
to an increased profitability.28 The authors conclude that conglomerates are more prone
to information asymmetries, suggesting a firm value discount potential for multi-segment
companies.29
Gilson et al. (2001) assert that a corporate refocusing strategy leads to an increase
of analyst coverage of 45% and to an increase of forecast accuracy of 30-50%. The
increasing importance of an external capital market, due to the lower size of an internal
capital market after the divestiture, heightens the firm’s likrlihood to become a customer
of an investment bank. Since investment banks are the main principles of analysts, their
coverage rises. This effect is even amplified by the lower research costs for analysts since
27 According to their results, the inclusion of information asymmetry in their firm value analysis does
not even change the extent of the discount substantially.
28 Although the results are not clear cut.
29 Berger and Hann (2002) also examine higher profitability of firms providing disaggregated infor-
mation about their segments.
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more information about the firm are available. Furthermore, the authors argue that new
analysts with high expertise cover the spin-off whereas the analysts of the former parent
company are now able to focus on the parent’s industry. Hence, not only the quantity
of analyst coverage increases but also its quality.
Berger and Hann (2003) discuss reasons why diversified firms provide less infor-
mation about their true state.30 First, they find that the number of reported segments
increased in the new accounting regime. Obviously, firms tried to hide their level of
diversification. The second finding of this paper provides a reason for the companies’
proclivity to disguise their segment activities: Firms that were classified as focused
before and categorized as diversified after the change of the reporting standards doc-
umented only a slight discount before the adoption of the new accounting standards
but a larger discount after it. Potentially most interesting is their third finding. The
stronger the reported transfers increased between the segments due to the adoption of
the new accounting rules, the stronger they have been reduced subsequently. There-
fore, the authors conclude that increased monitoring improves the efficiency of capital
transfers within conglomerates. In a posterior article Berger and Hann (2007) discover
further management’s motives for disguising segments. They compare the performance
of segments hidden under the old accounting regime but revealed under the new one.31
Their results suggest that the segments disguised under the old reporting rules performed
significantly weaker compared to other segments. According to these results, managers
disclosed performance data to hide low earnings; i.e., agency problems drive the limited
revelation of information. But management is also interested in hiding well-performing
segments, as Berger and Hann (2002) mention. In order to keep potential competitors
from their best performing segments, top-executives of diversified firms aggregate well-
performing segments with other business units. In line with that managers are more
willing to aggregate segments if the probability of the segments is highly diverse. Harris
(1998) supports this explanation by examining that segments in less competitive indus-
tries are less likely to be reported by the firm to not encourage firms to enter this rather
uncontested business, which generally provides higher profits to the incumbent.
Hadlock et al. (2001), however, state that diversification diminishes the problem
of information asymmetry when selling shares, which can be deduced from the less
negative market reaction after the announcement of equity issues by multi-segment firms.
30 They investigate the effect of the introduction of the new reporting standard SFAS 131, which
replaced the old standard SFAS 14 in 1997.
31 See footnote above.
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The results contradict the hypothesis that diversified companies are less transparent
and suffer more severe information asymmetry problems. Clarke et al. (2004) endorse
that information asymmetry is less severe in conglomerates. They argue that a multi-
segment company represents a basket of securities. Since the combination of securities
(to a basket) reduces the adverse selection risk of trading, shareholder of conglomerates
are less often confronted with information asymmetry.
The scientific literature does not distinctively confirm a relationship between di-
versification and information asymmetry, but it does suggest that less information pro-
vided about a firm (especially about a conglomerate) comes along with lower firm value
and less efficient investment.
1.3. Corporate transactions
In this chapter I summarize recent and relevant findings about acquisitions and
I provide an overview of the scientific findings about the drivers of acquisitions, their
characteristics, and their success. I begin this section analyzing the scientific literature
about drivers of corporate transactions.
1.3.1. Drivers of acquisitions
In this sub-chapter I discuss the factors that influence the decision to make acqui-
sitions. I start with discussing the conditions in the market that foster or hamper the
proclivity for transactions. I then briefly summarize why firms buy other companies and
finally provide an overview of the factors and the reasons that increase the risk for a
company to become a takeover target.
Market determinants
Despite the fact that the buyer must decide to acquire and the decision whom to
take over depends on the target’s characteristics, there are market determinants that
foster or hamper corporate transactions. Andrade et al. (2001) show that mergers
often occur in waves. The existence of antitrust laws since the 1940s did not allow
acquisitions until the 1960s, the period of diversifying corporate transactions. The next
wave took place in the 1980s, in which acquisitions were supposed to play a disciplinary
role, as the authors argue, but, although labeled as era of hostile takeovers, only 14% of
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them actually were hostile. The 1990s wave is referred to as era of deregulation, which
accounted for more than 50% of the mergers. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) analyze
the 1980s merger wave. This wave is characterized by clustering acquisitions, often
undertaken to increase market shares. Furthermore, they argue that industry shocks
trigger corporate transactions. According to Gorton et al. (2009), besides an industry
shock, industry structure is another important prerequisite for a merger wave. Industries
with many medium-sized firms are more likely to be affected by a merger wave.
Fauli-Oller (2000) provides an explanation for the occurrence of merger waves.
Takeovers stimulate further acquisitions since these transactions decrease the number
of competitors and increase therewith the output of non-acquiring firms. Hence a free-
riding situation emerges in which firms benefit from the transactions initiated by com-
petitors. The number of free-riders can be reduced by further acquisitions. Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argue that industry shocks, like deregulation or new
technologies, alone cannot fully explain merger waves. Market overvaluation is, accord-
ing to their data, a further fundamental driver of acquisitions. Assuming fully rational
market participants, valuation mistakes still happen in times of market overvaluation.
Although they reduce the value of an acquirer’s stock offer during hot markets, target’s
shareholder are more likely to overestimate this offer. As a consequence, the transaction
becomes more likely and therewith a merger wave although no substantial event justifies
the acquisition from an economic perspective. The same effect occurs if markets are
undervalued, making transactions significantly more unlikely. In line with their theory
the authors only count about 3,300 transactions from 1963 to 1964, compared to about
10,600 from 1968 to 1969.
After this brief inside into the macro-perspective of mergers, I show the key
findings of the previous research about the characteristics of acquirers and targets within
the next two subsections.
Determinants of acquirers
Before figuring out the reasons why corporate transactions occur, I provide an
overview about descriptive relationships between firm characteristics and acquisitions.
By outlining the scientific literature about characteristics of acquirers, I want to examine




Jensen (1986) argues that large cash holdings and low leverage are typical characteris-
tics of firms that initiate (bad) acquisitions. Harford (1999) confirms the relationship
between large cash holdings and an increased proclivity of firms to acquire. He further
identifies abnormal return, size, sales growth, and non-cash working capital as factors
that are positively associated with the likelihood of a bid announcement. Paliwal (2008)
also examines firm size as a positive indicator of high acquisition likelihood. Further
he finds that typical bidder characteristics are low insider ownership, large institutional
holdings, and high leverage. This suggests that firms that strive to buy other compa-
nies are more intensively monitored by outside market participants. Moreover, bidders
generally have shown good performance in advance of their bid announcement. Shleifer
and Vishny (2003) as well as Ang and Cheng (2006) mention that overvalued firms make
more acquisitions. Cheng et al. (2010) support this view by finding a strong relationship
between the development of the equity value, in terms of cumulative abnormal return,
and the likelihood of acquisitions. Owen and Yawson (2010) confirm the factors men-
tioned above. Furthermore, they show that firm life cycle, measured by retained earnings
to contributed capital, is associated with an increased M&A activity. Firms that retain
a high proportion of their earnings are more likely to initiate a corporate transaction.
Motives of acquirers
Besides typical indicators of takeover penchant, the reasons for an intensive acquisition
activity are of interest in order to predict the future performance of a firm more accu-
rately and to decide for measures that reduce or advocate merger likelihood. First and
second, I look at acquisition motives that are in line with shareholders’ interest: synergy
and private information. Third, I analyze motives that are not in the interest of the
firm: hubris and agency conflicts.
Synergies as motive of acquisitions
There are different specifications about the synergies realized in mergers. The most
prominent forms are financial and operational synergies. Financial synergies enable
firms to initiate profitable investment, which could not have been undertaken without a
sufficiently large internal capital market. Fluck and Lynch (1999) find that this benefit
particularly drives conglomerate acquisitions. Managers that are able to manipulate cash
flows face grave difficulties in generating resources for the funding of value-increasing
investment opportunities. Diversifying mergers may remedy for a certain period. Thus,
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they can be value enhancing, but only if the target is financially constrained.
There are two typical forms of operational synergies. The first one turns bad
performance into good performance, whereas the latter focuses on real synergies, i.e.
scale economies. According to Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), high q firms (strong
performer) acquirer low q companies (weak performer). Palepu (1986) posits that well-
performing firms buy weakly managed companies to replace its management and increase
target’s efficiency. Hartzell et al. (2004) investigate target CEO compensation after the
transaction. The benefits of the target CEO increase if they do not retain their jobs after
being acquired. Further, they find that half of the target top-executives lose their jobs
directly after the merger and the large majority of the remainder does not keep its old
position for more than three years. Moreover, only a small minority of target CEO that
lost their jobs find a comparable role subsequently. These findings further strengthen
the hypothesis that a lot of acquisitions are intended to replace weakly performing
management.
Although both forms (theories) of synergies are not mutually exclusive, some ad-
vocates of the economies of scale theory dissent the replacement theory of synergies. Li
and Zhang (2010) find only weak empirical evidence for the q-theory of mergers. Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan (2008) also contradict the q theory of acquisitions. Based on
their analyses, top-performers acquire best-in-class targets and weak performers buy
firms with low q. By doing so, the amount of synergies can be maximized since com-
plementary assets are most effectively utilized if they are under control of one firm. In
substitute mergers hold-up problems and underinvestment due to incomplete contracting
and asymmetric information may occur. Gorton et al. (2009) argue that increasing the
potential synergies, resulting from larger firm size after its own takeover, incentivizes a
well-managed firm to grow by acquisitions in advance.32 They also represent the notion
that operational synergies are a key motive for transactions due to potential economies of
scale. Devos et al. (2009) compare financial synergies with operational ones. They find
out that operational synergies are about four times higher than financial ones. Whereas
the latter mainly occur in diversifying mergers, as already Fluck and Lynch (1999) em-
phasize, operative improvements mainly occur after acquisitions of targets of the same
industry. They conclude that mergers create value mainly through better resource uti-
lization instead of overcoming financial constraints to enable investment or tax burden
reduction.
32 Goriatchev (2006) empirically confirms this conclusion.
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Private information as motive of acquisitions
Bradley et al. (1983) suggests that if corporate transactions are in line with firm’s
interest the motive might be either synergies or private information. To test if the
latter motive exists, he analyzes unsuccessful bids. His results provide evidence for the
synergy hypothesis but also show that private information about the target does not
drive its takeover. The private information hypothesis implies that market revalues
the target after the offer or that the targets’ management implements a new operating
strategy. Nevertheless, targets’ additional announcement returns after a rejected offer
are not stable if the firm is not taken over in the subsequent years. Moreover, the bidder
documents stable negative returns after the announcement only if the target will be
acquired by another firm, signaling more market power or better access to resources for
the unsuccessful bidder’s rival. This observation implies that the targets’ share price
increase after the unsuccessful offer is due to the market expectation of a new takeover
bid instead of private information previously closed but after the bid released. More
recent research from Martynova and Renneboog (2006) suggest that private information
about the true value of a firm influences the intention of an acquisition. However,
information advantages compared to the market are restricted to the valuation of the
acquirer and typically exploited by the utilization of equity as method of payment in
transactions.
Hubris and agency conflicts as motives of acquisitions
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) empirically confirm the existence of the synergy motive
and of two motives of acquisitions, which are not in line with firm’s interest: manage-
ment hubris and agency conflicts. Although synergies drive the most acquisitions, hubris
and agency conflicts also make mergers more likely. In case of management hubris the
executives intend to act in line with firm’s interest, as Roll (1986) argues, they overesti-
mate the value of the target and/or their capabilities to create synergies or to increase
profitability. A distribution of value from the acquirer to the target is the consequence.
Different from former studies, Roll’s does not assume inefficient markets. I.e. neither
must financial markets incorrectly set share prices for firms, nor has the presence or ab-
sence of (governmental) regulations to lead to inefficiently organized product and labor
markets to trigger acquirers to pay more than the market value for a target.
In case of agency conflicts management does only act in line with its own interest
but not with firm’s interest. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) examine that most
transactions with negative total gains are dominated by agency conflicts, the returns
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even further tumble with competition, suggesting that rivalry about a target even boosts
the aftermaths of agency conflicts. Interestingly, deals with good performance may suffer
management hubris at the buyer’s side. Overall they conclude that generating synergies
is the dominating motive in corporate transactions. However, also hubris and agency
conflicts trigger acquisitions, whereas only the latter has a distinct negative impact on
transaction performance.
One kind of agency conflicts that influences the decision to buy other firms is man-
agement entrenchment. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) find that specific investment helps
current management to protect their jobs. Most effectively deployed specific investment
requires specific knowledge, which the management of the firm holds rather exclusively
through its experience in the company. The replacement of management endangers the
exhaustion of maximum value out of an (specific) investment. Firm acquisitions may
be one form of specific investment. Baradwaj et al. (1996) add another perspective:
defensive mergers.33 According to their definition, an acquisition is characterized as
defensive if it grows a firm beyond the size that makes the entity prohibitively large
for other acquirers. Gorton et al. (2009) argue that this entrenchment motives entails
corporate transactions, although causing negative returns in many cases, striving to re-
tain management’s control due to protection against takeover by simply being too large
for other buyers. They conclude that uncertainty about job preservation is a specific
motive for buying other corporates. Park and Madhavan (2011) support this motive.
They argue that uncertainty in an industry tempts managers of firms in that business
to expand to other industries through mergers. Humphrey-Jenner and Powell (2011)
analyze the Australian M&A-market about the presence of management entrenchment
as motive for acquisitions. In contrast to the U.S. M&A literature, they find no incidents
that top-executives motives of self-preservation entails corporate transactions.
Drivers of acquisitions
Now that I provided an overview of characteristics and motives of acquirers, I discuss
literature that helps to explain the link between both: the drivers of acquisitions. In
an influencing article Jensen (1986) suggests that excess resources, in terms of excess
cash, induce top-executives to use these resources to grow a firm beyond its optimal size.
Minimizing the risk of being taken over, increasing resources under control and height-
ening the compensation are the main motives behind the utilization of excess cash for
acquisitions. Managers favor acquisitions over internal investment particularly in ma-
33 For the banking industry.
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ture industries since internal projects offer even less promising economic perspectives.
Harford (1999) endorse the free cash flow hypothesis.34 Large cash holdings diminish
the need of additional and external financing sources and thereby remove monitoring
capacities. Jensen (1986) further argues debt decreases the acquisition likelihood since
it aggravates outside monitoring and therewith sets up additional obstacles for at least
(value-decreasing) mergers. He also emphasizes prior performance as driver of acquisi-
tions. High returns in advance of such an event enabled the buyer to generate excess
resources.
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) hypothesize that firms that document a high market
valuation buy other companies more often. They use the high share price to pay the
target with equity and therewith serve the interest of their shareholders since the price of
the acquisition is then lower compared to cash payment or to equity payments in times in
which the acquirer’s value meet its fair value. Ang and Cheng (2006) empirically support
this theory. As already mentioned above, Owen and Yawson (2010) determine industry
life cycle as influencing on M&A activity. Firms that are neither young nor mature are
more likely to acquire. Whereas young firms do not have sufficient resources to stem a
transaction, mature firms are not dynamic enough to intervene in industry concentration
or business expansion processes. They further reason why large companies announce
bids more frequently: Lower financing expenditures, less integration costs, and empire
building motivate top-executives to grow their firms through corporate transactions.
It is known from previous research that synergies, hubris, and management self-
interest can be drivers of acquisition, following Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) ex-
pected synergies dominate the motives. However, also hubris, which potentially consists
of the management’s confidence to generate higher synergies than independent mar-
ket participants expect and subsequent performance indicates, and management self-
interest, i.e. agency conflicts (e.g., become manifest in empire building, management
entrenchment, increasing power and/or soaring compensation) are influential.
Determinants of targets
After I discussed market and buy-side determinants of acquisitions, I describe fac-
tors and reasons for why firms become takeover targets. The determinants of targets
are widely discussed in research. Palepu (1986) identifies several drivers, which can be
summarized as followed: Poorly performing targets are more likely to be acquired since
34 As well as Oler and Picconi (2009).
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these firms are expected to be poorly managed.35 After the takeover, this management
is intended to be replaced. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) contribute to this discussion that
takeovers are motivated by the intention to discipline target’s top-executives and to pre-
vent them from using excess resources for value-destructive activities. Bust-up mergers
are typical of such disciplinary acquisitions. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) outline bust-ups:
acquirers believe that the sum of the firm’s parts is more valuable than the whole entity.
Buying such targets and dismantling them afterwards provides consequently arbitrage
opportunities. Berger and Ofek (1996) show that diversified firms are more likely to
be taken over with decreasing excess value. Furthermore, the lower the firm value is,
the more likely its disintegration subsequent to the transaction is. I will discuss the
intersection between target likelihood and diversification in chapter 1.4 more detailed.
In addition to poor performance and bad management further characteristics
drive the takeover likelihood. Palepu (1986) argues that firms with a mismatch of
resources and growth opportunities are potential targets either to realize the growth
opportunities or to allocate redundant resources more efficiently. Firms with large re-
sources but poor growth perspectives are more likely to invest inefficiently (see e.g.,
Jensen (1986)); thus, acquiring these firms prevents them from further value destruc-
tion. If firms face promising growth opportunities but command only little resources to
finance them, an acquisition of these firms helps them to overcome financial constraints
and to conduct investments that would be foregone otherwise, see e.g., Fluck and Lynch
(1999)
As already suggested in the previous sub-section, large firms are better protected
against offers because their integration costs are expected to be higher and potential
costs for a prolonged battle due to takeover protection capabilities may be larger.36
High leverage is also related to lower takeover likelihood since leverage is supposed to
discipline management to pay out free cash flow to shareholder and to undertake only
efficient investment, as Jensen (1986) states.37 Safieddine and Titman (1999) confirm the
takeover-risk-attenuating-effect of leverage. They show that failed targets that increase
their leverage are significantly less likely to be taken over than failed targets that do not
alter their debt level. The authors suggest that increasing debt forces management to
35 This finding is supported by Hasbrouck (1985) and is in line with q theory of mergers by Jo-
vanovic and Rousseau (2002), predicting that (strongly performing) high q firms acquire (weakly
performing) low q firms.
36 This finding is supported by Song and Walkling (1993), Comment and Schwert (1995) and Billett
(1996).
37 However, Billett (1996) finds that increasing risky leverage even increases the takeover likelihood
and Mikkelson and Partch (1989) find no significant relationship between these two factors.
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improve the firm’s business. Lower capital expenditures, sold assets, fewer FTEs, and
higher operating cash flows signal management’s efforts to advance the firm’s contingent
and will be rewarded over five year period subsequent the change of the capital structure.
The disciplining effect of leverage, presumably due to a higher level of outside monitoring,
appears to reduce the improvement potential within a firm after its takeover and thereby
diminishes the incentives of potential acquirers to buy a highly leveraged company.
Jensen (1986) also argues that large cash holdings increase the takeover likelihood
either to prevent value-destructive investment by the target or to realize own investment
projects with the resources of the target.38 Mikkelson and Partch (1989) state that man-
agement ownership is inversely related to the likelihood of receiving a bid announcement,
but there is no significant relationship between top-executives’ voting rights and com-
pleted takeovers. Thus, the likelihood that an announcement bid becomes successful
increases with management ownership. The authors conclude that targets’ management
receive more lucrative offers or are in a better negotiation position during the takeover
if they have more voting rights.
Song and Walkling (2000) examine the relationship between takeover bids for in-
dustry competitors, firm returns and takeover likelihood. Takeover bids for competitors
lead to increasing returns. The steeper the growth becomes, the higher likelihood of
receiving a takeover bid is. The authors conclude that takeover bids for rivals trigger
a reexamination of a firm’s own takeover likelihood by the market and therewith entail
higher returns. Paliwal (2010) supports this conclusion. He finds that firms decrease
cash holdings, free cash flow, operating expenses, capital expenditures, and increases
leverage after their rival received a takeover bid. Thus, he supports Palepu (1986) as
well as Song and Walkling (2000) in their statement that takeover attempts serve as
disciplinary measure for firms suffering agency conflicts.
The above mentioned studies advocate the bad management replacement motive
of mergers. But there is a second line research that dissents this conviction. Grossman
and Hart (1980) find no evidence that inefficiently led firms are more likely to become
a target. According to their analysis, shareholders without significant influence in the
company are aware of poorly performing top-executives and expect profits to soar after
the takeover. Consequently they are not willing to sell their shares at a price below
their expected true value, i.e. they free-ride. Only if acquirers were allowed to treat
fractious shareholders different from typical minority shareholders management replace-
38 Billett (1996) finds empirical support for this hypothesis.
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ment mergers will occur.39 Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2005) find that patenting is related to an
increased likelihood of becoming acquired. Patents may serve as a signal for technolog-
ical industry shocks, which causes takeovers (see explanations above). But patents may
also be used inefficiently by firm’s management. In this case the management replace-
ment theory by Palepu (1986) holds, suggesting that the gap between weakly operating
management and unused firm performance becomes high enough too legitimate an ac-
quisition by other companies. Topically related to Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2005), Heeley et
al. (2006) investigate the impact of R&D expenditures on takeover likelihood. Higher
investment leads to a slight increase in the probability of being acquired. However, the
consideration of a company’s environment quarries more distinct results. Firms that
heavily invest in R&D in a dynamic, complex, and munificent environment are highly
significantly (statistically and economically) more likely of becoming a target. The au-
thors infer that profitable firms attract acquirers.
I discussed factors that make companies more attractive as takeover targets. To
finish this subchapter, I provide an overview of measures that firms actively use to be
less attractive for an acquisition. Previous scientific conversation touched the impact
of antitakeover provisions. Research about this discussion posits that entrenchment
measures effectively reduce the probability of receiving a successful bid announcement.
Borokhovich et al. (1997) confirm the efficacy of antitakeover amendments, like golden
parachutes, poison pills, antitakeover charter amendments, and staggered boards. Com-
panies that adopt these provisions are significantly less likely to be taken over. Ambrose
and Megginson (1992) as well as Johnson and Rao (1999), however, find no evidence for
any impact of antitakeover amendments regarding firm’s takeover probability.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) examine the negative impact of antitakeover
measures on firms’ abnormal returns. They find that externally imposed entrenchment
barriers40 lead to lower productivity and lower return on capital. They show that en-
trenchment provisions reduce CAPEX in new plants and attenuate the divestment of old
facilities. Thus, they infer that entrenched top-executives enjoy their quite life and waive
to pursuit growth opportunities. Gompers et al. (2003) identify a positive relationship
between shareholder rights and firm value. According to their analysis, weak stockholder
protection triggers additional agency cost. Nevertheless, top-executives do not change
corporate governance provisions in their favor before poor performance occurs. Bebchuk
39 Grossman and Hart (1981) support their statements by further theoretical deliberations in their
article from 1981.
40 I.e. antitakeover laws.
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et al. (2009) continuing the analyses of Gompers et al. (2003) by figuring out that only
management entrenchment appointments (of the shareholder rights indicators) are nega-
tively related to firm value. They even find evidence for a causal relationship between the
two variables.41 Faleye (2007) examines the impact of a typical entrenchment provision,
classified boards. Firms with classified boards have lower values, document less often
involuntary CEO turnover, and document a reduced sensitivity of firm performance to
CEO turnover and minor sensitivity of firm performance to CEO compensation. Al-
though Bates et al. (2008) emphasizes reservations about the causation, they endorse
the notion that companies with classified boards have lower firm value and are less likely
to receive a takeover bid.
However, research also indicates that entrenchment may not necessarily have neg-
ative consequences. Jensen and Ruback (1983) mention that antitakeover amendments
do not reduce firm value: e.g., higher requirements on takeover approval by board mem-
bers decrease the likelihood of a successful deal completion, but also trigger management
to represent the interests of the target’s management more effectively. Jensen (1988)
posits that golden parachutes are on average not deleterious to shareholders. He finds
that firms applying these contract specifications document an average share price in-
crease of 3%, although the reason of this gain is not distinct since either the signaling
effect of a likely takeover or the inherent efficiency of a golden parachute may entail
the rise of the firm value. Innocuous or even beneficial to firm’s shareholder are golden
parachutes if they incentivize target’s top-executives to negotiate a successful deal at a
maximum price, although these deals are often associated with personal costs for the
target’s management, like loss of power and prestige or moving costs. Bauguess and
Stegemoller (2008) show that an entrenchment measure such as large boards with inside
directors induce risk-averse managers to undertake value-increasing investments that
would have been foregone otherwise. Kesten (2010) emphasizes the negative implica-
tions of low dismissal barriers. Management may have a too narrow focus on short-term
visible projects and engage in more risky projects to induce higher returns. Furthermore,
qualified staff may be discouraged from applying for jobs in firms with high (involun-
tary) management turnover. Finally, top-executives who are aware of their dismissal
after transaction completion or even lost their positions during the acquisition process
probably do not fully exert their capabilities within the negotiation process, which leads
41 After controlling for management entrenchment at the beginning of the sample period, management
entrenchment is still associated with lower Tobin’s Q at the end of the sample period. Moreover,




to an increased risk of underpricing the control premium. Consequently, management
entrenchment may also influence firm value positively. The author mentions that the
impact is dependent on the macroeconomic climate, and reports a positive relationship
between entrenchment and firm performance during the financial crisis.
From the perspective of the target, scientific literature suggests that acquisi-
tions are generally at least intended to create value. The takeover aims at precluding
bad or self-interested management from undertaking value-destructive activities, at en-
abling profitable investments that could not be realized due to insufficient resources, at
generating synergies, or at gaining a competitive advantage by acquiring specific knowl-
edge other firms command. In the next sub-section I analyze the research about the
acquisition-performance and its drivers.
1.3.2. Characteristics of acquisitions
In this sub-chapter I provide an overview of the scientific contribution to the dis-
cussion about characteristics of acquisitions. I start with drivers of method of payment,
continue with method of financing, and finally discuss bid premiums.
Methods of payment in acquisitions
As I will point out later in sub-chapter 1.3.3, the method of payment plays an im-
portant role for the success of an acquisition. Thus, I scrutinize the literature about
the drivers of the medium of exchange in acquisitions. Hansen (1987)42 as one of the
first contemplates about the decision making process for the method of payment. As-
suming that the acquirer has not all proprietary information about the true state of
target, the finally offered price after the negotiation process will be an average of the
expected value of comparable firms. Akerlof (1970) describes the further process as
‘lemon market’ problem. The target will only sell if the offered price exceeds its true
value. Consequently, acquirers will reduce their price offers since the average expected
value decreases if only targets with low firm values sell. To remedy this ‘lemon market’
circle the acquirer may offer stocks instead of cash. The target will still accept the price
offered by the bidder, but has now an interest in not cheating the acquirer since its
future development is now linked with the target’s interests. Therefore, the likelihood
42 Besides Fishman (1989) who argues that bidders offering cash as method of payment strive to




of stock offers increases with uncertainty about the true value of the target. Faccio and
Masulis (2005) identify empirical indicators that support this hypothesis. They argue
that target and relative deal size denote more uncertainty for the acquirer because in-
creasing (relative) target size entails more negative market reaction to the acquirer if the
deal turns out to be unsuccessful. Expanding to new industries or to new countries is
also risky since the new industries and the new countries are unknown to the expanding
firm und and potential profit and loss forecasts less accurate. Consequently, acquisitions
with relatively large targets are more often paid with stocks.43 Martin (1996), however,
finds no support for an impact of deal size on the method of payment and argues that
increasing target size does not necessarily trigger more risk for the acquirer. Faccio and
Masulis (2005) further find that diversifying transactions and cross-border acquisitions
involve more cash than non-diversifying or domestic deals.
Hansen (1987) mentions that not only targets command proprietary information
about their true value but also acquirers may dispose of this privilege. In this case
the ‘lemon market’ circle unfolds with targets that reduce their expectations about the
average true value. This double ‘lemon problem’ has the consequence that the medium
of exchange is substantially driven by the market valuation of the acquirer. If the bidder
is overvalued, it uses more often stocks; if it is undervalued, cash is more likely to be
the method of payment. This hypothesis has been analyzed intensively by research.
As already mentioned above, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) assume stock markets to be
inefficient and managers to be rational by using these inefficiencies when stocks of their
firms are overvalued. Thus they predict disproportionally many stock acquisitions for
overvalued companies and vice versa. Mayer and Walker (1996), Zhang (2003), Faccio
and Masulis (2005), and Ang and Cheng (2006) empirically confirm this hypothesis.
Hansen (1987) argues that acquirers with high leverage ratios use more often
stocks, a hypothesis empirically confirmed by Faccio and Masulis (2005). Hansen (1987)
also posits that targets with low debt levels are more often paid with shares. Harford et
al. (2009) bring both predictions together. An acquirer intends to maintain its target
capital ratio in an acquisition. Thus, a deviation from its existing leverage ratio or a
significantly different target capital ratio is reflected in its method of payment decision,
assuming that cash acquisitions are financed through leverage.
Another important determinant of the method of payment is managerial owner-
ship. Amihud et al. (1990) explore that acquirers with more managerial ownership use
43 Zhang (2003) endorses these findings.
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more cash to pay in acquisitions. According to the authors, top-executives that hold
shares of their firms believe that their company is undervalued and do not want to issue
new stocks. There is substantial support for this finding in scientific literature by Harris
and Artur (1988), Stulz (1988), Mayer and Walker (1996), Martin (1996), Faccio (2005),
and Swieringa and Schauten (2008). These authors mention that acquirer’s management
with stock ownership value control over their firms and are less willing to dilute their
influence by paying with stocks. Ghosh and Ruland (1998) show that targets that exceed
the management ownership threshold of 3% are more often paid with stocks. Targets
with high managerial ownership are significantly more often paid with stocks than with
cash. The authors suggest that target’s management strives to retain voting power in
the merged firm and therefore prefer stock payment over cash payment. Consequently,
top-executives of the targets keep substantially more often their jobs after the trans-
action if the medium of exchange is shares. Interestingly, the influence of managerial
ownership is larger for targets than for bidders.
Chaney et al. (1991) identify different characteristics of bidders using cash com-
pared to those using stocks in acquisitions. Soaring firm size and price earnings ratio are
related to more stock acquisitions, increasing return on assets is associated with more
cash deals. In their influential articles Martin (1996) and Faccio and Masulis (2005) fur-
ther examine the relationship between bidders characteristics and method of payment.
The first focuses on a U.S. based corporates, the latter use a European sample. Martin
(1996) finds that acquirers with promising investment opportunities use equity in acqui-
sitions in order to retain cash for the realization of value-increasing projects. Faccio and
Masulis (2005) support this finding for continental Europe. Martin (1996) shows that
firms with large cash holdings use more cash as method payment.44 Faccio and Masulis
(2005) broaden the perspective and identify a positive relationship between bidder’s
financial strength (in terms of collateral, firm size, and leverage) and cash payments.
Another finding of Martin (1996) suggests that the presence of outside monitoring in-
stitutions like institutional shareholder and blockholder causes more cash payment in
corporate transactions since they prevent management from value destruction by using
equity in acquisitions as medium of exchange. Further he shows that strong conditions
of the stock markets are related to more stock deals.
To sum up, one can say that scientific literature provides empirically confirmed
drivers of the method of payment. Uncertainty about the target, high leverage ratio,
overvaluation of the acquirer and good investment opportunities are reasons for stocks
44 See Martynova and Renneboog (2009).
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as method of payment. The willingness of the acquirer to maintain its level of power
and the abundance of cash induce bidders to offer cash for the target.
Methods of financing
The scientific discussion about the method of financing applied in corporate transac-
tions started rather late, although the capital market substantially reacts on the methods
of transaction financing decision, as Martynova and Renneboog (2009) figure out. This
implies that the sources of the methods of payment, investigated in the articles presented
above, were not considered. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) shed light on this part
of M&A research. Most important they find that the sources acquirers use to finance
acquisitions depend on firm and deal characteristics. Further they find that acquirers
use the source with the lowest cost of capital. Put it differently, bidders with large cash
holdings rely on internally generated funds. If their internal resources are not sufficient,
they use debt borrowings to finance transactions if their debt capacity is high and issue
equity if their market valuation is high. These findings are line with the pecking-order
theory of investment financing, which Myers and Majluf (1984) present in their model.
They argue that firms should prefer safe securities over risky ones. Consequently, firms
should generally finance investment with internal resources to be built up by retained
earnings or by issued equity in periods of no managerial information advantage. If there
are no internal funds, firms should issue bonds. The authors argue that debt financing is
better than equity financing and even that foregoing value-creating investments instead
of issuing equity may be in the interest of shareholders.
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) extend these findings by adding further aspects
to their analysis. Bidders with good corporate governance and well-protected creditor
rights have easier access to debt and, according to the pecking order theory, use more
often debt-financing in transactions. This result is in line with the findings of La Porta
et al. (1997). They find that a good legal environment fosters the development of
capital markets.45 Put it differently, investors are more willing to lend money if they
are better protected against expropriation.46 Thus, they find that countries with best
45 See also Levine (1999), who shows that countries with strong creditor protection, effective contract
enforcement, and accurate financial reporting standards have better financial intermediaries and
document higher long-term economic growth.
46 See also Djankov et al. (2003), who examine that legislation and information-sharing institutions
that effectively protect investors increase the amount of private credits.
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investor protection have the largest capital markets.47 Moreover, strategic considerations
regarding the voting power of and the risk to the shareholder influence the financing
decision. That is, if the acquirer’s shareholders wish to retain control over the firm,
transactions are rather financed by debt.48 If, in contrast, the bidder’s stockholders
intend to share the risk of the deal with the owner of the target, equity-financing is more
often applied in corporate transactions.49 Interestingly, agency conflicts do not influence
the method of financing. They find that acquirers with dispersed ownership structure do
not significantly more often pass on debt financing of acquisitions although additional
leverage implies more monitoring and is therefore supposed to be avoided by managers
involved in agency conflicts with their principals. Harford et al. (2009) emphasize that
corresponding to the method of payment decision the choice of the financing source
depends on the acquirer’s target capital structure. The extent of equity-issuing and
debt-borrowing is influenced by the restriction not to deviate too far away from the
target capital structure.
Bid premium in acquisitions
Not only method of payment has substantial impact in acquisition performance but
also bid premium has.50 Thus, I discuss drivers of bid premiums in this sub-chapter.
Walkling and Edmister (1985) start the discussion about determinants of bid premiums
by exploring descriptive relationships between bidder as well as deal characteristics and
bid premiums. Not surprisingly, if the acquirer already controls a part of the company,
the bid premium will be lower. Moreover, a competitive as well as a contested bid
increases the price for the target. Bid premiums in conglomerate mergers are above
those in non-diversifying mergers. The author further finds that acquirers with low
leverage and low market to book values pay more for their targets.
Varaiya and Ferris (1987) describe and explain the phenomenon that bidders pay
too much to successfully complete the deal and document subsequently negative excess
returns. The average bid premium is in their sample above the average acquisition gain.
They further find that the higher the uncertainty about the true value and the closer
the offered price to the perceived value is, the higher the risk of overpayment becomes.
The authors argue that bidders sometimes overestimate and sometimes underestimate
47 See also La Porta et al. (1998) identifying tremendous differences in investor protection legislation
around the world with severe consequences on ownership concentration.
48 See Hansen (1987).
49 See e.g., Harris and Artur (1988) and Stulz (1988).
50 See 1.3.3: Impact of corporate transactions.
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the true value of a firm, but in average estimate the value of a target correctly. A
winner’s curse situation occurs when multiple bidders extend an offer for a company.
Due to different firm valuation techniques and varying expectations about synergies the
prices offered for the target may be considerably divergent. In this case the likelihood of
winning the competition for a target when a bidder underestimates its true value is rather
low. However, if the bidder overestimates the true value of the target the likelihood of
being accepted as acquirer is tremendously higher. To sum up, competitive bids, a great
deal of uncertainty and overestimation are drivers of (too) high bid premiums. Jennings
and Mazeo (1993) also find that bid competition is related to higher takeover prices.
Additionally, they find that high initially offered bid premiums discourage potential
competitors from bidding and reduce the likelihood that the bid will be rejected. Thus,
one can conclude that solely the danger of bid competition or bid rejection increases the
offered price for a target.
Robinson and Snabe (1990) dedicate their research to another aspect of bid pre-
mium determination. They identify a significant relationship between the acquisition
accounting method and bid premium. Acquisitions accounted for as pooling cause a
higher bid premium than acquisitions accounted for as purchases. Jaggi and Dorata
(2006) discuss the impact of the method of payment on the bid premium. They show
that cash acquisitions are associated with higher bid premiums. This effect is due to the
higher potential tax burden on capital gains induced by cash payments.51
Besides these deal-related reasons for bid premium, similarly to the reasons of
corporate transactions, there are three main sources for bid premiums, identified by
previous research: supposed private information about the true value of the target,
acquirer management’s hubris/self-interest, and synergies. Scientific literature provides
evidence that management may dispose of private information. Ahuja et al. (2005) posit
that managers are able to anticipate new market developments and to turn a profit out of
this knowledge. Laamanen (2007) argues that some extent of information asymmetries
always probably exists.
The second driver of bid premiums mentioned above is the presence of top-
executive hubris. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) provide evidence for this conjecture.
They identify three indicators of CEO hubris: recent firm performance, media praise of
the CEO and CEO compensation. All three indicators are significantly positively related
to bid premiums. If corporate governance is weak, this effect even increases. Soegiharto
51 See also Travlos (1987).
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(2009), however, does not find a significant association between indicators for CEO over-
confidence and bid premiums. According to the author, bid premiums increase during
merger waves and in periods of high capital liquidity. Jaggi and Dorata (2006) shed
light on the influence of CEO self-interest on bid premiums. They find that deals with
high bid premiums are generally followed by a larger increase in CEO-compensation
compared to transactions with small bid premiums. They conclude that the extent of
management self-interest has a severe impact on bid premiums. This inference is sup-
ported by the finding that CEO-ownership in the firm as well as post-acquisition firm
size reduction attenuates the association between change in CEO compensation and bid
premiums.52
Crawford and Lechner (1996) focus on target characteristics that drive bid pre-
miums. They raise the issue that indicators of high bid premiums are supposed to be
already reflected in takeover anticipation and consequently in the share price of the
target (although there are some special takeover protection target characteristics that
drive the bid premium but not the takeover likelihood is poison pills, as Heron and Lie
(2006) emphasize). Thus, the bid premium driven by the target can hardly be mea-
sured directly. To examine whether the anticipation effect dominates, they first test
the likelihood of takeover dependent on firm characteristics. Afterwards, they perform
a correlation analysis between these results and bid premiums. They find that that
the anticipation effect of a takeover already increases the target’s share price. Factors
that influence firm values in advance are target’s leverage, liquidity and return on eq-
uity.53 Assuming no information asymmetry, the only reason legitimating bid premiums
is synergies. Laamanen (2007) figures out that there are target characteristics that di-
rectly affect bid premiums. R&D investment-to-market ratios and R&D growth rates
are significantly positively related to bid premiums. He infers that bid premium driving
target characteristics should be reflected in the market value, but argues that there are
resource combinations that trigger additional value creation and therefore heightens the
acquirer’s willingness to pay higher bid premiums. Slusky and Caves (1991) highlight
the importance of financial synergies on bid premiums in acquisitions. In contrast to
that, real synergies have no impact on the prices paid in corporate transactions.
To sum up, the motives of bid premiums can be distinguished between deal and
firm related characteristics. On the one hand, deal transaction related aspects like
52 Slusky and Caves (1991) also find support for the agency conflict explanation of bid premiums.
53 Increasing return on equity and leverage reduce firm’s attractiveness and therewith increase bid
premium, soaring liquidity increase firm’s attractiveness and therewith decrease bid premium.
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discouragement of competitors and cash payments triggers higher bid premiums. On the
other hand, supposed private information, CEO hubris and self-interest, and expected
synergies are reasons for additional charges on the market value in acquisitions.
1.3.3. Impact of corporate transactions
There was already a broad scientific discussion about the acquisitions’ firm-value-
impact and its drivers. Jensen and Ruback (1983) find that acquisitions in general
create wealth, in which the target shareholders obtain almost all the gains and the bid-
der shareholders at least do not lose. Sources of these gains are likely to be synergies,
attenuated agency conflicts, tax benefits, less financial constraints, and the replacement
of inefficient management. Jensen (1988) identifies average abnormal returns for acquir-
ers after their bid announcement ranging from 0 to 4% percent and for targets from 30 to
50%. These results imply that, according to the author, mergers generate a gain of 8%
for the buyer and target combined. He further concludes that it is value-destructive if
management applies mechanisms to prevent corporate transactions. In contrast to these
findings, Moeller et al. (2005) report a loss of acquirer’s shareholder value of $220 billion
between 1980 and 2001.54 However, it is important to note that $240 billion loss after
acquisitions, based on bid announcement returns over a 3 days period surrounding the
proclamation, was cumulated between 1998 and 2001. In the same time the combined
value of acquirers and targets fell by $134 billion. On the other hand acquirer’s share-
holder had received a value gain of $24 billion between 1991 and 1997. Furthermore,
the losses between 1998 and 2001 were caused by only few and large deals. Without
these deals the shareholder value development after acquisitions would have been even
positive. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) also identify positive post-announcement re-
turns for the majority of the deals55 they analyze. Andrade et al. (2001) report in their
analysis of acquisitions from 1973 to 1998 a combined operating margin improvement
by 1% on average.56 In Europe bidders receive positive announcement returns of 0.5%
and targets 9% in the 1990s, as Martynova and Renneboog (2006) report. Obviously
announcement returns depend on the time period, deal size, and further acquirer, target,
and deal characteristics. Dutta and Jog (2009) do not examine significantly negative
returns for acquirers over a long-term period for their Canadian sample. The authors
posit that a different regulatory and capital market environment might cause the dif-
54 The authors use a U.S. based sample.
55 75%.
56 Based solely on transactions that include publicly traded acquirers and targets from USA.
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ferent observations compared to a studies using a U.S. based sample. I conclude that
the impact of corporate transactions on shareholders’ wealth distinguish over region,
time, and firm characteristics. Thus, a general assertion about the likely impact of an
acquisition is not possible.
Previous literature suggests that there are acquirer characteristics that allow a
forecast about the transaction performance. Morck et al. (1990) find that bidders with
poorly performing management face negative announcement returns. This effect may
potentially be driven by management entrenchment. Firms with weakly performing top-
executives are more likely to become a target.57 Firms with huge amounts of assets in
their balance sheets are less likely to be acquired.58 Hence, the market might expect bad
management to pursue the strategy of empire building in order to protect against their
dismissal. Moreover, the market could expect that bad internal investment decisions are
highly correlated with bad acquisitions. These transactions are referred to as defensive
mergers. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) as well as Baradwaj et al. (1996) examine negative
announcement returns for these mergers. Gorton et al. (2009) theoretically and Gori-
atchev (2006) empirically label such behavior of firms “eat or be eaten”. They predict
and accordingly confirm poor performance of these acquirers. The basic assumptions
behind this theory are that managers of firms prefer to run an independent institution
instead of being subject to other executives, that corporate transactions create value
due to synergies, which leads to a genuine interest of firms and their shareholders to buy
other firms, and that smaller firms cannot buy larger companies due to prohibitively
high integration costs and funding restrictions. Thus, top-executives tend to grow their
firms through takeovers to become sufficiently large to reduce the number of poten-
tial acquirers at best to zero. In contrast to the explanation of Morck et al. (1990),
the “eat or be eaten” theory does not assume poorly performing management but only
independence-demanding management.
Humphrey-Jenner and Powell (2011) in contrast find no evidence for negative
announcement returns on defensive mergers. This discrepancy may be driven by the
different regional focus of the articles. Whereas the advocates of the value-destructive
nature of defensive mergers mainly focus on U.S. firms, Humphrey-Jenner and Pow-
ell (2011) use a sample of Australian acquirers. The authors posit that Anti-takeover
provisions (ATP) enable management entrenchment and foster empire-building through
acquisitions. If such provisions are absent, as they are in Australia, the likelihood of
57 See Palepu (1986).
58 See Palepu (1986), Song and Walkling (1993), Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Billett (1996).
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becoming a target followed by management replacement increases with inefficient invest-
ment decisions. Consequently, firms do not conduct corporate transactions that destroy
value. Nevertheless, their arguments provide no substantial indication why the “eat or
be eaten theory” does not hold in Australia. I will discuss the impact of geography on
transaction performance later in this chapter.
Another determinant of value-destructive acquisitions is large cash holdings. Har-
ford (1999) and Oler (2008) empirically support this prediction by Jensen (1986). The
explanation for this effect is consistent over all three articles. Instead of paying out ex-
cess cash to shareholders, management uses these resources for increasing the capabilities
under its control and to reduce the likelihood of becoming acquired and replaced since
the takeover likelihood increases with unused cash holdings as Jensen (1986) and Palepu
(1986) emphasize. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) broaden the evidence of this exam-
ple to all agency conflicts. Based on their sample, agency conflicts that drive the decision
to acquire dominate the pool of transactions with negative total gains. They conclude
that agency-conflict-driven mergers are associated with wealth destruction. Hayward
and Hambrick (1997) add management hubris as further motive for bad transactions.
They identify strong recent performance, high media praise of CEO, high CEO compen-
sation, and weak monitoring of the CEO as typical indicators. Given these prerequisites,
acquisitions are more likely to destroy value. Moeller et al. (2005) use their calculations
about the general transaction performance to derive statements about characteristics of
unsuccessful acquirers. Firms that made large loss deals had been successful in corporate
transactions until their last deal. Management ownership of firm shares, in contrast, is
an indicator for strong acquisition performance, according to Amihud and Lev (1990).
This effect is particularly strong in acquisitions paid with stocks.
There is also comprehensive research about the impact of deal characteristics on
transaction performance. The method of payment has been content of numerous sci-
entific discussions about takeovers. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that firms with
high prior returns or overvalued equity are more likely to pay with equity in deals.
Key assumption of their model is that firms are overvalued due to market inefficiencies,
whereas managers act rationally by taking advantage of market’s mispricing. The mar-
ket perceives equity payments as sign of overvaluation, subsequently the acquirers’ value
declines. However, in the long run stock acquirer still document negative returns but
not as negative as they would without an acquisition. The negative association between
equity payment and deal performance are supported by Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau
and Vermaelen (1998) as well as Martynova and Renneboog (2006). Linn and Switzer
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(2001) focus on the impact of method of payment through measuring its effects in the
operating performance changes of the merged firm following the transaction. They find
that cash deals precede increases in the operating performance whereas equity deals
are not followed by better operating performance. Savor and Lu (2009) deny a causal
relationship between stock mergers and deal performance. Although they identify sig-
nificantly lower post-acquisition returns after stock payment, they emphasize that this
development is based on overvaluation instead of lower value creation. This conclusion
is based on their finding that successful acquirer significantly outperform those firms
which attempt to buy a target but fail due to exogenous reasons. The comparison of
failed cash and equity acquirer does not exhibit any difference in their firm value devel-
opment. Mortal and Schill (2010) refute any association between method of payment
and post-acquisition share price growth since they do not report a significant relation-
ship between deal performance and equity or cash exchange after controlling for target
size. They find that asset growth, independent from its source (e.g., corporate trans-
action, internal investment), is the most relevant (inverse) driver of deal performance.
Put it differently, the larger the acquisition in terms of asset growth is, the lower its
performance turns out to be.59 Lipson et al. (2010) provide reasons for this observation.
The first idea that large deals trigger high transaction costs only marginally explains
the negative relationship. The key driver of the value-destructive impact of large trans-
actions is mispricing. Increasing asset growth is significantly and positively related to
mispricing.60 The authors examine a significant and positive relationship between as-
set growth and idiosyncratic risk. Further they find that stocks that document a high
idiosyncratic risk provide low growth to their holders and vice versa. Thus Lipson et
al. (2010) conclude that large deals (but also investments not involving firm acquisi-
tions) generate low returns compared to small corporate transactions. They argue that
investors exuberantly react to large deal announcements, drive target prices high and
therewith attenuate further returns.
Research has covered another driver of post-acquisition performance: geography.
Doukas and Kan (1988) assert that multinational companies benefit from international
expansion, especially if the target’s country is a developing country and if the acquirer
59 Fauli-Oller (2002) reports a negative relationship between deal performance and relative deal size,
Mortal and Schill (2010), as mentioned above, identify a negative impact of absolute deal size.
Gupta and Misra (2007) focus exclusively on banking deals and find that deal size amplifies the
post-acquisition returns, i.e. merger gains of value enhancing deals increase with target size and
vice versa.
60 See also Titman et al. (2004), Cooper et al. (2008), Chan et al. (2008), Polk and Sapienza (2009),
and Li and Zhang (2010).
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already operates is it. The results of the authors further show that international expan-
sion in general leads to positive but insignificant announcement returns for the bidders.
Therefore, multi-national acquisitions per se have no significant impact on bidders’ re-
turns. Kang and Kim (1993) shows that Japanese acquirer of U.S. firms generate signif-
icantly positive returns. The close ties of Japanese companies to large banks increases
monitoring and therewith diminishes agency problems. The transfer of this close re-
lationship to U.S. corporates is consequently one source of additional value. Another
reason for the success of Japanese acquirers is the weak Dollar, which dropped 42%
against the Yen between 1976 and 1978 and again in 1985. Thus, the acquisition of
U.S. firms paid in Dollar but financed with Yen is cheaper relative to domestic trans-
actions. Eun et al. (1996) report positive returns for foreign acquirers if the target is
from the USA. However, the effect depends on the bidder’s country. Firms from U.K do
not generate significant positive returns with foreign investments, Japanese in contrary
do. Japanese bidder internalized the R&D capabilities very effectively, because they
are highly R&D intensive themselves compared to acquirers from other countries. The
authors conclude that these cross-border mergers are more synergy-creating.
Besides cross-border acquisitions, geographical distance in investments in general,
independent from frontiers in between, has attracted coverage by research. Coval and
Moskowitz (1999) find that geographical distance influences not only company mergers
but also investment decisions in general. According to the authors, a home bias exists
when investment managers61 compile their portfolio, particularly if the information base
is weak. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) confirm the local bias of investors. They find
that 30% of the investments are less than 250 km away from the investor, although only
10% of all eligible firms are less than 250 km away. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) examine
that geographically proximate investments provide a significant higher return for invest-
ment managers. They argue that investment managers that are close to their assets are
better able to monitor companies and have better access to private information. This
effect amplifies if the firms are in small cities and remote locations. Limited monitoring
due to large distance is also an issue in venture capital investments as Lerner (1995)
examines. Venture capitalists that are close to their firms are significantly more likely
to be board members62 since monitoring by board members entails high transaction
costs if travel distances are long. Malloy (2005) figures out that forecasts of geographi-
61 The authors exclusively investigate U.S. investment managers.
62 According to the authors, venture capitalists that are less than 5 miles away from the office are
twice as likely to be board member in a firm they financially support than venture capitalists that
are more than 500 miles away.
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cally proximate investors are much more accurate than their distant peers. The effect is
stronger for smaller firms in remote areas in smaller cities. The author concludes that
geographically proximate analysts command better information about firms than other
analysts.
Zhu (2002) dissents the limited information disadvantage hypothesis. The author
identifies indeed a bias of (individual) investors to local investments but neither finds
evidence that this bias is due to less information nor obtains results that suggest superior
performance of local investments. Instead, awareness of potential assets and familiarity
entail the local bias. Once remote companies intensify their advertisement the local bias
attenuates. Taken into account a recent study of Petersen and Rajan (2002), the question
rises whether geographical distance between firms and its (potential) stakeholders still
matters. They examine the distance between small firms and lenders between 1973
and 1993. Their results suggest that the distance between borrowers and lenders grew
in this period. Further they show that distant firms had to be high quality creditors
at the beginning of the period to obtain credits. This necessity disappeared until the
end of the period. The key findings of this study are likely to be driven by better
communication and technical devices, which improve the availability of information.
Degryse and Ongena (2005) even find that loan rates decrease with distance and conclude
that informational disadvantages by the lender play no significant role in determining
prices for credits. Hau (2001) provides further support for the irrelevance of geographical
distance: traders in financial centers, who should have more information if proximity to
firms and other capital market participants mattered and therewith outperform traders
from other regions, do not obtain higher earnings.
The mixed results about geographical distance’ influence on the relationship be-
tween firms and its investors suggest no clear prediction whether acquisition performance
is better, worse or similar if the bidder is close to the target, but there are a number
of studies that focus on the relationship between geographical distance and acquisition
performance. Grote and Rücker (2007) apply their analysis on German acquirers and
find that transactions with foreign targets are more successful if they are in a country
with common borders to Germany. The availability of soft information, the effectiveness
of control and the realization of synergies are more difficult if the target is far away
and reduce therewith the deal performance. Grote and Rücker (2007) identify a higher
preference of acquirers to proximate targets and further a better performance of local
deals compared to mergers including targets from far away. However, transactions of
almost adjacent, i.e. geographically very close, targets perform worse. Overconfidence,
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i.e. illusion of better control due to closeness, and proximity related benefits, like higher
local status, may explain this relationship.
There are further findings, which highlight the importance of geographical prox-
imity in acquisitions. Kang and Kim (2008) show that acquirers prefer to buy prox-
imate targets63 and find that geographical proximity is positively related to (target)
post-acquisition return and operating performance. Acquirers are more involved in
post-transaction corporate governance and monitoring, like board representation and
management replacement, if the target is proximate. This effect becomes stronger if the
target is small, has volatile profits, invests much in R&D, documents poor past perfor-
mance, or has small insider ownership. The authors suggest that information asymmetry
increases with geographical distance and attenuate post-acquisition benefits. Moreover,
lower monitoring costs for local targets induce acquirers to more intensive involvement
in the government activities of the target. Kedia et al. (2005) transfer this analysis
to acquirer returns and confirm the conjecture of a positive relationship between ge-
ographical proximity and deal performance. They posit that information advantages
benefit adjacent buyers.64 Overall, most previous findings suggest that adjacent tar-
gets are more effectively to monitor and integrate and therefore allow the realization of
higher returns. U.S. targets seem to be an exception potentially due to better corporate
governance regulation and greater availability of information about these firms.
To sum up I conclude that deal success depends, not surprisingly, on acquirers’
and deal characteristics. Acquirers that suffer agency conflicts, close large deals and,
are far away from their target are generally worse performing.
After I discussed in the last chapter key findings about diversification and in this
chapter the drivers of acquisitions and their performance, I provide an overview of the
research of the intersection between diversification and corporate transactions in in the
next chapter.
63 This finding is supported by Eun and Mukherjee (2006) who also find a strong home bias in
corporate transactions (34% of the targets are within the 100 km radius of their acquirer).
64 Grote and Rücker (2007) support these findings in principle, but argue that too geographically close
acquisitions may be a consequence of a top-executives’ pursuit of higher local status as well was
quite life and entail an illusion of control. Therefore, such deals suffer in general worse performance.
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1.4. Intersection between diversification and
transactions
The intersection between industrial diversification and corporate transactions has
been covered in two ways. First, research identified the implications of diversifying
mergers and second, research discussed the origin and aftermaths of bust-up mergers.
The findings in scientific literature about diversified firms are mixed – so are the
results of the analysis of diversifying mergers. In a recent study Park and Madhavan
(2011) examine differences in uncertainty in these industries as a key driver for conglom-
erate acquisitions. The greater the difference turns out to be, the higher the likelihood of
diversifying corporate transactions is. Acquisitions that involve companies from different
industries reduce shareholder value, perform worse than focused transactions, and have
been value destructive since the 1980’s. Morck et al. (1990) empirically confirm this
finding and assert that this effect was significantly more distinct in 1980’s than in 1970’s.
They argue that managerial objectives drive these mergers.65 Fluck and Lynch (1999)
emphasize a special case when diversifying mergers create value. If one of the companies
involved is financially constrained and suffers agency conflicts between management and
claimholders, an acquisition is beneficial to the shareholders since it enables marginally
profitable investments, which could not have been undertaken if the financially con-
strained firm had to operate alone. Devos et al. (2009) figure out the extent of added
value triggered by such mergers, but find that non-diversifying acquisitions with focus on
operational synergies create on average four times higher synergies. More recent studies
underline the general value-destructive character of industrially unrelated transactions.
Amihud and Lev (1999), Doukas and Kan (2004), and Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) detect
acquirers’ share price losses after the announcement of diversifying mergers. Ueng and
Wells (2001) link the underperformance of diversified transactions compared to focused
deals66 with the ratio of management’s equity shareholdings to management’s compensa-
tion. They argue that managers undertaking diversified mergers are less incentivized to
act in the interest of the firm and therefore initiate less valuable acquisition investments.
In contrast to the results of the articles mentioned above, Lewellen (1971) iden-
tifies value-increasing effects of diversifying mergers. He analyzes the conglomerate
65 Blanchard et al. (1994) support this hypothesis. They show that top-executives of firms receiving
unexpected and non-operating-business-related cash windfalls are prone to initiate diversifying
acquisitions.
66 Also identified by Sichermann and Pettway (1987) and Scanlon et al. (1989).
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merger wave in the 1960’s. If lenders and borrowers gauge the costs and risks pro-
hibitively high, diversifying transactions provide financing benefits. These acquisitions
allow former stand-alone entities to avoid bankruptcy caused by short-term cash con-
straints.67 Matsusaka (1993) claims that rather managerial synergies than managerial
objectives drive acquisitions of targets from different industries. He identifies positive
announcement returns in corporate transactions between 1968 and 1974. Hence, the
hypothesis that diversifying mergers only serve to empire building, management en-
trenchment, or other top-executive objectives is not generally true. The positive impact
of conglomerate mergers had changed since the mid-1970s. Between 1975 and 1979 the
abnormal announcement returns were zero and from 1980 to 1987 even significantly
negative. Nevertheless, in the long run shareholders of diversifying acquirers benefited
from these transactions. Chevalier (2000) examines a positive market reaction on di-
versifying mergers. She even finds no significant gap in the abnormal announcement
returns for different extents of diversifying mergers. Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) also
identify positive post-announcement returns for diversifying acquisitions, which, more-
over, do not perform worse than focusing transactions. Gabrielsen (2003) conjectures
that some pretended conglomerate mergers are actually transactions that increase the
market power of the acquirer by broadening its internal value chain. He analyzes the
acquisition of targets that own distribution channel by bidders that manufacture prod-
ucts to be distributed over channels owned by the target. If the acquirer possesses these
channels it can aggravate potential market entries by competitors and so create benefits
for its shareholders at the expense of welfare losses for the customers.
There is not only research about unrelated acquisitions but also about focusing
divestments. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that bust-ups of conglomerates reveal the
higher value of independent single segments compared to their aggregation in one com-
pany. Berger and Ofek (1996) figure out that these bust-up mergers occur more often
for poorly performing diversified corporates. They investigate a sample, which exclu-
sively consists of multi-segment firms. The larger the firm value discount is, the higher
the likelihood of being taken over in general and of being bought through an LBO68
in particular. Further, they find that the chance of being broken up after the acquisi-
tion increases with the discount. Put it differently, the lower a conglomerate’s value,
the higher its likelihood of being taken over and its probability of being dismantled.
Wiersema and Liebeskind (1995) examine the consequences of LBOs on diversification.




They find that LBO-targets reduce their level of diversification and lower the number
of periphery business lines. According to Burch and Nanda (2003), this dismantling
is value-enhancing.69 Almeida (2006) posit that in medium investor-protection environ-
ment the existence of conglomerates penalizes efficient external investment opportunities
relative to mediocre internal projects. Therefore, conglomerate bust-ups create value not
only for conglomerates’ shareholders but also for external parties. Transparency also de-
termines the likelihood of being taken over for a diversified firm, as Berger and Hann
(2003) emphasize. They show that the more accurate the information about a firm’s
business units are, the more likely a takeover becomes. Moreover, firms that had to pro-
vide more information about their segments subsequent to the legally forced adoption of
new accounting standards70 documented a significant higher risk of becoming acquired
after the disclosure of more segment information.
Overall, research about the intersection between acquisitions and diversification
provides a rather distinct picture that diversifying transactions are value destructive.
To the best of my knowledge, there is only rare contribution about the behavior of
conglomerates itself in corporate transactions, i.e. what kind of acquisitions they initiate,
how often multi-segment firms are involved, and whether they are more attractive targets
in general to other firms.
1.5. Conclusion
In this paper I provide an overview of the relevant and recent literature about two
important areas in corporate finance: industrial diversification as well as corporate trans-
actions and the intersection of both. I find inconsistent results and conclusions about the
impact of diversification. Primary research about conglomerates implies that these firms
have lower values, invest less efficiently, and are more prone to agency conflicts. More
recent findings challenge these distinct implications. Not only the causation is contested
dependent on time, region, and the data sample, but also the existence of a conglomerate
discount at all is doubted. So to date, a definite statement about the impact of diversi-
fication is not reliable. At best, there are some indications that multi-segment firms, on
the one hand, provide less information about their true state but, on the other hand, are
less prone to financial constraints. The same mixed picture emerges when considering
69 The authors reconstruct a sample of spin-offs as before their divestment and show that the recal-
culated excess value is higher than the original one in advance.
70 Introduction of the new segment reporting rule SFAS 131, which replaced SFAS 14.
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further aspects that are potentially related to diversification. The association between
investment policy, agency conflicts as well as information asymmetry and diversification
are still controversially debated in scientific discussion. Overall one can say that former
research suggested that diversification is an inefficient corporate strategy, recent research
indicates the contradicting aspects, e.g., productivity and investment is not less efficient
in multi-segment firms, conglomerates have better chances to overcome shortages of ex-
ternal financing and conglomerate’s management is not necessarily self-interested at the
expense of the firm’s shareholder.
Corporate transaction research also provides a mixed picture about the impact
of acquisitions. Post-announcement returns heavily depend on time and region. Not
only the general effect of mergers on firm value is contested but also the impact of the
most deal characteristics is controversial. However, most scientists agree on the nega-
tive impact of large acquisitions, which destroy value due to too high transaction and
integration costs etc. According to that, firms that are resource abundant or successful
in the past are more likely to initiate corporate transactions. These investment projects
are associated with negative announcement returns. Scientific literature suggests man-
agement hubris and/or self-interest as key drivers of such acquisitions. Firms that suffer
bad leadership, that have large unused resources or not sufficient resources for good
investment projects are more likely to become a target.
Some aspects of the intersection are already covered. Research suggests that di-
versifying mergers destroy value and those conglomerates that were divested documented
an increase in firm value, when considering the value of all parts after bust-up. Never-
theless, the connection between both areas in terms of whether conglomerates engage in
transaction activities more frequently on the one hand and face a higher takeover risk
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Abstract
We empirically investigate the impact of diversification on a special form
of corporate investment – corporate acquisitions. Our analysis is based on
more than 30,000 firm years in a worldwide sample from 2001 to 2008. We
find that conglomerates make significantly less acquisitions than stand alone
firms. This difference is particularly significant for cash rich firms. Moreover,
conglomerates do not pay higher bid premia and do not perform worse in
acquisitions than focused companies. Furthermore, we do not find a signifi-
cant relationship between conglomerate excess value and transaction perfor-
mance, suggesting that inefficient internal investment in diversified firm is
not complementary to inefficient external investment.
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2.1. Introduction
Diversified firms trade at a significant discount compared to a benchmark portfolio of
stand alone firms.1 The main strand of literature on diversification attributes this result
to inefficient capital allocation by conglomerates’ internal capital markets, thus pointing
towards diversified firm’s internal investment inefficiencies (e.g. Rajan et al. (2000),
Scharfstein and Stein (2000)). On the other hand the results of over 40 years of research
in M&A suggest that there are external investment inefficiencies as well: Empirical stud-
ies point towards significant negative price reactions for corporate bidders’ (Moeller et
al. (2005), Martynova and Renneboog (2006)) or at best neutral wealth effects for the
acquiring firm’s shareholders (e.g. Fuller et al. (2002), Schlingemann et al. 2004)). Both
areas mentioned have been intensely analyzed by financial researchers. However the in-
tersection of corporate diversification and corporate acquisition still offers opportunities
for interesting research questions untapped by the finance research community: This
paper investigates the differences between acquisitions done by stand alone firms and
the ones done by diversified firms. By doing so we aim to answer to following central
question: Is internal investment efficiency (measured by a conglomerates excess value)
related to external investment efficiency? Or, more pronounced: Is bad acquisition per-
formance substitute, complement of or independent from inefficient internal investment?
This question is of significant academic interest: Different agency problems and differ-
ent personal capabilities work differently on potential inefficiencies on both fields, thus
suggesting significant differences between the efficiency of internal and of external in-
vestment decisions. E.g. personal characteristics of firm managers like overoptimism
and hubris have been shown to impact M&A decisions and performance2 whereas little
evidence has been provided on their impact on internal investment. Transaction advisors
play a crucial role in M&A success whereas internal decisions are mostly done by man-
agement without taking external advice. Internal investment may be scalable, whereas
acquiring another firm is usually an “all or nothing” decision. On the other hand there
may be factors affecting both types of decisions in the same way: Recent studies show
that management entrenchment has a negative impact on acquisition performance3. In
a recent paper we showed that the probability to become a target in a corporate trans-
action is significantly less for diversified firms4. Thus being diversified may increase
1 See Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1996).
2 E.g. Roll (1986), Malmedier and Tate (2008).
3 Masulis et al (2007) and Harford et al. (2012).
4 Nöllgen and Schwetzler (2012).
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management entrenchment and thus encourage bad transactions. Managing several dif-
ferent business lines on the other hand requires a higher level of management attention,
thus less capacity is left for intense and time consuming acquisition procedures, includ-
ing the integration of the acquired target. It is an open question whether this scarcity
of management resources in diversified firms may result in a lower number of corporate
transactions undertaken by these firms and/or by a lower performance of the transactions
realized.
There is already one aspect located at the intersection of diversification and M&A per-
formance that is well explored: there is evidence for a negative relationship between the
performance of a transaction and a possible change in the firm’s degree of diversification
caused by it. “Unrelated” acquisitions increasing the diversification of the acquirer dis-
play significantly lower abnormal returns than “related” ones, not changing the acquirers
diversification5. On the opposite, divestitures reducing the number of the conglomerates’
business lines yield positive abnormal returns and an increase in shareholder wealth6.
Doukas and Kan (2008) find that conglomerates initiate diversifying (non-diversifying)
transactions if their core business provides weak (strong) growth opportunities or low
(high) cash flows. However our analysis covers an aspect not yet tapped by academic
studies: we do not investigate the impact of a change in diversification, but analyze
already existing differences in the level of diversification between acquiring firms. Thus
our analysis captures the case where a diversified firm acquires a target in an industry
already represented as an existing business line or a stand alone firms acquiring another
stand alone firm in the same industry. Generally comparing M&A-activities of con-
glomerates to standalone firms is, to the best of our knowledge, currently unexplored7.
We compare conglomerates against stand-alones with regards to deal propensity, deal
characteristics (methods of payment and bid premia) and deal performance. Moreover,
we analyze whether internal investment, cash richness and corporate performance, mea-
sured by conglomerate’s excess values, in general elicit deal related differences between
conglomerates and stand-alones.
Analyzing about 30,000 firm years from all regions of the world and more than 700
acquisitions from 2001 to 2008 we find evidence that a high degree of diversification, in
5 See e.g. Morck et al. (1990), Amihud and Lev(1999), Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007).
6 Ahn and Denis (2004), Burch and Nanda (2003).
7 Analyzing the impact of management entrenchment on deal performance, Masulis et al. (2007)
look at changes in the degree of diversification by differentiating between diversifying and non-
diversifying acquisitions. However their analysis does not generally distinguish between firms being
already diversified or stand alones when making the transaction.
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terms of the firm’s reporting segments in more than two different industries, significantly
reduces the likelihood to acquire. Conglomerates in general make fewer acquisitions.
However, we find that controlling for internal investment and excess cash leads to an
insignificant relationship. As cash holdings of conglomerates are lower than for stand
alone firms (see e.g. Duchin (2010)) we take this result as evidence for less funds available
driving this result. But even for cash rich conglomerates we find a significantly lower deal
propensity. Analyzing the link between a conglomerate’s internal performance measured
by excess value and transaction probability we only find weak evidence for a negative
relation. Thus perceived internal investment inefficiencies do not seem to drive external
investment decisions. With respect to deal characteristics we do not find significant
differences between the two types of firms: conglomerates and stand alones pay similar
deal premia und use similar methods of payment, if they undertake an acquisition.
Further, we show that conglomerates’ transaction performance is not significantly lower
than the one of stand alone firms. Thus we conclude that low transaction performance
is not complementary to low excess values of conglomerates.
This paper contributes to two streams of literature. First, we identify a significant
driver of predicting buyers. Unlike Jensen (1986) and Harford (1999), who focus on
resources, or Owen and Yawson (2010) as well as Cheng et al. (2010), who analyze
the impact of firm performance and valuation, we identify the organizational form as
influential for the acquisition likelihood.
Second, we shed light on the discussion about the potential inefficiencies of internal
markets in conglomerates. We follow Mortal and Schill (2010) having an integrated view
on internal and external investment behavior to estimate firm performance. Whereas
previous research mostly suggests that internal investment of diversified firms is ineffi-
cient (Rajan et al. (2000), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Lamont and Polk (2001)), we
examine the association between conglomerates and external investment.
Section 2.2 develops hypotheses from the theoretical background and the related liter-
ature. Section 2.3 provides details about the data and methodology. We show descriptive
statistics in section 2.4, discuss diversification and the likelihood of in transactions in
section 2.5.1, deal characteristics in acquisitions by conglomerates in section 2.5.2 and
the performance of diversified acquirer in section 2.5.3. A summary and some concluding
remarks close in section 2.6.
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2.2. Theoretical background
Over the last 20 years, extensive research has identified factors that drive the M&A-
activities and their success. Although results are partially mixed, some drivers of acquisi-
tions became apparent. Increasing size, excess cash, profitability, and stock performance
make takeovers more likely, whereas higher leverage reduces the takeover probability8.
A considerable part of research investigates factors that determine the bid premia.
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) find that CEO hubris is a key driver of the premium
offered. Crawford and Lechner (1996) investigate how the characteristics of the target
affect the purchase price. Furthermore, research could find comprehensive knowledge on
the factors influencing the method of payment in corporate transactions. It is confirmed
that bidder’s size, managerial ownership, stock price, target’s size and public status
drive the decision for a particular transaction currency9. There is, however, only limited
knowledge about the influence of the firm’s organizational form on corporate acquisitions.
Diversification has also attracted significant attention in scientific analysis. Researchers
concentrated mainly on the firm’s operational performance, which reflects in share price
development and operating profitability10. Rajan et al. (2000) and Maksimovic and
Phillips (2002) examine the magnitude and the efficiency of internal investment in di-
versified firms. The majority of studies found evidence for inefficient internal capital
markets being the main reason for conglomerates negative excess values11. Mortal and
Schill (2010) show that internal and external investment influences firm performance in
the same magnitude. They find evidence for asset growth being the most important fac-
tor for gauging investment’s impact. Though, there is to the best of our knowledge only
limited research about relationship between the organizational form and the magnitude
and the efficiency of external corporate investment – corporate acquisitions.12
2.2.1. Diversification and the likelihood of acquisitions
As of today, we know that the occurrence of corporate transactions is associated with
certain firm characteristics. E.g., Shleifer and Vishny (2003) find that acquirer’s over-
valuation leads to more (stock) acquisitions. Ang and Cheng (2006) and Cheng et al.
8 See e.g., Harford (1999), Owen and Yawson (2010).
9 See e.g., Martin (1996), Faccio and Masulis (2005).
10 See e.g., Berger and Ofek (1995) and Villalonga (2004).
11 Rajan et al. (2000), Scharfstein and Stein (2000).
12 Doukas and Kan (2008) examine factors that influence the decision of conglomerates to initiate
either diversifying or non-diversifying mergers.
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(2010) empirically confirm that acquirers (both cash and stock) are overvalued. Owen
and Yawson (2010) identify further characteristics of buyers. They note that a high
market-to-book ratio as an indicator of overvaluation boosts M&A-activity. Beyond
that, size, sales growth, retained earnings, and free cash flow increase the likelihood of
becoming a bidder, whereas high leverage reduces this probability.
Despite comprehensive research in identifying buyer characteristics, the knowledge
about the relationship between diversification and acquisition likelihood is rather limited.
So far it is known that large companies are more likely to buy other firms than small
ones. Faccio and Masulis (2005) argue that large companies display a higher degree of
diversification. They assume that diversification is positively related to size and draw
the conclusion that diversification leads to a higher M&A-activity. Nevertheless, an
empirical verification for this statement is yet absent. Thus the first hypothesis of our
study H1 is dealing with the link between diversification and transaction propensity:
H1: The transaction probability for diversified firms is higher than for stand alone
firms.
Some of the firm characteristics potentially driving M&A activity are related to the
organizational form and the degree of the firm’s diversification. This interaction has to be
taken into account. Having several different business lines as investment opportunities,
a conglomerate manager may perceive it easier to find valuable internal investment
opportunities than a manager in a stand alone firm. Thus, following Mortal and Schill
(2010) we analyze the question whether internal investment in diversified firms is a
stronger substitute for external transactions than in stand alone firms. This is reflected
in our second hypothesis H2:
H2: Internal investment in diversified firms has a different impact on transaction
probability than in stand alone firms.
One key driver of acquisition likelihood is the availability of cash. Jensen (1986) ar-
gues that excess cash can induce managers to spend cash in corporate acquisitions in
order to increase their power or to reduce their risk of losing power. Harford (1999)
empirically confirms that cash-richness is associated with increasing transaction proba-
bility, coupled with a significantly lower deal performance13. Owen and Yawson (2010)
confirm this relationship with their finding that increasing free cash flow leads to more ac-
quisitions. Diversified companies, however, have significantly lower cash holdings than
single-segment firms. Duchin (2010) shows that due to their active internal capital
13 Early evidence for this hypothesis is also provided by Blanchard et al. (1994).
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market conglomerates hold less cash; investment opportunities and cash flows of their
segments are not perfectly correlated. Lower cash holdings of conglomerates could con-
sequently elicit fewer acquisitions. Thus taking this difference into account we follow the
analysis of Sperling (2010) and calculate cash richnss measures for both types of firms.
This leads us to our third hypothesis H3:
H3: Excess cash of diversified firms has a different impact on transaction probability
than for stand alone firms.
Besides substition of external growth through internal investments/constraints, agency
problems influence the probability and the performance of corporate transactions. “De-
fensive” transactions may offer protection against takeover attempts. Gorton et al.
(2009) argue that top-executives strive to remain independent from other companies.
To protect their independence management initiates corporate acquisitions. Goriatchev
(2006) finds support of the “eat or be eaten” theory in his sample. Baradwaj et al. (1996)
examine negative post-announcement returns of defensive mergers, although Humphrey-
Jenner and Powell (2011) find evidence for the success of protective acquisitions to vary
over different regions. One could argue that conglomerates are already large or com-
plex enough to protect against takeover attempts and do not need to undertake value-
destructive defensive mergers. Nöllgen and Schwetzler (2012) find evidence that indeed
takeover probability is significantly lower for diversified firms. Thus relating to our hy-
pothsis H1 from above, conglomerates would initiate less often corporate transactions.
On the other hand research on diversification has also indentified significant agency prob-
lems related to internal investment and capital allocation efficiency.14 One way to link
internal and external investment in conglomerates is to analyze the impact of internal
capital market efficiency upon external M&A activity: do “bad” and discounted con-
glomerates make more corporate transactions than “good” ones? Using conglomerates’
excess value defined by Berger and Ofek (1996) as a proxy for internal market efficiency,
there could be either direction for the impact of low internal performance: As struggling
with capital allocation problems absorbs management attention M&A activity could be
lower to to a lack of management resources; on the other hand corporate transactions
could be seen as a way out of the internal problems and thus be encouraged by low
internal performance.15 Our hypothesis H4 is thus:
H4: Conglomerates with low excess values have a different transaction propensity than
conglomerates with high excess values.
14 See e.g. Scharfstein and Stein (2000).
15 The impact of potential agency problems on deal performance is discussed in section 2.2.3 below.
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To sum up, lower cash holdings, a broader set of investment opportunities, absorp-
tion of management attention and management entrenchment are hypothesized to yield
different M&A activitiy for conglomerate than for stand alone firms.
2.2.2. Diversification and deal characteristics
There is general evidence that deal characteristics as e.g. the premium offered or the
method of payment have a significant impact on the deal performance. Thus we analyze
whether diversified firms’ transactions are different to the ones of stand alone firms.
We start by looking at the bid premium. Early evidence by Walkling and Edmister
(1985) suggests that different types of offers lead to varying purchase prices. Transac-
tions yielding an increase in the intra-industry concentration (i.e. non-conglomerating
offers), displaying competition between several bidders, or being categorized as hostile
are associated with substantially higher premia. Jennings and Mazeo (1993) confirm
the price increasing effect of target resistance and bidder competition and show that the
occurrence of both effects depends on the cost of access to information about the target.
Walkling and Edmister (1985) suggest that the acquirer’s characteristics influence the
price paid for the target. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) show that former acquirer
performance, media praise of the CEO, and CEO’s compensation drive the bid premium
paid in corporate transactions. This effect is amplified by the absence of a strong and
independent monitoring institution as owner. Jaggi and Dorata (2006) identify further
determinants of the purchase price on the acquirer’s side, e.g. the market-to-book-ratio
and the leverage. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is only very limited knowl-
edge about the impact of the acquirer’s organizational form on the purchase premium.
We therefore use some of the arguments presented in the previous section to develop a
hypothesis to be tested for this variable. Conglomerates display a lower cash level and
a broader set of internal investment opportunities than stand alone firms. Additionally
due to their different business lines the size of potential synergies in an acquisition may
be significantly lower. Thus we hypothesize that diversified firms, if they acquire another
company offer a lower premium than stand alone firms.
H5: Diversified firms pay significantly lower bid premia in corporate transactions than
focused firms.
Combining H5 with the agency problems discussed in the previous section allows to
link conglomerate performance with acquisition premia: Do discounted conglomerates
pay higher premia than non-discounted ones? Following Graham et al. (2002) by ar-
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guing that low operating performance is triggering M&A activities our corresponding
hypothesis is thus:
H6: Discounted diversified firms pay higher premia than diversified firms without
discount.
Another key driver for acquisition performance in terms of share price development
is the method of payment. Loughran and Vijh (1997) provide early evidence for stock
acquirers significantly underperforming cash acquirers. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) show that acquirers’ overvaluation is driving the
choice of the method of payment offered towards a stock offer. Research further clas-
sifies several acquirer, target, and deal characteristics as significant for the choice of
the medium of exchange. Martin (1996) finds that increasing investment opportunities
are associated with more stock transactions, higher cash holdings instead go along with
more cash acquisitions. Faccio and Masulis (2005) identify further factors that drive the
insertion of cash as means of payment, e.g. bidder’s size, partial management ownership
of the acquirer, different industries of buyer and target, and cross-border deals. High
bidder’s market-to-book ratio and leverage instead make stock acquisitions more likely,
the same holds true for firm size. Though, the impact of conglomeration on the method
of payment (i.e., cash or stock) is not yet explored. When hypothesizing about potential
differences between stand alone and diversified firms, we find arguments in favour for
both directions: Lower cash levels of conglomerates may yield a lower fraction of cash
offers. On the other hand there is evidence that the degree of informational asymmetry
between acquirer and target negatively affects the choice of acquirer’s stock as trans-
action currency: Faccio and Masulis (2005) argue that target shareholders are more
reluctant to accept stock offers if the uncertainty about the bidder’s equity increases,
which might occur if the acquirer’s industry is different from the one of the target. They
find evidence that extra-industry deals are more often paid with cash than equity. Taken
the fact that due to their different business lines and the potentially inefficient internal
capital allocation diversified firms may be perceived as more opaque to outside investors
than stand alone firms.16 Thus target shareholder may be reluctant to accept a stock
offer and thus enforce either a higher premium or a greater fraction of the offer paid
in cash. Our hypothesis H7 is thus left open with respect to the sign of the potential
difference:
H7: Diversified firms use significantly different methods of payments stand stand alone
16 E.g. Nanda and Narayanan (1999).
85
2. Diversification and acquisitions
firms.
If this hypothesis is true, we can conclude that investors value a given takeover pre-
mium of a complex organization differently with respect to its currency. Moreover, a
confirmation would suggest that a potentially reduced likelihood of acquisitions can be
explained with differences in deal characteristics.
2.2.3. Diversification and deal performance
Having discussed differences in deal propensity in section 2.2.1 we now look at potential
differences in the performance of transactions undertaken between diversified firms and
stand alones. When hypothesizing about general differences in performance we argue
for a lower transaction performance for conglomerate firms: Masulis et al. (2007) and
Harford et al. (2012) provide evidence for acquirer’s management entrenchment having
a significant negative impact on transaction performance. Taking into account that
takeover probability is significantly lower for diversified firms17 conglomerization offers
a significant degree of takeover protection, thus increasing or at least preserving c.p. the
level of management’s entrenchment18. This is reflected in our hypothesis H8:
H8: Diversified firms have significantly lower transaction performance than stand
alone firms.
Taking the empirical evidence for a negative relationship between entrenchment and
corporate performance into account19 we are also interested whether highly inefficient
internal investment is coupled with low efficiency of external investment, i.e. corporate
transactions. Thus we analyze the link between conglomerate performance, proxied by
Berger and Ofek (1995) excess values and transaction performance of diversified firms.
Our hypothesis H9 states a negative relationship between the two variables:
H9: Diversified firms with low excess values have a significantly lower transaction
performance than diversified firms with high excess values.
Finally Harford et al. (2012) provide evidence that acquisitions of entrenched man-
agers only create poor synergies by showing that combined value creation of these trans-
actions is significantly lower than the one of not entrenched managers. Thus our hy-
pothesis H10 investigates the difference between stand alone and conglomerate acquirers
17 See Nöllgen and Schwetzler (2012) for empirical evidence.
18 Harford et al. (2012) assume in their analysis that management generally aims for increasing its
entrenchment.
19 See Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Baradwaj et al. (1996) and Gorton et al. (2009).
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with respect to total deal performance:
H10: Diversified acquirers have a lower total deal performance than stand-alone buyers
2.3. Data and methodology
The initial sample contains 30,000 firm years from a worldwide sample from 2001 to
2008. Almost 28% of these observations consist of diversified companies.20 The cap-
ital market and economic data stem from Thomson Reuters Datastream, the balance
sheet figures are from Thomson Reuter Worldscope databases. Our initial transaction
sample consists of 2,339 control-taking transactions of independent, publicly listed, and
non-financial firms from 2001 to 2008. We only analyze transactions whose acquir-
ers’ financial accounting statements are reported at Worldscope and share price data
is available at Datastream. This filtering process reduces our sample to 1,543 obser-
vations. Furthermore, all transactions must provide data about all necessary (control)
variables. After we exclude those deals that do not contain all data, our analysis of the
post-acquisition performance includes 719 transactions.21 The size of our data sample
is thus within the range other studies performing comparable analyses. E.g., Harford
(1999) examines 487 transactions and the sample of Doukas and (2008) contains 742
mergers. The method of payment analysis includes 725 and the bid premium analysis
consists of 621 acquisitions that match the criteria mentioned above.
Diversification measures We identify two measures of diversification based on Fama-
French-48 industry classification. The first measure of diversification DIVERSIFIED is
a binary variable, which is 1 if a company is diversified and 0 otherwise. We classify a
company as diversified if it reports at least two segments in different industries according
Fama-French-48 industry classification22 and if no segment accounts for more than 90%
of the total firm sales. >2 SEGMENTS is 1 if the corresponding firms reports segments
in at least three different industries and again if no segment accounts for more than 90%
of the sales and 0 otherwise.
20 See the definition of diversified companies below.
21 We provide an overview about the countries covered by our sample in the appendix in Table 2.8.
22 We use Fama-French industry classification to use industry groups that share common risk char-
acteristics and risk premia (see Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Bhojraj et al. (2003)).
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Control variables Following Chaney et al. (1991) increasing leverage reduces the like-
lihood of cash payment. Jensen (1986) argues that increasing leverage leads to a higher
level of control and reduces therewith the number of (inefficient) acquisitions. We define
the variable LEVERAGE as the ratio of long-term debt plus short-term debt and total
assets.
The overvaluation hypothesis predicts that bidder’s overvaluation enforces M&A-
activity. First suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2004) it is supported by Owen and Yawson (2010) who show that increasing acquirer
market-to-book ratio (MTB) makes acquisitions more likely. We define MTB as the
ratio of market value of common equity to the book value of common equity.
Palepu (1986) finds that smaller firms are more likely to become a target, Owen and
Yawson (2010) find empirical evidence that large firms are more likely to become buyers.
Faccio and Masulis (2005) posit that large firms have better excess to capital markets,
which leads to a more frequent use of cash in payment. We thus include SIZE, which is
computed by the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets deflated to 2001 as a control
variable.
Harford (1999) shows that price earnings ratio (PE) is positively related to the prob-
ability of becoming an acquirer. Owen and Yawson (2010) find that sales growth (GR-
SALES) is associated with more corporate transactions. We measure sales growth over a
1-year period prior to the respective firm year. We include both variables PE and SALES
in our acquisition likelihood and takeover likelihood regression. Based on the model of
Comment and Jarrell (1995), we further add in our transaction prediction model the
variables abnormal return (AR) and net working capital (NWC).
According to Berger and Ofek (1995), we integrate a variable that accounts for the
excess value of conglomerates compared to their focused benchmarks (EXCESS VALUE).
For calculating this variable we follow the pioneering approach of Berger and Ofek (1995).
We determine the imputed value as the benchmark of a matched portfolio of stand alone
firms based on median firm value to sales multiples of focused firms the conglomerate’s
segments sales. Excess value is the log ratio of conglomerates market firm value to
imputed firm value or the log ratio of stand alone market firm value to imputed firm
value (based on median sales multiple of stand alones in the same industry) respectively.
Moreover, we include acquisition-based control variables, identified by previous re-
search, in our regression equations. Faccio and Masulis (2005) show that the proba-
bility of stock payment increases as the relative deal size (REL SIZE) becomes larger.
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Swieringa and Schauten (2008) hypothesize that insufficient cash resources and high bar-
gaining power of large target’s management (who have a job retention ambition) could
be reasons for this observation. We compute REL SIZE by dividing the deal value by
the sum of the deal value and the acquirer’s market value.
Faccio and Masulis (2005) find evidence for cross-border (CROSS BORDER) deals
being predominantly paid with cash. Limited access to information, higher trading costs,
and exchange risk are potential reasons for this result. We set CROSS BORDER 1 if
the target is in another country than the buyer and 0 otherwise.
Martin (1996) provides indication that the mode of acquisition is relevant for method
of payment. He finds tender offers to be more likely to be paid with cash. We thus include
deal attitude by a variable HOSTILE set equal to 1 if the acquisition was classified hostile
and 0 otherwise.
Internal investment (INVESTMENT) might substitute external investment i.e. cor-
porate transactions. We measure INVESTMENT as CAPEX devided by total operating
assets deflated to the year 2001.
Jensen (1986) argues that excess cash tempts managers to make (value destructive)
acquisitions. Harford (1999) provides empirical support for this hypothesis. Further-
more, Martin (1996) finds that transactions are more likely to be paid with cash if the
cash holdings of the buyer are high. We thus introduce a control variable EXCESS
CASH. It is calculated as the relative deviation of a firm’s cash holdings from its nor-
mal cash holdings. The latter is estimated based on a regression equation developed by
Sperling (2010), including independent variables as market-to-book ratio, real firm size
(in 2001 U.S. dollars), cash flow ratio, liquid asset substitution ratio, capital expenditure
ratio, leverage ratio, the variability of firm’s cash flow ratio, R&D-to-sales ratio used as
cost of financial distress, dividend indicator, and ADRI23 for the firm’s country. For
determining the normal cash holdings of a firm we use the following regression equation
relying on the coefficients estimates from Sperling (2010):
ln (CHi,t) = α + β1 ×MTBi,t + β2 × ln(TA2001i,t ) + β3 × CFi,t
+β4 × LASi,t + β5 × CAPEXi,t + β6 × LEVi,t
+β7 × σi,t(CF ) + β8 × CoFDi,t + β9 ×DIVi,t
+β10 × ADRIi,t + εi,t
(2.1)
23 Anti-director rights index of a firm’s country by La Porta et al. (1998).
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Dependent variables Following Owen and Yawson (2010), we apply a binomial logit
model for the acquisition likelihood analysis. The dependent variable ACQ is 1 if a firm
is a bidder within the certain firm year and 0 otherwise. For our analysis of the method
of payment we follow Faccio and Masulis (2005) and apply an ordered logit regression
model. In this case the dependent variable MOP is 2 if the deal is solely paid with
cash, 1 if both cash and equity are used as a medium of exchange and 0 otherwise. For
our post-acquisition performance and bid premium analysis we use an OLS regression
model. The dependent variable of the post-acquisition performance is the cumulative
abnormal return from day -2 to day +2 relative to the bid announcement. We estimate
cumulative abnormal returns based on a single-factor model. We compare the actual
returns of the acquirer with its normal performance between -504 and -252 days before
the transaction by using the capital asset pricing model in equation 2.2 (Campell et al.
(1997)).
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi × (Rm,t −Rf,t) + εi,t ∀tε [−504,−253] (2.2)
Ri,t is the return of company i at time t, Rf,t is the return of U.S. treasury bills
24.
(risk-free security) at time t, and Rm,t is the return of the value-weighted all equity index
market portfolio25 at time t. We use the estimated coefficients to calculate the normal
performance26 for the event period from day -2 to day +2. The abnormal return is the
difference between the estimated normal return and the actual return. The bid premium
is calculated as the difference between the actual price paid for the target’s stock and its
equity market value divided by the equity market value of the target at the day before
the announcement date. We use robust standard errors for all regressions.
24 Since according to Campell et al. (1997) U.S. treasury bills are typically used to determine the risk
free return and almost 50% of our observations are U.S. based, we also used U.S. treasury bills as
risk free return.
25 Since according to Campell et al. (1997) S&P 500 is typically used to determine the market return
and almost 50% of our observations are U.S. based, we also used S&P 500 as market return.
26 Excess returns, i.e. the actual return of firm i at t minus the risk-free return at t.
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2.4. Descriptive statistics
In Table 2.1 we provide summary statistics of our sample. Column 2 exhibits the mean
values for all firm years of our sample, column 3 for all acquirers in year t-1 and column
4 for all other firm years. Column 5 shows the results of a two-group mean comparison
t-test on the differences of means between targets and non-targets.
Table 2.1.: Summary statistics for the analysis of the acquisition likelihood
This table shows the mean values of the diversification and control variables for all firm
years, for all aquirers only, and for all non-acquirers (Others firms) only of the acquisition
likelihood sample. DIVERSIFIED is 1 if the firm reports more than 1 different segment
according to Fama-French-48 industry classification in t-1, and if the largest segment ac-
counts for less than 90% of the firm’s sales and 0 otherwise. >2 SEGMENTS is 1 if the
firm reports more than 2 different segment according to Fama-French-48 industry classifi-
cation in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the firm’s sales and
0 otherwise. EV is the excess value (market value to imputed value) in t-1 based on sales
multiples. DIV * EV is the interaction term between DIVERSIFIED and EV. SIZE is the
natural logarithm of total assets in t-1 deflated to 2001. AR is the abnormal return in
year t-1, MTB the market-to-book ratio in t-1 PE is the price earnings ratio in t-1, NWC
is the net working capital in t-1 and LEVERAGE firm’s leverage in t-1. GRSALES is the
sales growth from t-2 to t-1. * (**,***) denotes the (two-sided) statistical significance on
a 10% (5%,1%) level.
Variable Sample- wide Acquirer Other firms t-test for difference
DIVERSIFIED 0.278 0.305 0.277 -1.537
>2 SEGMENTS 0.167 0.192 0.167 -1.665*
EV 0.368 0.822 0.357 -5.487***
DIV * EV -0.011 0.172 -0.016 -3.780***
SIZE 12.901 14.597 12.860 -21.794***
AR 0.156 0.147 0.156 0.401
MTB 2.953 3.748 2.934 -2.872***
PE 30.009 33.750 29.919 -1.975**
NWC 205,003 772,121 191,324 -21.511***
LEVERAGE 0.199 0.197 0.199 0.310
GRSALES 0.207 0.269 0.205 -2.699***
Observations 26,580 626 25,954
In our univariate analysis we find no indication that acquirers are less often diversi-
fied than focused firms. Instead the results even suggest that acquirers are more often
strongly diversified than non-acquirers. Nevertheless, these first findings can only be
confirmed via multivariate analyses. Furthermore, we find that excess values are signif-
icantly higher for acquirers, as well for the total sample and for diversified companies
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subsample. We observe statistically significant differences for almost all control variables,
suggesting that acquirers generally are different from non-acquirers.
2.5. Diversification and corporate transactions
2.5.1. Diversification and transaction probability
In the following section we examine the relationship between diversification and the
likelihood to become an acquirer. The results of our logistic regression are presented in
Table 2.2.
Looking at our two diversification variables, the DIVERSIFIED coefficient estimate
in model (1) being insignificant suggesting that diversification per se is not significantly
related to acquisition likelihood. However the results for the variable >2 SEGMENTS
in model (2) document that higher degreees of diversification in terms of reporting
more than two segments is significantly associated with a decreasing M&A-activity even
if we control for excess value and conglomerate discount. We interpret this finding
as weak support for our first hypothesis H1 that (strongly) diversified firms initiate
fewer acquisitions than focused firms. Measured in marginal effects we find that the
acquisition likelihood in an average firm year27 is 0.3%-age points lower for conglomerates
than for focused firms. Considering that the average likelihood of initiating a corporate
transaction is 1.5% in our sample, the results suggest that a diversified firm, with average
coefficients that are measured in our model, is 20% less likely to acquire compared to an
average stand-alone. Most of our control variables are significant in their hypothesized
sign in all of the four regression models.28
Looking at the impact of conglomerate performance on deal propensity we find no
support for our hypothesis H4: In all of our equations we do not find that conglomerate
excess value is significantly related to the dependent variable. Additionally in model (3)
we do not find evidence that increasing internal investment is significantly related to
27 Average firm year denotes the case where all coefficients of a firm year take the average coefficient
values of our sample.
28 Increasing market value compared to total assets is associated with higher acquisition likelihood.
We find that increasing leverage significantly reduces firms’ M&A-activities, which is in line with
Jensen (1986) “control hypothesis” of debt. The larger the firm is the more often it is engaged
in corporate takeovers. The same effect holds true for price-earnings ratio and sales growth. Ad-
ditionally, an increasing market-to-book ratio is associated with a growing proclivity to initiate
corporate transactions. Although the coefficient NWC is highly significant in all models (t-value
of e.g., 3.76*10−8) in model (4), the coeffcient is displayed at 0.000 (coefficient of 1.93*10−7).
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Table 2.2.: Logistic regression for the acquisition likelihood
This table shows the results of the logistic regression for the acquisition likelihood. The
dependent variable is 1 if the firm acquires in year t and 0 otherwise. DIVERSIFIED
(>2 SEGMENTS) is 1 if the firm reports more than 1 (2) different segment according to
Fama-French-48 industry classification in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less
than 90% of the firm’s sales and 0 otherwise. EV is the excess value (market value to
imputed value) in t-1 based on sales multiples. DIV * EV is the interaction term between
>2 SEGMENTS and EV. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in t-1 deflated to
2001. AR is the abnormal return in year t-1, MTB the market-to-book ratio in t-1 PE is
the price earnings ratio in t-1, NWC is the net working capital in t-1 and LEVERAGE
firm’s leverage in t-1. GRSALES is the sales growth from t-2 to t-1. INVESTMENT is
CAPEX divided by total operating assets in t-1. EXCESS CASH is the deviation of the
firm’s cash holdings from its normal cash holdings in t-1.DIV * INVESTMENT (DIV *
EXCESS CASH) is the interaction term between >2 SEGMENTS and INVESTMENT
(EXCESS CASH). The upper figure shows the regression coefficient the lower figure in
parenthesis displays the corresponding robust standard error. * (**,***) denotes the (two-
sided) statistical significance on a 10% (5%,1%) level.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
DIVERSIFIED -0.105
(0.094)
>2 SEGMENTS -0.229** -0.211 1.305
(0.109) (0.163) (1.301)
EV 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.096*** 0.124***
(0.094) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026)
DIV * EV -0.051 -0.052 -0.026 -0.055
(0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.047)
SIZE 0.442*** 0.447*** 0.434*** 0.432***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
AR 0.179** 0.181** 0.184** 0.162*
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.092)
MTB 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.009*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
PE 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NWC 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEVERAGE -1.613*** -1.599*** -1.686*** -1.841***
(0.305) (0.304) (0.324) (0.320)
GRSALES 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.203*** 0.200***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.044)
INVESTMENT -0.345
(0.292)




DIV * EXCESS CASH -1.039
(0.963)
Intercept -9.733*** -9.789*** -9.525*** -11.357***
(0.299) (0.300) (0.367) (0.646)
Pseudo-R2 0.099 0.100 0.100 0.101
χ2-statistics 760.0 760.4 765.7 679.2
Observations 26,580 26,580 26,564 23,536
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acquisition likelihood for all firms in our total sample and for conglomerates. Thus our
results do not support hypothesis H2: external acquisitions are neither a substitute nor
a complement of internal growth opportunities. With respect to our excess cash variable
we first find general evidence that excess cash is favouring corporate transactions. In
model (4) the coefficients estimate of EXCESS CASH is positive and significant at 1%
confidence level. However this general effect does not hold for diversified firms: With
respect to hypothesis H3 we do find the opposite effect with a negative coefficient, though
not statistically significant; still we do not find evidence that cash rich conglomerates
initiate more acquisitions than cash poor ones. This finding may be interpreted as
cash rich diversified firms still perceive their internal growth opportunities over several
different business lines as more attractive than stand alone firms in a single business,
thus being more reluctant to look for external growth options. With regards to the
overall robustness of our model,29 we perform a Heckprob test to examine the existence
of endogenous factors between diversification and acquisition likelihood and do not find
evidence for endogeneity.30
To gain a deeper insight into the impact of excess cash on M&A activities of diversified
firms we extend our analysis with respect to hypothesis H3 to multi-segment firms (with
segments in three or more different industries) and compare the association between
reporting segments in more than two different industries and acquisition likelihood for
different subsamples with respect to cash richness. In Table 2.3 we examine this rela-
tionship for the 25% of the companies disposing of the highest cash holdings, the 25%
of the firms having the lowest cash holdings, and the firms in between.
Table 2.3 indicates again cash rich firms are less likely to acquire if they report seg-
ments in more than two different industries. The coefficient is negative and significant
on a 5%-level. If the firms are not cash rich, diversification does not show any significant
relationship to acquisition likelihood.
The findings again support our hypothesis H3 and suggest that a company displaying
high excess cash holdings is less likely to initiate corporate transactions if it is strongly
diversified. In contrary, cash poor firms are similarly likely to make less acquisitions,
independent from their organizational form. These findings support the notion that
lower cash holdings of conglomerates are not the reason for lower acquisition likelihood
29 The χ2-statistics of more than 670 in all of models prove the overall significance of our model.
Moreover, we examine the variance inflation factors for all of our independent variables (see Table
2.9) and find that multicollinearity does not substantially affect our sample.
30 The inverse Mill’s ratio as a measure for endogeneity is insignificant.
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of conglomerates. The next step of our analysis is examining the performance of the
transactions initiated by diversified firms compared the ones initiated by focused com-
panies.
2.5.2. Diversification and deal characteristics
In this section we investigate the relationship between diversification and deal character-
istics. Table 2.4 analyzes the relationship between diversification and the premium paid
in the transaction. Starting with our diversification measure we do not find statistically
significant evidence supporting our hypothesis H5: diversified firms do not pay different
premia in their transactions than stand alone firms. With respect to our hypothesis H6
we only find weak evidence for low conglomerate performance driving higher bids: For
our models (2) and (4) the interaction term’s coefficient is positive, and in (4) significant
at 5% confidence level. Model (5) in Table 2.4 analyzing the conglomerate subsample
also shows a positive impact at 10% confidence level. Thus we reject our hypothesis
H6: Discounted conglomerates do not pay higher bid premia. Several of our control
variables are significantly related to bid premia. We find the relative size of the target
having a significantly negative impact on the transaction premium. Cash acquisitions
are associated with significantly higher bid premia.31 Additionally, increasing acquirer’s
price earnings ratios of yield increasing transaction premia for all firms.
As a next step we investigate differences regarding the resources that are used to
pay the target shareholders between focused and diversified firms. We analyze our
hypothesis H7, acquirer diversification having significant impact on method of payment
in acquisitions based on an ordered logistic regression model, using method of payment
as a categorized dependent variable. If H7 is true, the variables DIVERSIFIED and >2
SEGMENTS should have coefficients significantly different from zero.
In Table 2.5 we present the results for our ordered logistic regression about the method
of payment. We do not find supportive evidence for H7: Both variables DIVERSIFIED
and>2 SEGMENTS show insignificant coefficient’s estimates in all four models including
this variables. Acquirer’s degree of diversification does not significantly affect method
of payment in corporate transactions. Our analysis identifies significant control variable
coefficients, suggesting that larger companies use significantly more cash as means of
payment. Cross border deals are significantly more often paid with cash, which is in line
31 This effect is attributed to the different tax implications of stock and cash offerings for target
shareholders.
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Table 2.3.: Logistic regression for the acquisition likelihood after clustering companies according to
their extent of excess cash
This table shows the results of the logistic regression for the acquisition likelihood. The
dependent variable is 1 if the firm makes in an acquisition in year t and 0 otherwise.
Cash rich includes only companies, whose excess cash holdings are within the top 25% of
the sample, cash poor includes only companies, whose excess cash holdings are within the
bottom 25% of the sample and medium cash includes the firms in between. >2 SEGMENTS
is 1 if the firm reports more than 2 different segment according to Fama-French-48 industry
classification in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the firm’s sales
and 0 otherwise. EV is the excess value (market value to imputed value) in t-1 based on
sales multiples. DIV * EV is the interaction term between DIVERSIFIED and EV. SIZE is
the natural logarithm of total assets in t-1 deflated to 2001. AR is the abnormal return in
year t-1, MTB the market-to-book ratio in t-1 PE is the price earnings ratio in t-1, NWC
is the net working capital in t-1 and LEVERAGE firm’s leverage in t-1. GRSALES is the
sales growth from t-2 to t-1. The upper figure shows the regression coefficient the lower
figure in parenthesis displays the corresponding robust standard error. * (**,***) denotes
the (two-sided) statistical significance on a 10% (5%,1%) level.
Variable Cash rich Medium cash Cash poor
>2 SEGMENTS -0.370** -0.221 0.204
(0.182) (0.184) (0.203)
EV 0.191*** 0.067 0.205***
(0.051) (0.070) (0.065)
DIV * EV -0.086 0.020 -0.109
(0.062) (0.075) (0.070)
SIZE 0.434*** 0.458*** 0.507***
(0.029) (0.045) (0.057)
AR 0.191* 0.094 0.140
(0.114) (0.163) (0.171)
MTB 0.009 0.012** 0.020
(0.005) (0.006) (0.012)
PE 0.000 0.003*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
NWC 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEVERAGE -0.944** -1.972*** -2.107***
(0.409) (0.558) (0.657)
GRSALES 0.129*** 0.292*** 0.217*
(0.047) (0.073) (0.111)
Intercept -9.396*** -10.240*** -10.755***
(0.386) (0.599) (0.760)
Pseudo-R2 0.091 0.113 0.132
χ2-statistics 360.06 261.8 204.93
Observations 10,702 10,190 5,688
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Table 2.4.: Regression for the impact of diversification on bid premia
This table shows the results of the regression for the bid premium - the dependent variable
is bid premium, which is defined as the difference between the actual price paid for the
target and its market value divided by the market value of the target. DIVERSIFIED is
1 if the firm reports more than 1 different segment according to Fama-French-48 industry
classification in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the firm’s sales
and 0 otherwise. >2 SEGMENTS is 1 if the firm reports more than 2 different segment
according to Fama-French-48 industry classification in t-1, and if the largest segment ac-
counts for less than 90% of the firm’s sales and 0 otherwise. EV is the excess value (market
value to imputed value) in t-1 based on sales multiples. DIV * EV is the interaction term
between DIVERSIFIED and EV. GRSALES is the sales growth from t-2 to t-1. LEVER-
AGE firm’s leverage in t-1. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in t-1 deflated
to 2001. MTB is the market-to-book ratio in t-1. PE is the price earnings ratio in t-1.
MOP is the method of payment: 2 denotes full cash payment, 1 mixed payment and 0
full equity payment. CROSS BORDER is 1 if the acquirer’s and target’s home country
are different and 0 otherwise. HOSTILE is 1 if the mode of the acquistion was hostile
and 0 otherwise. REL SIZE is the relative deal size of the transaction. The upper figure
shows the regression coefficient the lower figure in parenthesis displays the corresponding
robust standard error. * (**,***) denotes the (two-sided) statistical significance on a 10%
(5%,1%) level.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DIVERSIFIED -3.321 -4.916
(2.818) (3.292)
>2 SEGMENTS -4.318 -5.968*
(3.103) (3.549)
EV -0.194 -0.406 2.468*
(1.087) (1.041) (1.253)
DIV * EV 2.377 3.334**
(1.563) (1.651)
GRSALES -1.931* -2.270* -1.872 -2.244* -11.406
(1.163) (1.261) (1.159) (1.270) (9.283)
LEVERAGE 3.925 3.294 3.433 2.382 7.921
(9.096) (9.669) (9.115) (9.701) (18.996)
SIZE -0.776 -0.598 -0.708 -0.548 -2.083
(1.042) (1.180) (1.061) (1.194) (1.580)
MTB -0.029 -0.050 -0.033 -0.046 0.215
(0.126) (0.135) (0.120) (0.131) (0.145)
PE 0.121*** 0.134*** 0.122*** 0.134*** 0.114
(0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.083)
MOP 8.375*** 7.834*** 8.322*** 7.690*** 6.481**
(1.564) (1.671) (1.551) (1.655) (2.881)
CROSS BORDER -2.720 -3.142 -2.598 -3.104 -1.811
(3.074) (3.332) (3.064) (3.324) (5.231)
HOSTILE -5.782* -3.873 -5.820* -4.104 -4.033
(3.335) (3.729) (3.335) (3.726) (7.063)
REL SIZE -4.791*** -4.704*** -4.800*** -4.687*** -2.096*
(1.544) (1.639) (1.586) (1.691) (1.131)
Intercept 28.238* 27.342* 27.243* 27.089 45.660*
(14.620) (16.348) (14.887) (16.574) (24.951)
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.067 0.086 0.069 0.085
F-statistics 5.01 3.89 4.98 3.96 2.97
Observations 621 554 621 554 176
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with the argument of Coval and Moskowitz (1999) that investors have a home country
bias and are therefore less willing to accept shares from abroad as medium of exchange.
Companies with high sales growth tend to use more stock in their acquisitions, as the
negative coefficient of our variable GRSALES in models (1) to (4) suggests (significant
at 5% and 1% confidence level resp.). Interestingly, excess cash is significantly negatively
related to cash as means of payments in acquisitions in our models (1) to (4), an obser-
vation which on first glance may look counter-intuitive. Although not being significant
for our conglomerate subsample in model (5) this result supports the evidence found by
Sperling (2010) that cash rich firms do not prefer cash as transaction currency.
Model (5) in Table 2.5 shows the regression results for our conglomerate subsample.
In contrast to the overall sample we find that high market valuation in terms of market
to book value and price earnings ratio now is significantly yielding fewer cash offers
whereas SIZE and CROSS BORDER loose their significance.
2.5.3. Diversification and post-acquisition performance
In this section we analyze the post-acquisition performance of conglomerates and poten-
tial differences to stand alone firms. We measure transaction performance by calculating
the cumulative abnormal return for the period of day -2 to day +2 around the deal an-
nouncement. For hypothesis H8 to be supported a significantly positive coefficient for
both diversification variables DIVERSIFIED and/or >2 SEGMENTS is necessary.
Table 2.6 shows the results of our regression anaylsis using acquirer CARs as depen-
dent variable. We do not find any significant relationship between the organizational
form of the acquirer (conglomerate or stand-alone) and post-acquisition performance in
any of our models (1) to (4). Thus hypothesis H8 is to be rejected: Stand alone firms
are more frequent, but not necessarily better acquirer than diversified firms. With re-
spect to our hypothesis H9 we do not find evidence for a significant relationship between
a conglomerates’ excess value and its transaction performance. Our hypothesis, that
the higher level of takeover protection offered by diversification induces management to
make worse transactions thus is not supported and we have to reject H9. A potential
explanation for this effect might be the fact that having reached a certain level of en-
trenchment via diversification does not necessitate any transactions for further increase
of entrenchment. Control variables in our regressions (1) to (4) show the hypothesized
signs and support earlier evidence: We find that acquisitions paid in cash are associ-
ated with higher abnormal returns. Moreover, large acquirers have a significantly lower
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Table 2.5.: Logistic regression for the impact of diversification on method of payment
This table shows the results of the ordered logistic regression for the method of payment.
The dependent variable is 2 if the firm pays the acquisition solely with cash, 1 if it pays
with cash and equity and 0 otherwise. DIVERSIFIED is 1 if the firm reports more than
1 different segment according to Fama-French-48 industry classification in t-1, and if the
largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the firm’s sales and 0 otherwise. >2 SEG-
MENTS is 1 if the firm reports more than 2 different segment according to Fama-French-48
industry classification in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the
firm’s sales and 0 otherwise. EV is the excess value (market value to imputed value) in
t-1 based on sales multiples. DIV * EV is the interaction term between DIVERSIFIED
and EV. EXCESS CASH is the deviation of a firm’s cash holdings from its normal cash
holdings. GRSALES is the sales growth from t-2 to t-1. LEVERAGE firm’s leverage in
t-1. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in t-1 deflated to 2001. MTB is the
market-to-book ratio in t-1 PE is the price earnings ratio in t-1. CROSS BORDER is 1
if the acquirer’s and target’s home country are different and 0 otherwise. HOSTILE is 1
if the mode of the acquistion was hostile and 0 otherwise. REL SIZE is the relative deal
size of the transaction. The upper figure shows the regression coefficient the lower figure
in parenthesis displays the corresponding robust standard error. * (**,***) denotes the
(two-sided) statistical significance on a 10% (5%,1%) level.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DIVERSIFIED 0.235 0.059
(0.189) (0.240)
>2 SEGMENTS 0.233 0.142
(0.212) (0.253)
EV 0.006 0.010 0.161
(0.095) (0.094) (0.171)
DIV * EV 0.178 0.172
(0.148) (0.159)
EXCESS CASH -1.181** -1.201* -1.235** -1.212* -1.076
(0.571) (0.726) (0.560) (0.718) (0.399)
GRSALES -0.628*** -0.677** -0.628*** -0.667** -1.058
(0.234) (0.273) (0.234) (0.273) (0.012)
LEVERAGE 0.900* 0.866 0.911* 0.865 0.730
(0.517) (0.535) (0.517) (0.534) (0.468)
SIZE 0.205*** 0.214*** 0.206*** 0.215*** 0.294
(0.048) (0.052) (0.048) (0.051) (0.004)
MTB -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.481)
PE -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015)
CROSS BORDER 1.031*** 0.923*** 1.017*** 0.906*** 0.577
(0.214) (0.223) (0.212) (0.221) (0.217)
HOSTILE 0.317 0.325 0.313 0.327 0.036
(0.238) (0.250) (0.238) (0.250) (0.941)
REL SIZE -0.234 -0.225 -0.231 -0.226 -0.178
(0.227) (0.237) (0.236) (0.235) (0.304)
Intercept 1 -0.334 -0.360 -0.405 -0.342 0.996
(0.926) (1.180) (0.927) (1.182) (2.439)
Intercept 2 1.251 1.258 1.180 1.276 2.219
(0.928) (1.173) (0.928) (1.176) (2.431)
Pseudo-R2 0.075 0.074 0.075 0.073 0.094
χ2-statistics 79.62 64.94 78.75 64.08 24.99
Observations 725 653 725 653 146
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transaction performance, as indicated by the negative sign of our SIZE control variable.
Finally, following the suggestion of Harford et al. (2012) we analyze the impact of
diversification on the combined transaction performance of the acquirer and the tar-
get. We proxy the combined wealth effects of the transaction as dependent variable by
weighing and combining the acquirers abnormal return with the bid premium paid for
the target by the acquirer. The results of our models (1) and (2) in Table 2.7 do not show
a significant impact of strong diversification on the combined transaction performance.
Thus we reject our hypothesis H10.
2.6. Conclusion
We investigate the impact of diversification on acquisition likelihood and performance.
We run our analysis in the period from 2001 to 2008 using a large worldwide sample of
more than 30,000 firm years.
In general we find that transactions performed by diversified firms are in many ways
similar to those done by stand alone firms: Conglomerates pay similar premia, use
similar MOPs and have no worse transaction performance than firms operating in a
single line business. Our findings also suggest that transactions in general and for
conglomerates especially are neither substitute nor complement for internal investments.
The same result holds for investment inefficiencies in diversified firms: Conglomerates
excess values are not related to deal propensity and transaction performance. We find
slightly lower deal propensities for highly diversified firms. Our results do not support our
entrenchment related hypotheses: Though offering a higher level of takeover protection
than stand alone firms multi business firms’ management is not induced to make more
value destructive transactions. One potential explanation for this result is that once
having reached a protective level of entrenchment by diversification there is no more
need for any transactions potentially further increasing it. We believe that the only
significant difference between conglomerate and stand alone transaction behavior points
into the same direction: In contrast to stand alone firms cash rich conglomerates show
a significantly lower deal propensity.
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Table 2.6.: Regression for the impact of diversification on post-acquisition performance
This table shows the results of the regression for the post-acquisition performance. The
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return from day -2 to day +2 relative to
the bid announcement. DIVERSIFIED is 1 if the firm reports more than 1 different seg-
ment according to Fama-French-48 industry classification in t-1, and if the largest segment
accounts for less than 90% of the firm’s sales and 0 otherwise. >2 SEGMENTS is 1 if the
firm reports more than 2 different segment according to Fama-French-48 industry classifi-
cation in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the firm’s sales and
0 otherwise. EV is the excess value (market value to imputed value) in t-1 based on sales
multiples. DIV * EV is the interaction term between DIVERSIFIED and EV. PRECAR
is the cumulative abnormal return in the year before the transaction. LEVERAGE firm’s
leverage in t-1. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in t-1 deflated to 2001. MTB is
the market-to-book ratio in t-1 PE is the price earnings ratio in t-1, NWC is the net work-
ing capital in t-1. HOSTILE is 1 if the mode of the acquistion was hostile and 0 otherwise.
MOP is the method of payment: 2 denotes full cash payment, 1 mixed payment and 0 full
equity payment. REL SIZE is the relative deal size of the transaction. The upper figure
shows the regression coefficient the lower figure in parenthesis displays the corresponding
robust standard error. * (**,***) denotes the (two-sided) statistical significance on a 10%
(5%,1%) level.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
DIVERSIFIED -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.009)




DIV * EV -0.014** -0.012*
(0.007) (0.007)
PRECAR -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
LEVERAGE 0.036 0.029 0.034 0.029
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
SIZE -0.005** -0.004* -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
MTB 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HOSTILE 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
MOP 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
REL SIZE 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Intercept 0.021 0.006 0.027 0.015
(0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033)
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.108 0.080 0.104
F-statistics 3.38 2.52 3.41 2.47
Observations 719 645 719 645
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Table 2.7.: Regression for the impact of diversification on post-acquisition performance
This table shows the results of the regression for the post-acquisition performance plus bid
premium. The dependent variable is weighted average of the cumulative abnormal return
from day -2 to day +2 relative to the bid announcement and the bid premium, which is
defined as the difference between the actual price paid for the target and its market value
divided by the market value of the target. >2 SEGMENTS is 1 if the firm reports more
than 2 different segment according to Fama-French-48 industry classification in t-1, and if
the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the firm’s sales and 0 otherwise. EV is
the excess value (market value to imputed value) in t-1 based on sales multiples. DIV *
EV is the interaction term between DIVERSIFIED and EV. PRECAR is the cumulative
abnormal return in the year before the transaction. LEVERAGE firm’s leverage in t-1.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in t-1 deflated to 2001. MTB is the market-
to-book ratio in t-1 PE is the price earnings ratio in t-1, NWC is the net working capital
in t-1. HOSTILE is 1 if the mode of the acquistion was hostile and 0 otherwise. MOP is
the method of payment: 2 denotes full cash payment, 1 mixed payment and 0 full equity
payment. REL SIZE is the relative deal size of the transaction. The upper figure shows
the regression coefficient the lower figure in parenthesis displays the corresponding robust
standard error. * (**,***) denotes the (two-sided) statistical significance on a 10% (5%,1%)
level.
Variable (1) (2)
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Appendix
Table 2.8.: Overview of firm years per country
This table shows the countries covered by our transaction likelihood sample, the number


















United Kingdom 3043 11
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Table 2.9.: Multicollinearity test
This table shows the results of tests for multicollinearity. Column 2 shows the variance
inflation factors and column 3 its square roots for each independent variable. Column 4
displays R2 for each variable to examine the statistical dependence of a variable to the
other regressors. Column 5 exhibits the tolerance which is 1-R2. DIVERSIFIED is 1
if the firm reports more than 1 different segment according to Fama-French-48 industry
classification in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the firm’s
sales and 0 otherwise. EV is the excess value (market value to imputed value) in t-1 based
on sales multiples. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in t-1 deflated to 2001.
AR is the abnormal return in year t-1, MTB the market-to-book ratio in t-1 PE is the
price earnings ratio in t-1, NWC is the net working capital in t-1 and LEVERAGE firm’s
leverage in t-1. GRSALES is the sales growth from t-2 to t-1. The regional dummies ASIA,
EUROPE and PACIFIC BASIN are 1 if the firm year is in that region and 0 otherwise.
The year dummies are 1 if the firm year is in that yeary and 0 otherwise.
Variable VIF SQRT VIF R2 Tolerance
DIVERSIFIED 1.06 1.03 0.055 0.945
EV 1.74 1.32 0.426 0.575
SIZE 1.41 1.19 0.291 0.709
AR 1.06 1.03 0.057 0.943
MTB 1.05 1.02 0.045 0.955
PE 1.02 1.01 0.022 0.978
NWC 1.23 1.11 0.184 0.816
LEVERAGE 1.19 1.09 0.158 0.842
GRSALES 1.03 1.02 0.030 0.970
EXCESS CASH 1.17 1.08 0.148 0.852
ASIA 1.85 1.36 0.458 0.542
EUROPE 1.13 1.06 0.114 0.886
PACIFIC BASIN 1.07 1.04 0.070 0.930
2003 1.83 1.35 0.453 0.548
2004 1.90 1.38 0.472 0.528
2005 2.06 1.43 0.514 0.486
2006 2.07 1.44 0.516 0.484
2007 2.09 1.45 0.523 0.477
2008 2.08 1.44 0.519 0.481
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Abstract
We empirically investigate the impact of diversification on the likelihood of
being acquired. Our analysis is based on more than 24,000 firm years from all
regions for the period between 2001 and 2008. We find that conglomerates are
significantly less likely to be acquired and bid premiums paid for diversified
targets to be significantly lower than for single business line firms. Further,
we identify an insignificant relationship between acquirer’s cumulated abnor-
mal post-acquisition return and target diversification. These findings suggest
that anticipated lower synergies and higher integration costs frequently more
than outweigh the potential value creation of reducing the diversification dis-
count by bust-ups or increased efficiency of capital allocation.
112
3. Diversification and takeover likelihood
3.1. Introduction
Causes and consequences of corporate diversification are discussed controversial in finan-
cial research. Early research by e.g., Berger and Ofek (1995), suggested that diversifi-
cation destroys value through misallocation of capital, i.e. cross-subsidization of poorly
performing segments, see Rajan et al. (2000); lower productivity as well as unjustified
higher wages for employees, mentioned by Schoar (2002); and overinvestment, empha-
sized by Ahn et al. (2006). Previous contributions, as Graham et al. (2002), dissent
this conclusion and argue in favour for a reverse causality: that poor performance causes
diversification.
Research on corporate acquisitions provides a promising contribution to this de-
bate. According to Palepu (1986), firms that do not achieve their market value poten-
tial are likely takeover targets. This implies that firms discounted due to diversification
should be more likely to be acquired. Berger and Ofek (1996) examine that multi-
segment firms are more likely to become a target and subsequently dismantled if their
discounts are high. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) and Gertner et al. (2002) find that
investment efficiency improves after the bust-up of a conglomerate. Therefore, diversi-
fied companies with a significantly less efficient investment policy should be particularly
interesting targets especially for non-strategic investors like PE- funds. However, if con-
glomerates do not document lower firm values due to their organizational form, they
should face no higher risk of takeover but should even be less likely to become a target.
Devos et al. (2009) find that conglomerating mergers induce four times lower synergies
than focused transactions. Furthermore, integration costs are supposed to be higher
due to the greater deal of complexity1 and uncertainty about the profitability of single
segments2 within conglomerates. In case of only relatively little or even no conglomer-
ate discount to be reduced after the merger, diversified firms should be significantly less
interesting as potential targets.
To shed light on the causality debate we examine the intersection of the two
research areas diversification and takeover likelihood. This paper addresses the ques-
tion whether acquirers of conglomerates perceive and/or realize lower value creation
compared to the takeover of focused firms. We, therefore, examine whether diversified
companies are more likely to be acquired and whether acquirers pay a higher premium
for multi-segment targets and yield higher post-announcement returns. Whereas the
1 See Rajan et al. (2000)
2 See Berger and Hann (2002).
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research areas diversification and takeover likelihood are widely explored,3 the impact
of diversification on target likelihood, bid premiums, and post-transaction performance
of the acquirer is, to the best of our knowledge, only rarely investigated.4
Based on a sample of more than 24,000 firm years, we find that conglomerates
are significantly less likely to be acquired. Furthermore, we develop a simple model
that connects synergies, integration costs, and the conglomerate discount and allows
us to analyze the influence of diversification on maximum bid premiums. In our study
we find that the bid premiums paid for conglomerates are significantly lower compared
to their focused peers. This result implies that the perceived lower synergies relative
to the equity amount invested and the additional integration costs significantly reduce
any estimated potential value gains of reducing the conglomerate discount by improved
capital allocation after the acquisition, e.g., by spinning off certain segments. We find
that this effect is substantially driven by the lower match of the industries the acquirers
and the diversified targets are doing business in. This inference is confirmed by finding
no evidence that despite a lower premium paid acquiring a diversified firm leads to a
better performance than buying a focused firm.5 Thus our findings lead us to conclude
that the lower premiums are properly reflecting the lower net benefits of acquiring a
diversified firm.
This paper contributes to two areas in academic research. First, it sheds light on
the influence of the firm’s organizational form on target probability and bid premiums.
We show that conglomerates are less often acquired; moreover, their shareholders receive
a lower bid premium.
Second, our results suggest that lower synergies relative to the amount invested
and higher integration costs associated with acquiring multi-segment firms significantly
reduce any potential gains from removing or reducing conglomerate discounts and thus
translate into lower premiums for diversified target firms.
This paper is organized as follows: we outline the theoretical background and
3 Diversification: Berger and Ofek (1995) (value destruction), Rajan et al. (2000) (cross- subisdiza-
tion), Schoar (2002) (productivity), as well as Ahn et al. (2006) (overinvestment) and takeover
likelihood: Hasbrouck (1985) (low q), Song and Walkling (1993) (managerial ownership), Comment
and Schwert (1995) (poison pills), Billett (1996) as well as Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2005) (large firms) and
Heeley et al. (2006) (R&D).
4 See Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010), who examine that diversifying transactions perform at least as
good as related mergers. They do, however, not examine the relationship corporate transactions
and diversified targets.
5 We further support our findings by showing that the absence of higher post-transaction returns is
not driven by management resistance on the target side (i.e. the insignificance still remains after
we analyze transactions which are friendly, with small and cash-poor targets).
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the derivation of our research hypothesis in section 3.2. Data description, methodology
explanation, and variable identification follow in section 3.3. In section 3.4 we show
some descriptive statistics. We discuss the impact of diversification in section 3.5 and
examine the relationship between bid premiums as well as post-acquisition performance
and diversified targets in section 3.6 and 3.7, respectively. We summarize and conclude
in section 3.8.
3.2. Theoretical background
3.2.1. Corporate performance, diversification and takeover
probability
The general drivers of takeover likelihood have been extensively researched in the past.
Palepu (1986) finds that large companies are less likely to be acquired because of the
higher integration cost. This result is empirically supported by Billett (1996), who argues
that besides the costs of integration, financing expenditures are also prohibitively high
if the company to be acquired is large.
In general Hasbrouck (1985) and Palepu (1986) find that strong performers are
less likely to be taken over. Palepu (1986) posits that poor performers are afflicted with
a bad management, which will be replaced after the takeover. Though the impact of
diversification on the probability of becoming a target up to now has only rarely been
directly investigated, there is an obvious link between the two: Conglomerates seem to
have a lower performance than stand alone firms.
Berger and Ofek (1995) find that conglomerates are discounted by 13 to 15% in
firm value compared to a matched sample of stand alone firms. Rajan et al. (2000)
explain this discount by inefficient capital allocation in conglomerates, enabling redun-
dant investments in poorly performing segments. Based on these findings, the result of
Palepu (1986) that firms with poorly performing management (e.g., those who advance
inefficient investment) will be taken over and led by a new management should hold
true for a significant share of the conglomerates. Buying a conglomerate and selling
the single entities, a strategy known as bust-up mergers, may thus be value-creative for
the acquirer. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) hypothesize that bust-ups of conglomerates
often occur after hostile takeovers. They reveal that the sum of the single segments is
115
3. Diversification and takeover likelihood
more valuable than the firm as a whole. Berger and Ofek (1996) empirically support
that bust-up takeovers are intended to create value. They identify a significant posi-
tive relationship between the diversification discount and the likelihood of being taken
over. Moreover, they notice that the likelihood of bust-ups is highest, when the discount
reaches its maximum. Analyzing spin-offs of conglomerates Burch and Nanda (2003)
mark the divestment of segments from other industries as value enhancing. They recon-
struct conglomerates after their spin-off and find a significantly higher combined excess
value than before the spin-off. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) provide further evidence
for this argument by showing that the firm’s investments are more efficient after the sale
of segments that are not related to the core business of the firm. As a consequence the
discount declines. Gertner et al. (2002) report that investment-efficiency of the spin-offs
also increases after they are sold. Finally, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) explain why
the dismantling of diversified firms may create value: In their model, multi-segment
companies invest in rather mediocre internal projects than in external projects, espe-
cially if investor protection is not strong, which induces that externally invested capital
cannot be pledged.
However, the results of Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) as well as Gertner et al.
(2002) may, according to their own judgment, suffer from a potential sample selection
bias, i.e. only those conglomerates may sell their segments that have an inefficient inter-
nal capital market. On the other hand there may also be a large number of diversified
firms with efficient internal capital markets not selling some of their segments. There-
fore, spinning off some segments may not necessarily increase investment-efficiency for
all conglomerates.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2008) strengthen this doubt, by detecting the indepen-
dence of CAPEX from the firm’s organizational form. In an earlier study from 2002,
they find no evidence that conglomerates subsidize weak segments.6 Academic contro-
versy does not only relate to the investment inefficiency hypothesis; the hypothesis that
conglomerate discount is rooted in the organizational form of the firm is challenged,
too. Graham et al. (2002) explain the lower valuation of diversified firms with a lower
value of the single segments before they had been aggregated into one organization.
Villalonga (2004) critisizes measurement probems and does not observe any discount
for multi-segment firms, after applying another database for calculating excess values of
6 See Doukas and Kan (2008), who discover that conglomerates transfer capital from less profitable
to more profitable segments after acquisitions and Chevalier (2000), who suggests that the cross-
subsidization of weak segments identified by her had been apparent prior to diversifying mergers.
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diversified firms.7 Bodnaruk et al. (2010) even argue that the conglomerate discount
measured by the conventional methods and data is a sign of higher value. The lower q
for diversified firms, being the reason for the calculated discount suggests that conglom-
erates are able to realize a higher level of favourable investment opportunities (with a
NPV greater 0) due to their internal capital markets. Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010)
examine positive market reactions to diversifying transactions and find these deals not
to perform worse than related transactions.
These findings suggest that diversification is not causing a lower firm value. In-
terestingly, previous research provides only little evidence that diversification is shifting
wealth from shareholders to management: Rose and Shepard (1997) as well as Duru and
Reeb (2002) find a lower top-executive compensation after a firm diversified. Anderson
et al. (2000) note an increase of monitoring by outside directors and an increased per-
formance sensitivity of compensation. Thus excessive management compensation can
be ruled out to be the source of the diversification discount.
3.2.2. Entrenchment, diversification and takeover probability
There is also comprehensive scientific literature on takeover protection. Managers
being aware of the danger to lose their job after a takeover try to entrench themselves
by barriers that either impede an acquisition or at least aggravate a dismissal after
the change within the control entity. Potential barriers are antitakeover charter amend-
ments, poison pills, golden parachutes, or staggered boards. The majority of the research
results about this topic suggests that these entrenchment activities effectively reduce the
takeover likelihood.
Borokhovich et al. (1997) confirm the efficacy of antitakeover amendments.
Companies that adopt these amendments are significantly less likely to be taken over.
Johnson and Rao (1999), however, find no evidence for any impact of antitakeover
amendments, neither regarding firm’s earnings after their adoption, nor regarding firm’s
takeover probability. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) provide evidence for the nega-
tive impact of antitakeover measures on company performance. They show that exter-
nally imposed entrenchment barriers8 lead to lower productivity and return on capital
and conclude that these results are due to lower CAPEX in new plants, but also due to
7 Custódio (2010) finds no significant diversification discount anymore after adjusting for M&A-
accounting methods by taken its inflating impact on book value of assets into account.
8 I.e. antitakeover laws.
117
3. Diversification and takeover likelihood
lower divestment of old facilities. Entrenched top executives enjoy their
”
quite life“and
neglect to pursuit growth opportunities. Gompers et al. (2003) identify a positive
relationship between shareholder rights and value. According to their analysis, weak
stockholder protection entails additional agency cost; however, top-executives do not
change corporate governance provisions in their favor before poor performance occurs.
Bebchuk et al. (2009) narrow the approach of Gompers et al. (2003) and examine
that only management entrenchment appointments (of the shareholder rights indicators)
are negatively related to firm value.9 Faleye (2007) examines the impact of classified
boards, a typical entrenchment provision. He finds firms with classified boards have lower
values, document less often involuntary CEO turnover, and are less sensitive in terms
of firm performance to CEO turnover and of firm performance to CEO compensation.
Although Bates et al. (2008) emphasizes some reservations about the causality, the
results endorse the notion that companies with classified boards have lower firm value
and are less likely to receive a takeover bid. Finally the negative impact of poison pills,
being another entrenchment provision, poison pills refuted by Heron and Lie (2006).
The authors suggest that not each entrenchment measure essentially lessens shareholder
value and takeover probability.
On the other hand, recent research results indicate that entrenchment may also
have positive consequences: Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) show that an entrench-
ment measure such as large boards with inside directors induce risk-averse managers to
undertake value increasing investments that would have been foregone otherwise. Kesten
(2010) emphasizes the negative implications of low dismissal barriers. Management may
have a too narrow focus on short-term visible projects and engage in more risky projects
to induce higher returns. Furthermore, qualified staff may be discouraged from applying
for jobs in firms with high (involuntary) management turnover. Finally, top-executives
who are aware of their dismissal after transaction completion or even lost their positions
during the acquisition process do not exert their capabilities within the negotiation pro-
cess, which leads to an increased risk of underpricing the control premium. Consequently,
management entrenchment may also influence firm value positively. The author men-
tions that the impact is dependent on the macroeconomic climate, and reports a positive
relationship between entrenchment and firm performance during the financial crisis.
9 After controlling for management entrenchment at the beginning of the sample period, management
entrenchment is still associated with lower Tobin’s Q at the end of the sample period. Moreover,
increases of management entrenchment during the sample period are related to decreases of Tobin’s
Q.
118
3. Diversification and takeover likelihood
Finally some arguments suggest that yet another way to increase management’s
job security is to acquire other firms. First, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) identify specific
investment as an appropriate measure to entrench because these investments unfold
their maximum value only under current management, which significantly reduces the
replacement risk of the current top- executives. Second, Gorton et al. (2009) find that
acquisitions are an effective form of specific investments and as such are appropriate to
protect firms against takeover attempts.10 In their
”
eat or be eaten“model firms acquire
to survive and to protect current management, i.e. they initiate defensive mergers.11
Baradwaj et al. (1992) and Baradwaj et al. (1996) report negative announcement returns
on defensive mergers. However this strategy may as well increase takeover probability of
the firm: Mitchell and Lehn (1990) report that takeover targets previously made value
reducing acquisitions, whereas non-targets initiated value increasing transactions. Lehn
and Zhao (2006) provide evidence that value destroying acquisitions entail a higher
risk for the top executives of being replaced by takeovers as well as by bankruptcy
and internal governance. Hence, defensive acquisitions turn out to be a double edged
sword: they are protective for management only if they are not destroying ”too much”
value. Doukas and Kan (2008) identify a relationship between conglomerates and their
proclivity to defensive mergers. They report that diversified firms with poor performance
and low growth opportunities in their core business engage in unrelated and potentially
entrenching acquisitions.
3.2.3. Synergies, integration costs and takeover probability
Palepu (1986) finds that perceived costs of integration of the target into the ac-
quirers’ organization are decisive for a company’s acquisition decision. As diversified
firms are larger (Faccio and Masulis (2005)) and more complex it is more expensive
to integrate them into a company. In their study, Moeller et al. (2005) attribute the
losses from corporate transactions from 1980 to 2001 only to large deals. Excluding large
deals from their sample, the authors even report positive average announcement returns.
Mortal and Schill (2010) identify target size as the key driver of (negative) acquisition
performance. According to their findings, other deal characteristics, e.g., method of
payment and market performance, loose their statistical significance if deal size is taken
10 Dependent on industry concentration.
11 See Morck et al. (1990), Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and Baradwaj et al. (1996), however,
Humphrey-Jenner and Powell (2011) find no evidence for both the efficacy and the value-destructive
impact of acquisitions as entrenchment measure.
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into account. Thus due to size, higher complexity and informational asymmetries (see
Gilson et al. (2001), Bens and Monohan (2004) and Berger and Hann (2007)) we con-
clude that the acquisition of diversified targets causes higher integration costs, a fact
that obviously diminishes their attractiveness as target.
Another important factor triggering corporate transactions are perceived syner-
gies. Devos et al. (2009) identify two sources of synergy gains financial and opera-
tional ones. The main benefits of conglomerating mergers are concluded to be financial
synergies. Fluck and Lynch (1999) motivate this finding by showing that diversifying
acquisitions help especially financially constrained firms to initiate marginally profitable
projects that could otherwise not be undertaken. Devos et al. (2009) add to this motive
tax savings that can be generated via an acquisition, but find out that these tax benefits
amount to only one fifth of the operational synergies. These operational synergies are,
however, mainly generated in focused mergers. As the acquirer of a diversified firm is
usually not able to generate synergies by matching all target business line with his own
business we hypothesize that synergies relative to transaction size are lower in diversified
firms.
Although there are empirical indications that bust-ups of conglomerates are value-
enhancing, numerous studies neglect this potential. Furthermore, previous literature
suggests that integration costs are higher and synergies are lower, if diversified firms are
involved as targets. We conclude that acquirers are less willing to select conglomerates
as targets. Consequently, our first hypothesis is:
H1: Diversified firms are less likely to be acquired than focused firms.
If this hypothesis holds true, we expect our measures of diversification to be
negative and statistically significant in the regression of the takeover likelihood.
3.2.4. Bid premiums and post-acquisition returns
To identify a relationship between discount, integration costs and, synergies, we develop
a simple model, which takes into account the differences of bid premium between fo-
cused and diversified targets. If the acquirer’s management acts in the interest of their
shareholders, the maximum willingness to pay for the firm (MaxBid) plus target’s net
debt (ND) equals target’s enterprise value EV, including synergies s and subtracting
cost of integration cPMI , which are both in % of the target’s EV. For standalone firms
Equation 3.1 applies.
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MaxBids +NDs = EV s(1 + s− cPMI) (3.1)
In case the target is a conglomerate we need to take into account that only a part
q (q ∈ 0, 1) of the target will be integrated in an existing business line and therewith
provide substantial synergies (Devos et al. (2009)). For the rest of the target to be sold
spin-off/diversifying cost cc accrue. For the spun-off part we assume the cost cc to be
absolutely lower than the negative net benefits when not being spun off cPMI . Moreover,
according to Berger and Ofek (1996), the acquirer of a diversified target may reduce the
conglomerate discount discount d by α per cent. Therefore equation 3.2 applies for the
maximum bid for a diversified firm
MaxBidc +NDc = EV c(1 + s× q)− EV c(q × cPMI + (1− q)cc)
+EV cdα (3.2)
Since firm value EV is the sum of equity value E and net debt ND, we can transpose













Ec(1 + q(s− cPMI) + dα− (1− q)c)
Ec
+





with leverage ratio LEV and MaxBid
E
with 1 plus the maximum bid
premium maxp we transform Equation 3.3 to 3.5 and 3.4 to 3.6.
maxps = (1 + LEV s)× (s− cPMI)− 1 (3.5)
maxpc = (1 + LEV c)× (q(s− cPMI) + dα− (1− q)cc)− 1 (3.6)
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Comparing maxps against maxpc yields the following relation.
(1 + LEV s)× (s− cPMI) T (1 + LEV c)× (q(s− cPMI) + dα− (1− q)cc) (3.7)
1 + LEV s
1 + LEV c
(s− cPMI) T q(s− cPMI) + dα− (1− q)cc (3.8)
With respect to potential benefits related to improving capital allocation and re-
ducing costs attached to this and other conglomerate inefficiencies we derive the following
relation:
dα T [
1 + LEV s
1 + LEV c
− q](s− cPMI) + (1− q)cc (3.9)
Relation 3.9 highlights the benefits and disadvantages of acquiring a diversified
firm against acquiring a stand alone firm: The term on the l.h.s. of relation 3.9 rep-
resents the potential benefit of improving capital allocation and internal efficiency in a
conglomerate measured by the reduction in the perceived conglomerate discount. The
r.h.s. of relation 3.9 describes relative disadvantages compared against single segment
target companies: The first term can be interpreted as lost synergies relative to invested
equity on the non-fitting business lines of the conglomerate. Empirically conglomerates




should be expected to be lower than one: Higher leverage of conglomerates
works into the direction of an increased premium for conglomerates; due to the lower




to be greater than q, thus resulting a disadvantage for diversified firms:
Compared to single business line firms only q per cent of the target’s business lines
match and produce net benefits of (s-cPMI). The second r.h.s. term cc(1 – q) reflects
the additional costs for spinning-off for the non-fitting business lines. For the maximum
premium to be offered for a conglomerate to exceed the one for a stand alone firm, the
potential benefits from reducing the conglomerate discount on the l.h.s. of relation 3.9
have to be higher than the relative disadvantages on the r.h.s.
We hypothesize that the observed premium in completed transactions is lower for
conglomerates than for single segment firms. Starting point is the presumption that the
l.h.s. of relation 3.9 is smaller than the r.h.s.: Maximum premiums for conglomerates are
lower than for stand alone firms. Our hypothesis for observed premiums thus additionally
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assumes that potential differences between the two types of target firms in the acquisition
process are not strong enough to change the sign of relation 3.9 for the realized premium.
Our hypothesis H2 is therefore:
H2: Bid premiums paid for conglomerates are significantly below those paid for focused
firms.
If this hypothesis holds true, we expect our measures of diversification to be nega-
tive and statistically significant in the regression of the bid premium. If premia turn out
to be lower for diversified targets, the question arises whether this result translates into
a higher transaction performance. So our third hypothesis analyzes potential differences
in the cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers between the two types of targets:
H3: Acquirers do not yield significantly different post-acquisition returns if they buy
diversified firms.
If this hypothesis holds true, we expect our measures of diversification not to be
statistically significant in the regression of post-acquisition performance.
3.3. Data and methodology
Our initial sample contains 24,064 firm years from a worldwide sample from 2001 until
2008. 28% of these firm years are diversified.12 The capital market and economic data
stem from Thomson Reuters Datastream, the balance sheet figures are from Thomson
Reuter Worldscope databases. We take the transaction related data from Bureau van
Dijk’s Zephyr database. Our initial transaction sample consists of 2,339 transactions of
independent, control-taking, publicly listed, and non-financial firms from 2001 to 2008.
For the post-acquisition performance and bid premiums, we only analyze transactions
whose acquirers’ financial accounting statements are reported at Worldscope and share
price data is available at Datastream. This filtering process reduces our sample to 1,543
observations. 1,151 of these transactions provide data about the dependent variable
”post-acquisition return” and our key independent variable ”diversification”. The re-
quirement of our analysis to obtain sales data for each segment of the target entails
the significant reduction of 1,151 to 290 observations for our analyses including the
conglomerate discounts. Furthermore, all acquisitions must provide data about all nec-
essary control variables. After we exclude those deals that do not contain all data, our
12 See description below for the definition of diversified companies
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analysis of the post-acquisition performance includes 212 control-taking transactions.13
Our data sample contains fewer observations than other studies as e.g., Harford (1999),
who analyses 487 transactions. This difference is, as mentioned above, mainly due to
the consideration of only those transactions, in which the targets provide comprehensive
data about their sales per segment. It is in line with the sample of Berger and Ofek
(1996) who analyze 329 transactions over a similarly long period and requiring the same
depth of data. The bid premium analysis includes 298 acquisitions that match the simi-
lar criteria mentioned above over an 8 year period, which is slightly below the number of
observations of other recent articles, e.g., Laamanen (2007) who examines 458 mergers
over an eleven year period.
Diversification
We use three measures of diversification for our analysis. All are based on Fama-French-
48 industry classification. The first one (DIVERSIFIED) is a dummy variable, which
is 1 if the firm reports operational activities in more than one industry (according to
Fama-French-48 industry classification) and if the one segment accounts for less than
90% of the sales and 0 otherwise. >2 SEGMENTS is one if the corresponding firms
reports segments in at least three different industries and again if no segment accounts
for more than 90% of the sales. DEGDIV counts the number of industries, different
from the firstly reported in the accordant year, in which the firm operates.
Control variables
Berger and Ofek (1996) find that excess value is an important determinant for takeover
likelihood. We therefore integrate the variable excess value (EXV). For calculating this
variable we use the approach pioneered by Berger and Ofek (1995). First, we calculate
the imputed value by determining firm value (i.e. market value of equity + book value
of debt) to sales multiples of focused firms and multiplying these values with the sales
of a firm’s segment. Second, we sum the imputed values of the segments up to the
total imputed value and calculate the logarithm of the ratio firm value to imputed
firm value. To compute the excess value only for diversified companies we compute
the interaction term DIV * EXV, which is the product of the according diversification
variable and excess value. Furthermore, we use several control variables to test the
robustness of diversification’s impact on the attractiveness of a firm. Palepu (1986)
argues that large targets are more costly to integrate and therefore less likely to be
13 See Table 3.14 for detailed description of our data
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acquired. We integrate firm size (SIZE), calculated as the natural logarithm of the total
assets deflated to the year 2001, in our analyses and expect a negative sign. Palepu
(1986) further posits the so-called bad management hypothesis. It suggests that poorly
performing management induces lower abnormal returns and higher risk of acquisition
attempts. We measure the impact of the abnormal return (AR), as the difference between
actual excess returns and estimated normal returns,14 of a firm in the year before the
transaction. Hasbrouck (1985) argues that not only low abnormal returns but also a
low market valuation (compared to the book value of assets) signal bad management
and therefore increase the likelihood that the firm becomes a target. To cover this
relationship we integrate two measures of market valuation, the market-to-book ratio
(MTB) and the price earnings ratio (PE). Palepu (1986) mentions a further driver of
the firm’s attractiveness as target: leverage. He finds that an increase of leverage is
associated with a reduced likelihood of becoming a target. The same holds true for the
sales growth. Thus, we measure the effect of leverage (LEVERAGE) and sales growth
(GRSALES) over the year before the transaction. Jensen (1986) provides evidence that
excess cash in firms tempts its management to initiate inefficient investment. Blanchard
et al. (1994) confirm this finding for corporate acquisitions. As a consequence firms with
excess cash should be more likely to be acquired. We define EXCESS CASH, referring
to Sperling (2010), as the ratio of the deviation of a firm’s cash holdings from its normal
cash holdings. He defines normal cash holdings by controlling firm’s cash holdings for
market-to-book ratio, real firm size (in 2001 U.S. dollars), cash flow ratio, liquid asset
substitution ratio, capital expenditure ratio, leverage ratio, the variability of firm’s cash
flow ratio, R&D-to-sales ratio used as cost of financial distress, dividend indicator and
ADRI15 for the firm’s country. For determining the normal cash holdings of a firm we
use the following following regression model 3.10
ln (CHi,t) = α + β1 ×MTBi,t + β2 × ln(TA2001i,t ) + β3 × CFi,t
+β4 × LASi,t + β5 × CAPEXi,t + β6 × LEVi,t
+β7 × σi,t(CF ) + β8 × CoFDi,t + β9 ×DIVi,t
+β10 × ADRIi,t + εi,t
(3.10)
To control for regulatory effects, we include regional dummies, which are 1 if the
14 For further details, see calculation of CAR in the next paragraph: dependent variables.
15 Anti-director rights index.
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head office of the firm is in the according region and 0 otherwise. To control for time
effects, we integrate year dummies, which are set equal to 1 if the firm year equals the
transaction year and 0 otherwise.
Dependent variables
Following Owen and Yawson (2010), we apply a binomial logit model for the ac-
quisition likelihood analysis. The dependent variable TGT is 1 if a firm is a target within
the certain firm year and 0 otherwise. We analyze the post-acquisition performance and
bid premium using an OLS regression. The dependent variable of the post-acquisition
performance analysis is the cumulative abnormal return from day -2 to day +2 rela-
tive to the bid announcement. We calculate the cumulative abnormal return by using
a one-factor model. We compare the actual returns of the acquirer with its normal
performance. The latter one is estimated on observations between -504 and -252 days
before the transaction using a version of the capital asset pricing model in Equation 3.11
(Campell et al. (1997)).
Ri,t −Rf,t = α̂i + β̂i × (Rm,t −Rf,t) + εi,t ∀tε [−504,−253] (3.11)
Ri,t denotes the return of company i at time t, Rf,t is the return of U.S. treasury
bills (risk-free security) at time t, and Rm.t is the return of the value-weighted all equity
index (market portfolio) at time t. The estimated coefficients are used to estimate the
normal performance16 for the event period from day -2 to day +2. The abnormal return
is the difference between the estimated normal (excess) return and the actual (excess)
return.
We define bid premium as the difference between the actual price paid for the
target and its equity market value divided by the market value of the equity of the target
at the day before the announcement date. To increase the efficiency of our results we
use for all regressions robust standard errors.
16 Excess returns, i.e. the actual return of firm i at t minus the risk-free return at t.
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3.4. Descriptive statistics
3.4.1. Successful bids and diversification
In Table 3.1 we provide summary statistics of our sample. Column 2 exhibits the
mean values for all firms of the sample, column 3 for the non-targets and column 4 for
the targets. Column 5 shows the results of a two- group mean comparison t-test on the
differences of means between targets and non-targets.
127
3. Diversification and takeover likelihood
Table 3.1.: Summary statistics for the analysis of the takeover likelihood
This table shows the mean values of the diversification and control variables for all firm
years, for all non-targets and targets of the takeover likelihood sample. DIVERSIFIED is
1 if the firm reports segments in different industries according to Fama-French-48 industry
classification in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the firm’s
sales and is 0 otherwise. DEGDIV is the number of segments with industry codes different
from the first segment according to Fama-French-48 classification in t-1 (reaching from 0,
i.e, focused, to 9). EXV is the excess value in t-1 based on sales multiples as defined in
Berger and Ofek (1995). DIV * EXV is the interaction term between DIVERSIFIED and
EXV. SIZE is the total assets in t-1 deflated to 2001. AR is the abnormal return in year
t-1, MTB the market-to-book ratio in t-1 PE is the price earnings ratio in t-1, NWC is the
net working capital in t-1 and LEVERAGE firm’s leverage in t-1. GRSALES is the sales
growth from t-2 to t-1. EXCESS CASH is the deviation of the firm’s cash holdings from
its normal cash holdings in t-1. AMERICA is 1 if the firm is located in America and 0
otherwise. ASIA is 1 if the firm is from an Asian country and 0 otherwise. EUROPE is 1 if
the firm is from European country and 0 otherwise PACIFIC BASIN is 1 if the firm is from
Australia or New Zealand and 0 otherwise. * (**,***) denotes the (two-sided) statistical
significance on a 10% (5%,1%) level.
Variable Sample-wide Non-target Target t-test for difference
DIVERSIFIED 0.28 0.28 0.16 9.808***
DEGDIV 0.83 0.85 0.44 40.427***
EXV -0.62 -0.63 0.39 -13.174***
DIV * EXV -0.52 -0.52 0.18 -10.505***
SIZE 1,317,517 1,319,327 1,162,094 2.562**
AR 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.636
MTB 4.77 4.78 3.71 2.409**
PE 29.3 29.3 32.6 -1.899*
NWC 100,886 100,967 93,532 0.565
LEVERAGE 0.25 0.25 0.19 6.873***
GRSALES 0.26 0.26 0.32 -2.258**
EXCESS CASH 1.36 1.36 1.38 -3.336***
AMERICA 0.30 0.30 0.62 -26.714***
ASIA 0.38 0.38 0.10 22.053***
EUROPE 0.25 0.25 0.19 5.450***
PACIFIC BASIN 0.04 0.04 0.07 -5.961***
Observations 24,064 23,676 388
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For almost all variables statistically highly significant differences can be observed.
The results of the summary statistics correspond to our hypothesis that the likelihood
of becoming a target is negatively related to diversification. We find that targets are on
average less likely to be diversified. Moreover, the level of diversification is higher for
non-targets. Our results further suggest that acquired firms are smaller and less valuable
in terms of their book values, but more valuable compared to their earnings, have lower
leverage, face higher growth, and hold more excess cash.17
3.4.2. Bids and conglomerates: univariate analysis
In a next step we compare the likelihood of being a conglomerate in general and
the likelihood of being a conglomerate subject to the reception of a takeover offer. We
expect that the likelihood of being a conglomerate is much smaller within the sample of
firms that receive a bid announcement compared to the total sample.
The results in Table 3.2 support our hypothesis. The share of conglomerates is
significantly higher in the total sample compared to the offer sample, i.e. firms that
receive an offer. Put it differently, firms that receive an offer are less likely to be diver-
sified than firms in general. Hence, conglomerates appear to be less attractive takeover
targets.
Carline et al. (2011) analyze the link between corporate governance and takeover
Table 3.2.: Summary statistics for the likelihood of being diversified
This table shows the likelihood of being a conglomerate for the total sample and for the
firm years that receive a takeover offer. A firm year is a conglomerate if it reports reports
segments in different industries according to Fama-French-48 industry classification in t-1,
and if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the firm’s sales, otherwise the firm
year is a stand-alone. * (**,***) denotes the (two-sided) statistical significance on a 10%
(5%,1%) level.
Conglomerate Stand-alone Observations
Offer 0.16 0.84 388
Total 0.28 0.72 23,676
t-statisitics -11.5829***
17 In Table 3.11 we show the distribution of stand-alone and diverisified targets between 2001 and
2008. We find that targets were more often diversified from 2004 to 2006, i.e. in the peak stage
of PE firms, an observation, which provides slight incidence that diversified firms are particularly
interesting for non-strategic investors.
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resistance. They find that firms, with entrenched management, reject bids more often.
Some defense strategies are only open to diversified firms, e.g. selling certain business
lines (
”
crown jewels“) in the course of a takeover battle. If diversification is thus posi-
tively related to entrenchment, takeover attempts of conglomerates will be more often
withdrawn. We examine this implication in Table 3.3.
Consistent with our expectations, we find that the likelihood of the target being
a conglomerate is higher if the takeover offer is finally withdrawn, compared to all firms
that receive an offer. However, the difference is not statistically significant. The results
of our univariate analysis allow two preliminary conclusions. First, conglomerates appear
to be less attractive targets than stand alone firms. Hence, there is an indication that
diversification is appropriate to protect against takeover attempts. Second, takeover
attempts of conglomerates are more often withdrawn, which suggests that diversified
firms are better able to defend against bids. However, the second conclusion is not
based on statistically significant results.
3.5. Diversification and the likelihood of being acquired
To corroborate the findings of our univariate analysis, we run a regres- sion for the
likelihood of being acquired, subject to diversification and further firm characteristics.
We use binomial logistic regression in which the depen- dent variable is 1 for a firm year
if the company is a target in that year and 0 otherwise. The results of this analysis are
shown in Table 3.4.
The coefficient estimates for both variables capturing diversification clearly in-
dicate that conglomeration is significantly associated with a reduced probability of be-
Table 3.3.: Summary statistics for the likelihood of being diversified
This table shows the likelihood of being a conglomerate for firm years that receive a
takeover offer and firm years that receive a takeover bid, finally withdrawn. A firm year
is a conglomerate if it reports reports segments in different industries according to Fama-
French-48 industry classification in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less than
90% of the firm’s sales, otherwise the firm year is a stand-alone. * (**,***) denotes the
(two-sided) statistical significance on a 10% (5%,1%) level.
Conglomerate Stand-alone Observations
Offer 0.16 0.84 388
Withdrawn 0.22 0.78 83
t-statisitics -1.376
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Table 3.4.: Logistic regression for the likelihood of being acquired
This table shows the results of the logistic regression for the acquisition likelihood. The
dependent variable is 1 if the firm becomes acquired in year t and 0 otherwise. DIVERSI-
FIED is 1 if the firm reports more than 1 different segment according to Fama-French-48
industry classification in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the
firm’s sales and 0 otherwise. DEGDIV is the number of segments with different industry
codes according to Fama-French-48 classification in t-1. EXV is the excess value in t-1
based on sales multiples as defined in Berger and Ofek (1995). DIV * EXV is the interac-
tion term between DIVERSIFIED and EV. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets
in t-1 deflated to 2001. AR is the abnormal return in year t-1, MTB is the market-to-book
ratio in t-1, PE is the price earnings ratio in t-1, NWC is the net working capital in t-1 and
LEVERAGE firm’s leverage in t-1. GRSALES is the sales growth from t-2 to t-1. EXCESS
CASH is the deviation of the firm’s cash holdings from its normal cash holdings in t-1.
The upper figure shows the regression coefficient the lower figure in parenthesis displays
the corresponding robust standard error. * (**,***) denotes the (two-sided) statistical
significance on a 10% (5%,1%) level. We also control for regional and year dummies from
2003-2008, which we do not for the ease of computation show in this table.





EXV -0.043 -0.048 -0.046 -0.051
(0.036) (0.045) (0.036) (0.045)
DIV * EXV 0.008 0.010
(0.053) (0.053)
SIZE -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
AR -0.107 -0.107 -0.104 -0.104
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
MTB 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
PE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NWC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEVERAGE -0.308 -0.309 -0.292 -0.294
(0.334) (0.334) (0.333) (0.333)
GRSALES 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060)
EXCESS CASH 0.821* 0.821* 0.794* 0.795*
(0.448) (0.448) (0.449) (0.450)
Intercept -4.560*** -4.560*** -4.575*** -4.240***
(0.707) (0.707) (0.707) (0.687)
Pseudo-R2 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.043
χ2-statistics 167.11 167.19 169.35 169.41
Observations 24,064 24,064 24,064 24,064
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coming a target. It is significantly less likely (on a 1% level) that a firm will be taken
over if it is engaged in different industries. Increasing levels of of diversification, in terms
of the number of segments, are also significantly negatively related to the likelihood of
becoming a target. We infer that potential benefits from reducing conglomerate ineffi-
ciencies are often overcompensated by lower synergies and higher integration costs thus
making diversified firms generally less attractive targets. In contrast to Berger and Ofek
(1996), we do not find that conglomerate excess value is significantly related to takeover
likelihood. Especially negative excess values of conglomerates as represented by the in-
teraction term
”
excess value x diversification dummy“does not have a significant impact
on the probability of becoming a takeover target: the coefficients’ estimates are not sta-
tistically significantly different from zero. To avoid problems linked to heteroskedasticity
we use robust standard errors for our analysis. The variance inflation factors substan-
tially below 4 (see Table 3.15 in the appendix) indicate that our model does not suffer
multicollinearity. We perform a Heckprob test to examine the existence of endogenous
factors between diversification and target likelihood. The indicator of endogeneity, the
inverse Mill’s ratio, is insignificant, thus we assume no endogeneity in our regression.
Some of our control variables are statistically significant and show the hypothe-
sized sign, too: Palepu (1986) argues that large firms are less likely to be acquired due
to the high integration cost. As our size variable displays negative coefficients at 1%
confidence level, we find evidence for this hypothesis. Furthermore, our excess cash vari-
able coefficients display a positive sign at 10% confidence level, thus confirming Jensen
(1986), who claims that excess cash is an incentive for other companies to buy the
respective firm.
We run several robustness checks with respect to the measurement of the con-
glomerate’s excess values. Rudolph and Schwetzler (2012) provide evidence for potential
distortions in estimating conglomerate discounts, suggesting to estimate excess values
based on enterprise values instead of firm values in order to avoid biases due to systematic
differences in corporate cash holdings. Thus we run the takeover likelihood regression
again by using enterprise value instead of firm value for our excess value estimates.
Additionally we use geometric mean instead of median for calculating the focused firm
benchmark of excess value. The results of this robustness test are presented in Table
3.5.
The results provide evidence that measurement of excess value has no impact on
the takeover likelihood, independent from whether we apply firm or enterprise value and
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Table 3.5.: Logistic regression for the likelihood of being acquired
This table shows the results of the logistic regression for the acquisition likelihood. The
dependent variable is 1 if the firm becomes acquired in year t and is 0 otherwise. DIVER-
SIFIED is 1 if the firm reports more than 1 different segment according to Fama-French-48
industry classification in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the
firm’s sales and 0 otherwise. EXV is the excess value in t-1 based on sales multiples as
defined in Berger and Ofek (1995). DIV * EXV is the interaction term between DIVER-
SIFIED and EXV. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in t-1 deflated to 2001.
AR is the abnormal return in year t-1, MTB is the market-to-book ratio in t-1, PE is
the price earnings ratio in t-1, NWC is the net working capital in t-1 and LEVERAGE
firm’s leverage in t-1. GRSALES is the sales growth from t-2 to t-1. EXCESS CASH is
the deviation of the firm’s cash holdings from its normal cash holdings in t-1. ASIA is 1
if the firm is from an Asian country and 0 otherwise. EUROPE is 1 if the firm is from
European country and 0 otherwise PACIFIC BASIN is 1 if the firm is from Australia or
New Zealand and 0 otherwise. The upper figure shows the regression coefficient the lower
figure in parenthesis displays the corresponding robust standard error. * (**,***) denotes
the (two-sided) statistical significance on a 10% (5%,1%) level. We also control for year
dummies from 2003-2008, which we do not for the ease of computation show in this table.
Variable (1) (2) (3)
DIVERSIFIED -0.350*** -0.350*** -0.352***
(0.133) (0.131) (0.132)
EXV -0.033 -0.031 -0.037
(0.046) (0.050) (0.043)
DIV * EXV -0.016 -0.006 0.009
(0.050) (0.058) (0.050)
SIZE -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.071***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
AR -0.108 -0.113 -0.111
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
MTB 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
PE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NWC 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEVERAGE -0.313 -0.348 -0.358
(0.334) (0.335) (0.336)
GRSALES 0.002 -0.004 -0.002
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062)
EXCESS CASH 0.833* 0.901** 0.888*
(0.445) (0.445) (0.453)
ASIA -1.673*** -1.641*** -1.621***
(0.265) (0.266) (0.257)
EUROPE -0.668*** -0.679*** -0.675***
(0.140) (0.139) (0.139)
PACIFIC BASIN -0.364 -0.374 -0.374
(0.241) (0.241) (0.241)
Intercept -4.562*** -4.288*** -4.241***
(0.705) (0.674) (0.689)
Pseudo-R2 0.042 0.042 0.042
χ2-statistics 167.69 166.46 167.05
Observations 24,095 23,901 23,802
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use median or geometric mean to calculate the excess value.
We can infer from these results that potential bidders are reluctant to acquire
diversified firms. To find out why diversified companies are less often taken over, we
examine the effect of conglomeration on bid premiums paid and on CAR realized by the
acquirers of such firms.
3.6. Diversification and the bid premiums paid
In this section we analyze whether shareholders of diversified firms receive lower bid
premiums compared to shareholders of focused firms. We run a regression that contains
the bid premiums (which is the difference between the actual price paid for the target
and its equity market value divided by the market value of the equity of the target at
the day before the announcement date) as dependent variable and measures of target’s
diversification as well as excess value and further control variables as independent factors.
The results presented in Table 3.6 show that for conglomerates in general bid
premiums paid in corporate transactions are not significantly lower the coefficients es-
timate for our dummy variable is not significantly different from zero. However, all
conglomerates with segments in more than two different industries receive significantly
lower bid premiums.18 The negative coefficients of our variable indicating >2 segments
are statistically significant on a 5%-level in all but one model specification.19 Our simple
premium model in relation 3.9 indicates that the variable q, measuring the fraction of
segments with an overlap between acquirer and target business, has a positive impact
on the maximum premium offered. Thus we analyze whether a match between the ac-
quirer’s and target’s business segments in terms of industry classification yields a lower
transaction premium. We test this hypothesis by applying different variables capturing
the business line match in % of the aquirer’s sales (model (3)), target’s sales (model (4))
and in % of combined sales (model (5)). We find that an increase in the match between
bidders and the target’s segments yields a significantly higher bid premium. Thus our
results supports our hypothesis 2: we find a significant positive relationship between the
18 For robustness checks see Table 3.13, which also shows the relationship between diversification and
bid premiums including a larger sample via omission of Excess Value related variables and showing
similar outcomes.
19 We further find that lower target’s leverage is related to lower bid premium and cash acquisitions
are accompanied by higher bid premiums, potentially due to higher tax burden (Jaggi and Dorata
(2006)). We further run a Ramsey’s RESET test, whose results indicate that our model does not
suffer omitted variables. We repeat this test for all following regressions and do not identify results
suggesting omitted variable problems.
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Table 3.6.: Regression for the drivers of bid premiums paid in acquisitions
This table shows the results of the regression for the bid premiums. The dependent variable
is the bid premium paid in an acquisition. DIVERSIFIED is 1 if the firm reports more
than 1 different segment according to Fama-French-48 industry classification in t-1, and if
the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the firm’s sales and is 0 otherwise. >2
SEGMENTS is 1 if the firm reports more than 2 different segment according to Fama-
French-48 industry classification in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less than
90% of the firm’s sales and is 0 otherwise. EXV is the excess value in t-1 based on sales
multiples as defined in Berger and Ofek (1995). DIV * EXV is the interaction term between
DIVERSIFIED and EXV. GRSALES is the sales growth from t-2 to t-1. LEVERAGE is
the firm’s leverage in t-1. MOP is the method of payment: 2 denotes full cash payment,
1 mixed payment and 0 full equity payment. REL SIZE is the relative deal size of the
transaction. PUB LIST ACQ is 1 if the acquirer is publicly listed and 0 otherwise. SEG
MATCH ACQ is the share of the revenue of the acquirer generated in an industry, in which
the target also operates. SEG MATCH TGT is the share of the revenue of the target
genrated in an industry, in which the acquirer also operates and SEG MATCH TOT is the
share of the total revenue genrated by the acquirer and the target in the same industries.
The upper figure shows the regression coefficient the lower figure in parenthesis displays
the corresponding robust standard error. * (**,***) denotes the (two-sided) statistical
significance on a 10% (5%,1%) level.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DIVERSIFIED -4.216
(4.009)
>2 SEGMENTS -7.153** -7.373** -5.150 -7.062**
(3.405) (3.325) (3.252) (3.326)
EXV 1.099 0.762 0.582 0.588 0.562
(1.144) (1.276) (1.253) (1.268) (1.256)
DIV * EXV -0.194 -0.068 0.088 0.268 0.136
(1.223) (1.339) (1.300) (1.336) (1.306)
GRSALES 3.457 4.021 4.026* 3.955 4.029*
(2.194) (2.494) (2.427) (2.439) (2.426)
LEVERAGE -25.802*** -24.163*** -24.124*** -24.621*** -24.129***
(7.740) (8.183) (8.032) (8.238) (8.034)
MOP 7.410*** 8.233*** 8.907*** 8.299*** 8.920***
(2.308) (2.770) (2.877) (2.726) (2.879)
REL SIZE -0.339 -0.336 -0.363 -0.442 -0.364
(0.340) (0.483) (0.451) (0.429) (0.448)
SEG MATCH ACQ 9.796**
(4.893)
SEG MATCH TGT 6.463
(4.347)
SEG MATCH TOT 9.886**
(4.952)
Intercept 23.249*** 17.506*** 15.097*** 17.506*** 14.982***
(3.022) (5.046) (5.247) (4.844) (5.297)
Adjusted R2 0.1374 0.147 0.162 0.151 0.161
F-statisitics 8.84 6.64 6.65 6.69 6.62
Observations 270 230 229 229 229
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match of acquirer’s and target’s segments and the premium paid in the transaction.20
We provide additional details about the segment match of targets in Table 3.7
and Table 3.8.
Table 3.7 shows the distribution over the number of targets’ segments and the
number of acquirers’ segments. Table 3.8 displays details about the average segment
match according to the number of targets’ and acquirers’ segments.
As our univariate and multivariate results in sections 3.4 and 3.5 already suggest,
the results in Table 3.7 confirms that most corporate transactions include stand-alone
targets and that the number of transactions decrease with increasing diversification.
Considering that the majority of firms in our sample are focused entities this outcome
is hardly surprising. Much more insightful is therefore our analysis about the match of
the segments between targets and acquirers subject to the number of (targets’) business
units reported in different industries, displayed in Table 3.8.
The results in Table 3.8 support our intuition that focused targets fit better to
their acquirer in terms of business units in the same industry. E.g., 70% of the stand-
alone targets fit on average to a business line in the same industry of the acquirer, but
only 56% of the segments of targets that operate in two different industries fit at least
one business line industry of to the acquirer. Our matching variable further decreases
with increasing target diversification. Overall, 50% of the diversified target segments
match at least one segment of their acquirers.
The negative association between target’s diversification and bid premium allows
for the following inference. In general the lower synergies and higher integration costs of
diversified targets exceed potential value gains by removing conglomerate inefficiencies
through post-merger bust-up thus yielding according to relation 3.9 lower maximum and
realized premiums for diversified firms. An important question triggered by this result is
whether lower premiums translate into higher transaction performance. In this case the
acquisition of diversified firms would be systematically more beneficial to the acquirer
and allow to earn higher post- acquisition returns compared to buyers of stand-alone
firms. We differentiate between the two potential explanations by analyzing the capital
market reaction on the deal announcement in section 3.7.
20 We provide an overview about the distribution of segment match q in transactions with diversified
targets in Table 3.12
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Table 3.7.: Distribution of acquirers’ and targets’ number of segments in corporate transactions
This table shows the number of acquirers’ and targets’ number of segments reported in
different industries in corporate transactions. Proportion denotes the share of acquir-
ers/targets clustered by the number of segments reported in different industries on the
total number of transactions reported in this table.
Number of segments target
acq/tgt 1 2 3 4 5 Proportion
Number of segments 1 95 33 8 3 0 40%
acquirer 2 56 30 12 6 0 30%
3 28 19 9 7 1 18%
4 11 13 5 3 0 9%
5 2 2 2 0 0 2%
6 0 4 0 0 0 1%
Proportion 55% 29% 10% 5% 0%
Table 3.8.: Average match of the target segments to the acquirer segments dependent on the number
of segments in corporate transactions
This table shows the average match of the target segments to the acquirer segments in
corporate transactions dependent on the number of reported segments. Average q denotes
the average match of target segments to the acquirer segments per number of reported
segments by acquirer and target independent from the number of segments reported by
the transaction counterpart. See appendix for further explanation.
Number of segments target
acq/tgt 1 2 3 4 5 Average q
Number of segments 1 78% 39% 21% 17% 64%
acquirer 2 67% 66% 31% 38% 61%
3 71% 58% 70% 46% 20% 64%
4 45% 69% 33% 50% 54%
5 0% 50% 50% 33%
6 63% 63%
Average q 70% 56% 41% 39% 20%
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3.7. Diversification and the CAR of the acquirer
In Table 3.9 we examine the impact of target’s diversification on the cumulative
abnormal return of the acquirer by running a standard OLS regression. We integrate
the main independent variables, which describe diversification, and three further groups
of control variables: target, acquirer, and deal related variables. We also include buyer
characteristics, e.g. post- acquisition performance, firm size, and deal characteristics as
method of payment, relative deal size and bid premium.
Our results suggest that there is no statistically significant relationship between
the diversification of the target and the acquirer´s post-acquisition performance, inde-
pendent from whether we define diversification as operating in at least two or three
industries: none of the coefficients is significantly different from zero. Additionally none
of our different definitions of segment match variables has a significant impact on the
transaction performance. Thus our results confirm our hypothesis H3. We also find the
interaction term between diversification and excess value of the target as an estimate for
the conglomerate excess value does not display any significant coefficient. This result
implies that our estimate of the conglomerate discount of the target has only little im-
pact on the post-acquisition performance of the acquirer. These findings further support
our conjecture that acquirers see significantly lower potential in yielding additional value
by taking over discounted conglomerates with the intention of a bust-up or rearranging
and improving internal capital allocation than previous research from e.g., Berger and
Ofek (1995) suggests. Despite lower premiums paid, deal performance is not affected by
our measure for conglomerate discounts. As expected, cash deals display a significantly
better performance than stock deals or deals with mixed currency. Thus, negative excess
values of the target are related to higher post-acquisition performance. As this result
does not apply to conglomerates, it seems to be easier to remove inefficiencies of stand
alone target firms.
The results of our univariate analysis suggested that takeover attempts of diver-
sified targets are less often successful than of stand alone firms. Diversified firms are
able to use a wider range of defense strategies; additionally our simple model relation 3.9
suggests that the economic side effects for taking over a diversified firm and removing the
conglomerate inefficiencies, e.g., integration costs are significant. As a result manage-
ment entrenchment could be expected to be more severe in a diversified firm. Therefore
we analyze the impact of diversification on the relative deal performance, measured by
the ratio of cumulative abnormal return over bid premium for different subsamples re-
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Table 3.9.: Regression for the impact of target’s diversification on post-acquisition performance
This table shows the results of the regression for the post-acquisition performance. The
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return from day -2 to day +2 relative to
the bid announcement for acquiring firms of the targets. DIVERSIFIED tgt is 1 if the
target reports more than 1 segment in year t, and if the largest segment accounts for less
than 90% of the sales and is 0 otherwise. DEGDIV tgt is the target number of segments
with different industry codes according to Fama-French-48 classification in t. EXV tgt is
the excess value of the target in t based on sales multiples as defined in Berger and Ofek
(1995). DIV * EXV tgt is an interaction variable, which is the product of the diversification
variable DIVERSIFIED tgt and EXV tgt. PRECAR is the abnormal return for the year
before the transaction. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in t deflated to 2001.
MOP is the method of payment: 2 denotes full cash payment, 1 mixed payment and 0 full
equity payment. REL SIZE is the relative size between target and acquirer. tgt-variables
describe targets, all other variables reflect acquirer or deal characteristics. BID PREMIUM
is the bid premium paid in the acquisition. SEG MATCH ACQ is the share of the revenue
of the acquirer generated in an industry, in which the target also operates. SEG MATCH
TGT is the share of the revenue of the target genrated in an industry, in which the acquirer
also operates and SEG MATCH TOT is the share of the total revenue genrated by the
acquirer and the target in the same industries. The upper figure shows the regression
coefficient the lower figure in parenthesis displays the corresponding robust standard error.
* (**,***) denotes the (two-sided) statistical significance on a 10% (5%,1%) level.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DIVERSIFIED tgt -0.009
(0.015)
> SEGMENTS tgt 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.007
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
EXV tgt -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
DIV * EXV tgt 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
PRECAR -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
SIZE -0.005 -0.005 -0.007** -0.007* -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
MOP 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
REL SIZE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BID PREMIUM -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SEG MATCH ACQ -0.008
(0.011)
SEG MATCH TGT -0.005
(0.010)
SEG MATCH TOT -0.009
(0.011)
Intercept 0.038 0.039 0.068 0.064 0.069
(0.046) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047)
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.162 0.182 0.181 0.182
F-statistics 4.58 4.51 4.47 4.44 4.47
Observations 212 212 206 206 206
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flecting different levels of target resistance. To exclude potential effects of higher target
resistance we create a subsample without management resistance consisting solely of
friendly transactions.21
Table 3.10 shows the results of the regressions. In this subsample management re-
sistance of (diversified) targets does not (substantially) influence the deal performance.
Nevertheless, target diversification has in no subsample significant impact on the the
post-announcement return. These results suggest that potential management resistance
of diversified acquirers does not explain why buyers of conglomerates do not gain (sig-
nificantly) positive abnormal returns, although they pay lower bid premiums.
We find that acquirers of diversified firms despite paying a lower premium do
not earn superior returns. We conclude from this result that the lower premium prop-
erly reflects the of lower net benefits of acquiring a diversified target compared to the
net benefits of a stand alone target acquisition. The reason for lower net benefits are
lower synergies and higher integration costs exceeding potential benefits from reducing
perceived conglomerate inefficiencies.
3.8. Conclusion
In this study we investigate the attractiveness of conglomerates compared to focused
firms, i.e. we examine the impact of diversification on takeover likelihood, bid premium
and post-acquisition return. We run our analysis from 2001 to 2008 by using a worldwide
sample of more than 24,000 firm years.
With respect to our three hypotheses we derive the following results: First, we
find that conglomerates are significantly less likely to be acquired. Increasing diversi-
fication is negatively related to a firm’s attractiveness as a takeover target. Therefore,
higher entrenchment of current management appears to be a potential side product of
diversification.
Second, we find that the premium paid for a target that is engaged in more than
two different industries is also significantly lower than for stand alone targets. This find-
ing suggests inthat in the majority of corporate transactions the higher integration costs
and lower synergies compared to standalones exceed the potential benefits of harvesting
a conglomerate discount by removing conglomerate inefficiencies after the acquisition.
21 We create two further subsamples: one consisting of targets that have no excess cash and one
including only deals in which the target is relatively small compared to its acquirer (i.e., relative
deal size of about 10% or smaller).
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Table 3.10.: Regression for the impact of target’s diversification on post-acquisition performance of
friendly acquisitions
This table shows the results of the regression for the post-acquisition performance to the
bid premium paid for the target. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal
return from day -2 to day +2 relative to the bid announcement for acquiring firms of the
targets. DIVERSIFIED tgt is 1 if the target reports more than 1 segment in year t, and
if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the sales and 0 otherwise. PRECAR
is the abnormal return for the year before the transaction. GRSALES is the growth of
the sales from t-1 to t. LEVERAGE is the leverage of the firm in t. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets in t deflated to 2001. MTB is the market-to-book ratio in t.
MOP is the method of payment: 2 denotes full cash payment, 1 mixed payment and 0
full equity payment. tgt-variables describe targets, all other variables reflect acquirer or
deal characteristics. The upper figure shows the regression coefficient the lower figure
in parenthesis displays the corresponding robust standard error. * (**,***) denotes the
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Third, we find that despite the lower premium paid post-transaction returns for
acquirers of conglomerates are not higher than for stand alone firms. So, the market
reaction suggests that the lower bid premium properly reflects that the disadvantages of
higher integration costs and lower synergies exceed the benefits of value creation through
more efficient capital allocation or bust-ups.
The fact that acquirers of conglomerates do not realize significantly higher post-
acquisition returns, supports the conclusion that diversification creates takeover barriers
through higher integration costs and lower synergies compared to focused targets.
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Appendix
In Table 3.8 we report the average match of the target segments to the acquirer segments
dependent on the number of segments in corporate transactions. E.g., 78% in line 3,
column 3 denotes that the industry of the target’s segment matches the industry of the
acquirer’s segment in 78% of the observed transactions (in which the acquirer and the
target report segments in only one industry). 45% in line 6, column 3 denotes that
in 45% of the observed transactions (in which the acquirer reports segments in four
industries and the target reports segments in one industry), the industry in which the
target operates matches one industry in which the acquirer reports segments. 50% in
line 7, column 5 denotes that 50% of the target-segment-industries match the acquirer-
segment-industries for all observations, in which the acquirer reports segments in five
industries and the target reports segments in three industries. An average q of 56% in
column 4 denotes that 56% of the target-segment-industries match the acquirer-segment-
industries for all observations, in which the target reports segments in two industries.
In Table 3.15 we show the results of several multicollinearity tests. We measure for
each dependent variable of our takeover likelihood regression the variance inflation factor
(VIF) to quantify the increase of variance entailed by collinearity. The square root of
the VIF quotes how much the standard error of each variable has been heightened by
collinearity. R2 indicates to what extent a variable statistically depends on the other
regressors and is the fundament for determining the tolerance
In figure 3.1 and 3.2 we show the relationship between bid premium and post-
announcement returns for all targets (1) and diversified targets only (2). Both figures
provide strong support for the notion that either post-announcement return does not
depend on bid premium or is already reflected in the price for the target, i.e. bid pre-
mium. These findings are in line with those by Laamanen (2007) and Mortal and Schill
(2010) who argue that it is rather the asset growth effect than the deal characteristics,
which drives the post-acquisition performance.
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Table 3.11.: Distribution targets among years
This table shows the distribution of the targets from 2001 to 2008 splitted between stand-
alone and diversified firms. A firm is diversified if it reports more than 1 different segment
according to Fama-French-48 and if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the
firm’s sales and is stand-alone otherwise. The column Share Diversified provides the
percentage of diverisifed targets on on all targets in our sample within the according year
Year Stand-alone Diversified Share Diversified
2001 15 3 17%
2002 25 3 11%
2003 39 6 13%
2004 36 15 29%
2005 53 14 21%
2006 59 17 22%
2007 59 13 18%
2008 26 5 16%
Total 312 76 20%
Table 3.12.: Distribution of industry matching q over transaction with diversified targets
This table shows the number of transactions in which the sales of diversified targets are
generated in industries, which are also reported by the acquirer. q is the share of the
target sales in industries also reported by the acquirer.
q q=1 1>q>0.8 0.8>q>0.6 0.6>q>0.4 0.4>q>0.2 q<0.2
Transactions 31 0 11 63 26 26
Percentage 20% 0% 7% 40% 17% 17%
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Table 3.13.: Regression for the drivers of bid premiumss paid in acquisitions
This table shows the results of the regression for the bid premiums paid for the target.
The dependent variable is the bid premium paid in an acquisition. DIVERSIFIED (>2
SEGMENTS) is 1 if the target reports more than 1 (2) segment(s) in year t, and if the
largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the sales and is 0 otherwise. GRSALES
is the sales growth from t-2 to t-1. LEVERAGE is the firm’s leverage in t-1. MOP is
the method of payment: 2 denotes full cash payment, 1 mixed payment and 0 full equity
payment. REL SIZE is the relative size between target and acquirer. PUB LIST ACQ is
1 if the acquirer is publicly listed and 0 otherwise. The upper figure shows the regression
coefficient the lower figure in parenthesis displays the corresponding robust standard
error. * (**,***) denotes the (two-sided) statistical significance on a 10% (5%,1%) level.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
DIVERSIFIED -6.093* -5.812
(3.662) (3.651)
>2 SEGMENTS -7.185** -7.443**
(3.283) (3.246)
GRSALES 3.287 3.297 3.355 3.362
(2.046) (2.060) (2.056) (2.069)
LEVERAGE -25.988*** -26.505*** -26.010*** -26.521***
(7.424) (7.421) (7.309) (7.294)
MOP 7.673*** 7.558*** 7.444*** 7.343***
(1.960) (1.961) (1.943) (1.948)
REL SIZE -0.304 -0.329 -0.235 -0.263
(0.300) (0.311) (0.300) (0.311)
PUB LIST ACQ -4.560 -4.497
(5.249) (5.289)
Intercept 23.043*** 23.717*** 22.970*** 23.634***
(2.931) (2.981) (2.911) (2.975)
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.107 0.108 0.107
F-statistics 10.17 8.53 10.34 8.62
Observations 298 298 298 298
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Table 3.14.: Data sample development
This table shows the development of our post-acquisition performance sample in Table 3.9,
starting with the number of transactions drawn from the Zephyr database and reduced
by the inclusion of variables.
Steps Observations left
Zephyr database 2,339
Targets in Datastream 1,543
Inclusion of CAR 1,302
Inclusion of DIVERSIFIED tgt 334
Inclusion of EXV tgt 290
Inclusion of SIZE 273
Inclusion of MOP 262
Inclusion of REL SIZE 262
Inclusion of PRECAR 262
Inclusion of BID PREMIUM 212
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Table 3.15.: Multicollinearity test
This table shows the results of tests for multicollinearity. Column 2 shows the variance
inflation factors and column 3 its square roots for each independent variable. Column 4
displays R2 for each variable to examine the statistical dependence of a variable to the
other regressors. Column 5 exhibits the tolerance which is 1-R2. DIVERSIFIED is 1
if the firm reports more than 1 different segment according to Fama-French-48 industry
classification in t-1, and if the largest segment accounts for less than 90% of the firm’s
sales and 0 otherwise. EXV is the excess value in t-1 based on sales multiples as defined
in Berger and Ofek (1995). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in t-1 deflated
to 2001. AR is the abnormal return in year t-1, MTB the market-to-book ratio in t-1 PE
is the price earnings ratio in t-1, NWC is the net working capital in t-1 and LEVERAGE
firm’s leverage in t-1. GRSALES is the sales growth from t-2 to t-1. The regional
dummies ASIA, EUROPE and PACIFIC BASIN are 1 if the firm year is in that region
and 0 otherwise. The year dummies are 1 if the firm year is in that yeary and 0 otherwise.
Variable VIF SQRT VIF R2 Tolerance
DIVERSIFIED 1.06 1.03 0.055 0.945
EXV 1.74 1.32 0.426 0.575
SIZE 1.41 1.19 0.291 0.709
AR 1.06 1.03 0.057 0.943
MTB 1.05 1.02 0.045 0.955
PE 1.02 1.01 0.022 0.978
NWC 1.23 1.11 0.184 0.816
LEVERAGE 1.19 1.09 0.158 0.842
GRSALES 1.03 1.02 0.030 0.970
EXCESS CASH 1.17 1.08 0.148 0.852
ASIA 1.85 1.36 0.458 0.542
EUROPE 1.13 1.06 0.114 0.886
PACIFIC BASIN 1.07 1.04 0.070 0.930
2003 1.83 1.35 0.453 0.548
2004 1.90 1.38 0.472 0.528
2005 2.06 1.43 0.514 0.486
2006 2.07 1.44 0.516 0.484
2007 2.09 1.45 0.523 0.477
2008 2.08 1.44 0.519 0.481
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Figure 3.1.: Relationship between bid premium and CAR
This figure shows the relationship between the bid premium paid in an acquisition and
the post-announcement returns for the acquirer
Figure 3.2.: Relationship between bid premium and CAR
This figure shows the relationship between the bid premium paid in an acquisition and
the post-announcement returns for the acquirer. This analysis only contains of deals with
diversified targets.
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